Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2017 05-May-2017 08-Mar-2017 No n/a Yes. Alectra Inc. has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Horizon Utilities rate zone covering the Hamilton and St. Catharine's service areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (IMS) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra system controllers (and others as required) is performed on a regular basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is performed. Strong winds impacting the Hamilton and St. Catharines service areas commenced at 11:06am. The strong winds continued through the remainder of the day and were the root cause of the majority of outages. The total customer minutes of interruptions experienced on March 8, 2017 due to outages that started on the same day exceeded the Major Event Day threshold of 1.84 million customer minutes. 9 hours No. Yes. 1. ETRs were published on Horizon Utilities? website, in addition to an outage map. 2. Alectra Utilities' Corporate Communications teams issued ETR notices for each outage that occurred during the extreme weather event via Twitter, that included a link to Horizon Utilities? website. Any responses to customers' messages via Twitter also included ETRs. Alectra Utilities is taking steps, as follows: 1) Providing contingency training to staff regarding backup power supplies for automated switches. 2) Improving the damage assessment process, prioritization of response strategy, and improving communications to field staff are future strategies in development. 3) Implementing programming changes to increase website response time for customers accessing outage information for the Hamilton and St. Catharines service areas. 4) Revising 3rd party call centre service provider training to address gaps that became apparent since this was the first MED for which the service provider was on call. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2017 29-May-2017 07-Apr-2017 No. N/A Yes. Alectra Inc. has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the PowerStream rate zone covering the Alliston, Aurora, Barrie, Beeton, Bradford, Markham, Penetanguishene, Richmond Hill, Thornton, Tottenham and Vaughan service areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (IMS) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra system controllers (and others as required) is performed on a regular basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is performed. High winds gusting up to 76km/h and blowing snow/rain/ice accretion in portions of the Simcoe County service area caused "galloping" of conductors and equipment failure. Temperature ranged between 0 and -4 C. Galloping is the high-amplitude, low-frequency oscillation of overhead power lines due to wind. The total customer minutes of interruptions experienced on April 7, 2017 due to outages that started on the same day exceeded the Major Event Day threshold of 2.2 million customer minutes. 9 hours. No. Yes. 1. ETRs were published on the outage map available on the Alectra-PowerStream website. 2. ETRs were provided in email notifications to customers and on the Outage Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. 3. ETRs were provided via the Alectra_YorkSim (@PowerStreamNews) Twitter channel. 1. Additional spacers are being deployed between circuits to prevent galloping conductors short circuiting during severe weather conditions. 2. Engineering is improving the design for the pole infrastructure where the galloping conductor issues occurred. 3. Processes and procedures in place for Major Events were reviewed events with staff to seek opportunities to improve the system and outage restoration efforts. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2017 13-Dec-2017 15-Oct-2017 3:04 PM No, as weather alerts were issued at the time of the storm. The distributor did not have prior warning. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Enersource rate zone, covering the City of Mississauga. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Winds up to 102km/h were recorded at Pearson Airport. This not only impacted the Enersource Rate Zone but neighbouring municipalities as well. This is outside of the control of Alectra Utilities as the event was not caused by any defects in our electrical system. The outages on October 15th, 2017 amounted to a SAIDI of 5.70 which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 3.03. 90% of the customers were restored in 5 hours and 34 minutes. No. Given the nature/severity of the event, mutual assistance was not required. Yes. 1. ETRS were provided via the Alectra Utilities Enersource Rate Zone Twitter Channel (@ alectra_Sauga) 2. ETRs were published on the outage map which was available on the Alectra Utilities-Enersource Website. Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as the Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2017 13-Dec-2017 15-Oct-2017 3:13 PM (D No, as weather alerts were issued at the time of the storm. The distributor did not have prior warning. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the PowerStream rate zone covering the Alliston, Aurora, Barrie, Beeton, Bradford West Gwillimbury, Markham, Penetanguishene, Richmond Hill, Thornton, Tottenham and Vaughan service areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (IMS) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is performed. Peak wind recorded at Pearson Airport was 102km/h at 3:22PM EDT. In post event discussion with Environment Canada, based on the damage done in and around the GTA and other parts of Southern Ontario, there could have been peak winds in the 110 to 120 km/h range. These winds in Vaughan caused pole failures in several locations. The total customer minutes of interruptions experienced was 5,430,744 on October 15, 2017 on the same day exceeded the Major Event Day threshold of 2.2 million customer minutes. 90% of the customers interrupted were restored within 4 hours. No. Given the nature/severity of the event, mutual assistance was not required. Yes. 1. ETRs were published on the outage map available on the Alectra Utilities (PowerStream Rate Zone) website. 2. ETRs were provided in email notifications to customers and on the Outage Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. 3. ETRs were provided via the Alectra_YorkSim (@PowerStreamNews) Twitter channel. Alectra Utilities has developed and undertaken a storm hardening initiative that incorporates the following: 1. Storm hardening ? Pole upgrades 2. Additional guying of overhead system Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 11-May-2018 12-Mar-2018 03:53 AM No, a vehicular collision caused the event. The distributor did not have prior warning. Yes, Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Brampton rate zone. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of the Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and a continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Foreign Interference is an OEB cause category for Major Events. These types of events are outside of the control of Alectra Utilities. The SAIDI minute per day was 4.94 on March 12 which exceeded the threshold of 3.11 for the Brampton Rate Zone. 2.95 hours to restore 90% of the customers. Yes, private construction contractors were used. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System 2) Twitter Alectra Utilities will review data to determine the likelihood of a similar event, if such an event is possible the pole may be relocated or the line placed underground. Additional remote switching will also be investigated to reduce the duration of potential of future outages. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 04-Jun-2018 04-Apr-2018 09:21 AM There was a Wind Warning issued at 12:35PM on April 4, 2018 by Toronto Police Operations. Environment Canada indicated that strong westerly winds will push through the area in the afternoon with wind gusts of up to 90 km/h. The warning was issued at 12:35PM on April 4, 2018, so no additional employees were on duty or on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. Alectra Utilities? daily availability of staff in the Enersource Rate Zone is as follows: 1. On Call Line Supervisor 2. 2 Lines Managers and Operations Director available 3. 24/7 Trouble truck( 2 trucks on days and one at night) - 2 journeyman per truck 4. 24/7 Control Room 5. A Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 6. B Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 7. RBD Operator - journeyman 8. Substation person ? 1 substation electrician 9. On Call Control Room operator 10. Stores person ? one Storekeeper 11. Emergency call out list - approximately 70 lineman/ apprentices, 3 forestry and various Lines/Forestry contractors available Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Enersource Rate Zone covering the City of Mississauga. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Gusts up to 91km/h were recorded at Pearson Airport. This not only impacted the Enersource Rate Zone, but neighbouring municipalities as well. This is outside of the control of Alectra Utilities as the event was not caused by any defects in its electrical system. The outages on April 4th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 5.35, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 2.92. 90% of the customers were restored in 9 hours. No. Yes. 1. ETRS were provided via the Alectra Utilities Twitter Channel (@alectranews) 2. ETRs were published on the outage map which was available on the Alectra-Enersource Website. Staff training is part of an ongoing process, per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 14-Jun-2018 14-Apr-2018 10:58 AM Environment Canada issued an ice storm warning at approximately 9:39am on April 13, 2018. Alectra Utilities did arrange to have extra employees on duty and on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. The staffing arrangements were as follows: Control Room: An additional 2 operators were scheduled for the April 14, 2018 Nightshift, for a total of 3 operators. Lines: All Lines staff employees were notified of the pending storm conditions and were on standby. Further, additional on call crews were assigned in both Hamilton and St. Catharines. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Horizon Utilities Rate Zone covering the Cities of Hamilton and St. Catharines. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Hamilton / St. Catharines areas with frequent gusts near 90 km/h the night of April 14 continuing into the morning of April 15, with a few gusts of 100 km/h. There were also periods of freezing rain and ice pellets during the event. This not only affected the Horizon Rate Zone, but also neighbouring municipalities, as well. This is outside of the control of Alectra Utilities, as the event was not caused by any defects in its electrical system. The outages on April 14, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 9.35, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 8.19. 90% of the customers were restored in 6 hours. Yes, third parties were notified prior to the event and were required to assist in the restoration of power. Private electrical construction contractors and Tree contractors were utilized. Yes. 1. ETRS were provided via the Alectra Utilities Twitter Channel (@alectranews) 2. ETRs were published on the outage map which was available on the Alectra-Horizon Utilities Website. Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 15-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 2:55 PM Environment Canada issued an ice storm warning at approximately 9:39am on April 13, 2018. Alectra Utilities? daily availability of staff in the Enersource Rate Zone is as follows: 1. On Call Line Supervisor 2. 2 Lines Managers and Operations Director available 3. 24/7 Trouble truck( 2 trucks on days and one at night) - 2 journeyman per truck 4. 24/7 Control Room 5. A Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 6. B Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 7. RBD Operator - journeyman 8. Substation person ? 1 substation electrician 9. On Call Control Room operator 10. Stores person ? one Storekeeper 11. Emergency call out list - approximately 70 linemen/ apprentices, 3 forestry and various Lines/Forestry contractors available Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the former Enersource rate zone covering the City of Mississauga. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities? system controllers (and others as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Mississauga area with frequent gusts near 90 km/h on the night of April 14, continuing into the morning of April 15, with a few gusts of 100 km/h. There were also periods of freezing rain and ice pellets during the event. This not only affected the Enersource Rate Zone, but also neighbouring municipalities. This is outside of the control of Alectra Utilities, as the event was not caused by any defects in its electrical system. The outages on April 15th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 3.02, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 2.92. 90% of the customers were restored in 4 hours. No. Yes. 1. ETRS were provided via the Alectra Utilities Twitter Channel (@alectranews) 2. ETRs were published on the outage map which was available on the Alectra-Enersource Website. Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 2:12 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement at 13:00 hrs Eastern Standard Time for strong winds and gusts of 90-100km/h for the Hamilton and St. Catharines area. Alectra Utilities did arrange to have extra employees on duty and on standby, prior to the commencement of the Major Event. The staffing arrangements were as follows: Control Room: A total of five operators were scheduled for a regular dayshift. On nightshift, an additional three operators were called in and remained until 23:30hrs. Following the nightshift the standard complement of two operators were scheduled until the next scheduled day shift. ? Dayshift 7:30-19:30 = 5 operators ? Evening 19:30 ? 23:30 = 5 operators ? Night 23:30 ? 7:30 = 2 operators Lines: All lines staff employees were notified of the pending weather conditions and were asked to make themselves available, if required. There were two crews on standby in St. Catharines and three crews on standby in Hamilton. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Horizon Utilities rate zone covering the Cities of Hamilton and St. Catharines. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff that participated in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities? system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Hamilton and St.Catharines area with frequent gusts near 90-100 km/h on May 4. The outages on May 4th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 52.87, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 8.19. 90% of the customers were restored within 18 hours (May 4th 14:00 hrs- May 5th 08:00hrs) Yes, Alectra Utilities utilized assistance of private construction contractors, forestry contractors, and the third party IVR Company. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System, 2) Twitter Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 2:56 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement at 13:00 hrs Eastern Standard Time for strong winds and gusts of 90-100km/h for the Vaughan and Barrie area. Alectra Utilities did arrange to have extra employees on duty and on standby, prior to the commencement of the Major Event. The staffing arrangements were as follows: Alectra Utilities arranged for eight additional staff members for the Control Room to deal with outage and other related events through the evening and overnight. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the PowerStream rate zone covering the Cities of Alliston, Aurora, Barrie, Beeton, Bradford West Gwillimbury, Markham, Penetanguishene, Richmond Hill Thornton, Tottenham and Vaughan. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff that participated in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities? system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Vaughan and Barrie area with frequent gusts near 90-100 km/h on May 4. The outages on May 4th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 51.09, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 5.83. 90% of the customers were restored within 8 Hours. No. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System, 2) Twitter Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 2:00 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement at 13:00 hrs Eastern Standard Time for strong winds and gusts of 90-100km/h for the Mississauga area. Alectra Utilities daily availability of staff in the Enersource Rate Zone is as follows: 1. On Call Line Supervisor 2. 2 Lines Managers and Operations Director available 3. 24/7 Trouble truck( 2 trucks on days and one at night) - 2 journeyman per truck 4. 24/7 Control Room 5. A Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 6. B Team ? on call team of 2 journeyman 7. RBD Operator - journeyman 8. Substation person ? 1 substation electrician 9. On Call Control Room operator 10. Stores person ? one Storekeeper 11. Emergency call out list - approximately 70 lineman/ apprentices, 3 forestry and various Lines/Forestry contractors available Additional staff were notified of the potential Major Event. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Enersource rate zone covering the City of Mississauga. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (IMS) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff that participated in the exercise. Training of Alectra system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Mississauga area with frequent gusts near 90-100 km/h on May 4. The outages on May 4th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 35.55, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 2.63. 90% of the customers were restored within 12 hours (May 4th 14:00 hrs- May 5th 02:00hrs) Yes, the third party IVR was utilized. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System, 2) Twitter Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 3:37 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement at 13:00 hrs Eastern Standard Time for strong winds and gusts of 90-100km/h for the Brampton area. Yes, extra Operators were assigned due to the Major Event. Further, all line staff employees were advised to be on standby, additional crews were organized for on-call duty, and private construction contractors were also notified. In addition, extra staff members were made available to provide operational support. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its four rate zones including the Brampton rate zone covering the City of Brampton. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff that participated in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities? system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for the Brampton area with frequent gusts near 90-100 km/h on May 4. The outages on May 4th, 2018 resulted in a SAIDI of 3.59, which exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold of 3.11. 90% of the customers were restored within 5.92 hours (May 4th 15:37 hrs- May 4th 21:32 hrs) Yes, private construction contractors, forestry contractors, and the third party IVR were utilized. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System, 2) Twitter Staff training is part of an ongoing process per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems such as an Incident Management System have been rolled out as part of regular training. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2020 22-Jan-2020 01-Dec-2019 07:00 AM ( No. Weather alerts did not come until the time the storm occurred. No arrangements were made, since no prior warning was provided. Yes. Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (?IMS?) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. Large ice accumulation over a prolonged period (Dec 1st from 6:00am to 12:00am) caused multiple wires to be down and equipment failures in several locations. At the peak of the ice storm (around 4:00pm), Alectra Utilities had 26,096 customers interrupted with over 91 outage events across Alectra Utilities? service territory. The total customer minutes of interruptions experienced on Dec 1st, 2019 (15.85 million customer minutes) exceeded the Major Event Day threshold of 2.97 million customer minutes. 90% of the customers were restored in 26 (twenty-six) hours (11:00am Dec 2nd) Yes, third parties were notified prior to the event and were required to assist in the restoration of power. Private electrical construction contractors and tree contractors were utilized. Yes. 1. ETRS were provided via the Alectra Utilities Twitter Channel (@alectranews) 2. ETRs were published on the outage map which was available on the Alectra Utilities Website. 3. ETRs were provided in email notifications to customers and on the Outage Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. 1. Staff training is part of an ongoing process as per the Alectra Utilities Emergency Plan. New systems, such as an Incident Management System, have been rolled out as part of regular training. 2. Tree trimming practices are being reviewed. 3. Alectra Utilities submitted an application to the OEB for additional funding which will address the ability to fault find and restore more efficiently, as well as greater storm resilience. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2020 03-Nov-2020 14-Sep-2020 07:23 AM No The outage was caused by an event at Newton TS, a Hydro One-owned Transformer Station (TS). A squirrel contact at the station on “Y Bus” tripped both the “B3” and “B4” high voltage transmission circuits affecting other Hydro One-owned stations: Dundas TS, Newton TS and Mohawk TS. These stations are servicing Alectra Utilities customers in the City of Hamilton. Alectra Utilities customers that are connected to Dundas TS and Mohawk TS were out of power until HONI transmission circuits were restored. Some of the Newton TS loads were transferred to alternate feeders from other stations, however, further restoration by Hydro One within Newton TS was required in order to restore power to the remaining Alectra Utilities customers. Power to these remaining customers was restored by 11:36 AM DST. Question 5: 3.88% of Alectra Utilities' customer base Question 6: It took 3 hours and 23 minutes to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted Dundas TS: 4,589 Customers experienced a momentary outage (<1 minute); Mohawk TS: 22,237 Customers were restored within 47 minutes; Newton TS: 14,445 Customers were restored within 3 hours and 23 minutes. From the very start of the event, Alectra Utilities issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily Twitter. Alectra Utilities responded to many customers through direct messaging on Facebook. In addition, Alectra Utilities received media calls and responded with the most up to date information about the cause and estimated time of restoration (“ETR”). Alectra Utilities posted an initial ETR with tentative restoration time of 13:00PM DST at approximately 7:45 AM DST on the website. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers was ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 41271 4 Yes No Others No Alectra Utilities undertook further discussions with Hydro One in regard to Newton TS station assets, specifically the replacement plan and animal abatement plan. Newton TS is an outdoor station and will require further investments to address potential animal contact issues. A review of the protection co-ordination will also be conducted by Hydro One to determine if all devices operated properly. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2020 12-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 01:00 PM Yes Environment Canada issued a wind warning for Toronto, Peel, and Halton regions. On Saturday, November 14, 2020, Alectra arranged to have additional Control Room staff on standby for Sunday, November 15 in anticipation of the adverse weather event. The additional staff were called in on Sunday, November 15. On November 15, 2020, high winds and rain caused trees outside of the right of way (ROW) to fall on primary circuits across the entire Alectra’s service territory. Long duration outages resulted, as trees were cleared and circuits were rebuilt. Prior the event, Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily via Twitter. In addition, Alectra responded to hundreds of customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Social media responses and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra sent out one News Release on November 15. Alectra also proactively communicated approximately 40 (forty) Safety Messages across Twitter, Instagram and Facebook. Four media interviews took place with the media spokesperson on November 16. Alectra received 3,800 clicks on Twitter to links that were provided to customers and over 2,000 engagements over the period of November 15 to 26. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 103486 10 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2022 26-Jan-2022 11-Dec-2021 13:00 Yes Environment Canada issued a wind warning for most of southern Ontario. In anticipation of the adverse weather event, additional staff were made available on December 11, 2021. Additionally, Alectra’s communications team continuously prepares for emergency situations. A full staff complement from the communications and government relations team were made aware of the incoming weather system and were asked to charge devices and remain on standby in the case of an event. Additional Comments for Item #3: Alectra informed customers of imminent adverse weather conditions based on information from Environment Canada. Information about the special weather statement and associated emergency preparedness messages were communicated to customers via social media channels (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram). The messages included emergency preparedness information from Alectra’s website and YouTube videos illustrating important safety messages. Additional Comments for Item #4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. On December 11, 2021, high winds and rain caused trees to fall on primary circuits across the entire Alectra’s service territory. Long duration outages resulted, as trees were cleared, and overhead circuits were repaired. Approximately 7 hours. • Prior the event, Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily Twitter. • In addition, Alectra responded to hundreds of customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. • Alectra issued a Media Release on December 11. https://www.alectra.com/news/alectra-crews-will-continue-working-through-night-restore-customers-impacted-high-winds • Alectra also proactively communicated Safety Messages across Twitter, Instagram and Facebook. • Several media interviews were conducted with the media spokesperson on December 11 and 12. Alectra used these opportunities to illustrate the restoration efforts and provide safety information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 86128 7.9 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2022 06-Jun-2022 15-Apr-2022 12:48 PM Yes Environment and Climate Change Canada issued a wind warning, which initially anticipated wind gusts of 80 km/hour. As the afternoon progressed, Environment and Climate Change Canada revised the warning to predict wind gusts of 90 km/hour. The website, “The Weather Network” later indicated, St. Catharines experienced wind gusts of 123 km/hour, which is equivalent to the strength of a Category 1 hurricane. In anticipation of the adverse weather event, additional staff were made available on April 15, 2022. Alectra’s communications team continuously prepares for emergencies. Full staff complements from the communications and government relations team were made aware of the incoming weather system and were asked to charge devices and remain on standby in the case of an event. Additional Comments for Q3: Alectra’s communications teams continuously informs customers how to prepare for major events. Messages include how to prepare a 72-hour emergency preparedness kit, what to do before, during, and after an outage, and how power is restored. Safety messages are communicated via social media channels (primarily Twitter, Facebook and Instagram). Prior the event, Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily Twitter. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted annually. Exercises must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. On April 15, 2022, high winds and rain caused trees to fall on primary circuits and caused broken poles in Alectra’s West service territory. Long duration outages resulted, as trees were cleared, and overhead circuits were repaired. N/A During the event, Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily Twitter. Tweets provided ETR to customers, as well as location, number of customers affected, and the cause of the outage. Social media response were ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. In addition, Alectra responded to customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 46884 4.3 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes N/A Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2022 06-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 11:24 EST Yes Environment and Climate Change Canada issued a thunderstorm warning for Ontario on May 21, 2022. The following locations that are serviced by Alectra Utilities were anticipated to be impacted by 130 km/hour wind gusts, nickel to toonie-sized hail, and risk of tornadoes: Hamilton, Dundas, Waterdown, Ancaster, Rockwood, Brampton, Mississauga, Richmond Hill, Vaughan, Markham and Aurora. In anticipation of the thunderstorm, additional Control Room and Lines staff were made available on May 21, 2022. Alectra’s Communications team regularly prepares for emergencies. Full staff complements from the Communications and Government Relations teams were made aware of the incoming weather system and were asked to charge devices and remain on standby in the case of an event. Additional Comments for Q3: Alectra’s Communications team regularly informs customers regarding how to prepare for major events. Messages include how to prepare a 72-hour emergency preparedness kit, what to do before, during, and after an outage, and how power is restored. Safety messages are communicated via social media channels (primarily Twitter, Facebook and Instagram). Alectra’s Communications team updated the banner message on alectrautilities.com and posted media releases on the homepage. Additionally, safety messages and videos were posted across all social media channels. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted annually. Exercises are debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities’ system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and regular review of the Emergency Plan is undertaken. On May 21, 2022, strong winds and rain caused havoc on the overhead infrastructure throughout Alectra’s service territory. In the Central and East regions, broken poles were caused by either strong winds or fallen trees and branches. The West and Southwest regions were also impacted by outages due to tree contacts and adverse weather. Tree contacts due to high winds accounted for 43.51% and adverse weather accounted for 50.60% of the total customer-hours of interruption (“CHI”) (1,515,746.90) associated with the MED. During the event, Alectra’s Communications team issued two (2) media releases on the homepage, conducted nearly 20 media interviews with CTV, CBC, CP24, as well as radio, print and online media outlets to inform customers of restoration efforts. Alectra’s Communications team issued multiple notices via social media channels – primarily Twitter. Tweets provided an estimated time of restoration (“ETR”) (when available) to customers, as well as the location, number of customers affected, and cause of the outage. Safety messages and videos that were posted across all social media channels, were reiterated via media interviews. Alectra’s Communications team also responded to customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra’s Government Relations team communicated by email and phone with municipal leaders of the areas affected by restoration efforts. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 297650 28 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2022 11-Oct-2022 17-Sep-2022 13:33 EST No Hydro One Networks Inc. (HONI) indicated that a tractor trailer crashed into one of HONI’s distribution network poles. This resulted in a Loss of Supply event for Alectra. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted annually. Exercises are debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities’ system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and regular review of the Emergency Plan is undertaken. On September 17, 2022, HONI reported a tractor trailer collided with one of HONI’s distribution network poles near Highway 12 and Triple Bay Road, in Tay Township. The pole supports HONI 44kV feeders 98M3 and 98M7 out of Waubaushene transformer station (TS). These feeders are the only supply to the Town of Penetanguishene. Both feeders are in parallel on the same structures for 21.3 km from the Waubaushene TS to Penetanguishene. The 98M3 also supplies MS421 Fox Station and MS422 Robert Station. As a result of the incident, customers supplied from these municipal station feeders were also impacted. The pole was isolated, and customers remained without power for the duration of the pole replacement by HONI. Of Alectra's total customer base of 1,082,316 customers, 0.36% (3,923 customers) experienced an interruption during the major event. During the event, Alectra’s Communications team issued notices via social media channels, primarily Twitter. Tweets provided an estimated time of restoration (“ETR”) (when available) to customers, as well as the location, number of customers affected, and cause of the outage. Alectra’s Communications team also responded to customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra’s Government Relations team communicated by email and phone with municipal leaders of the areas affected by restoration efforts. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3923 0 No No No further action is required at this time No Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2023 16-Jan-2023 23-Dec-2022 7:51 AM Yes Environment Canada issued a major winter storm warning for southern Ontario. In anticipation of the adverse weather event, Alectra’s staff were briefed on forecasted weather and additional staff were made available from December 21 through December 25, 2022. Additionally, Alectra’s Corporate Communications Team was on standby in anticipation of the weather event to advise customers and to provide updates to disruptions and/or emergency situations. Additional Comments for Q3: Alectra informed customers of imminent adverse weather conditions and associated emergency preparedness via social media channels (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram). The communication included emergency preparedness information from Alectra’s website and YouTube videos illustrating important safety messages. A proactive News Release also was sent out over Canada NewsWire on December 21st (“Incoming storm may cause power outages, Alectra reminds customers to ensure mobile devices are charged and emergency kits are ready.”) This release was picked up by multiple news outlets and Alectra’s Media Spokesperson was interviewed. The release was subsequently picked up by Global News, St Catharines Standard, 105.9 The Region, News Talk 610, CTV Morning Live, and CTV News. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises be conducted annually. Exercises are debriefed and critiqued, and a written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities’ system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and regular review of the Emergency Plan is also undertaken. On December 23, 2022, there was a major winter storm with wind gusts up to 110 km/hour, rain, snow, and flash freezing which resulted in long duration outages across Alectra’s service territory. There were also fallen trees and broken conductors which required repair. During the event, Alectra’s Communications Team responded to incoming customer inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. Social media response, including updated estimated time of restoration (“ETR”) messaging was ongoing throughout the day until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra also communicated Safety Messages across the social media channels. Several media interviews were conducted with the media spokesperson on December 21, 22, 23, and 24. Alectra used these opportunities to illustrate the restoration efforts and provide safety information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 58206 5.4 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2024 23-Apr-2024 28-Feb-2024 3:12 PM Yes Weather alerts were provided by the media warning of abnormal weather conditions for Ontario including strong winds and rainfall. In anticipation of the adverse weather event, additional staff were made available on February 28, 2024. Additionally, Alectra’s Communications team regularly prepares for emergency situations. Full staff complements from the Communications and Government Relations teams were made aware of the incoming weather system and were asked to charge devices and remain on standby in the case of an event. Additional Comments for Q3: Alectra informed customers of imminent adverse weather conditions based on information from Environment Canada. The special weather statement and associated emergency preparedness messages were communicated to customers via social media channels X (formerly known as Twitter), Facebook and Instagram. The messages included emergency preparedness information from Alectra’s website and YouTube videos illustrating important safety messages. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. The supply to 5,240 customers from the towns of Beeton and Tottenham was affected when the Everett TS 138M8 44kV feeder breaker locked out on February 28, 2024, at 3:12 p.m. Alectra crews observed an uprooted customer owned tree on the overhead circuits at the rear of Eastern Avenue, just north of Mill St MS. The Everett TS 138M8 44kV feeder, the Nolan Rd MS834-F1 and the Mill St MS835-F3 8.32 kV feeders traverse the rear of Eastern Avenue along the CN Railway. At the time of the outage, Tottenham was experiencing 65-70 km per hour maximum wind gusts. A high amount of precipitation on February 27 and 28 totaling 16 mm would have been a contributing factor to the uprooted customer owned tree, coupled with strong winds. 5,240 customers (sustained outages only) were interrupted during the Major Event. An additional 1,995 customers were interrupted during system restoration for 6 minutes. Prior the event, Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels (primarily X). In addition, Alectra responded to dozens of customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook, Instagram and X. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the evening until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra also proactively communicated Safety Messages across X, Instagram and Facebook. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5240 0 No No System upgrades No Yes Yes The Everett TS 138M8 44 kV feeder is susceptible to loss of supply and fallen trees. To reduce the outage impact, five (5) 44 kV remote operated switches, one automated switchgear, two (2) 13.8 kV remote operated switches and construction of 1km of 44 kV overhead line will be required. Alectra Utilities Corporation Alectra Utilities Corporation 2024 10-Oct-2024 17-Aug-2024 10:27 AM Yes Weather alerts were provided by Environment Canada and other media sources warning of severe weather conditions, including thunderstorms and flooding in association with Tropical Storm Ernesto. In anticipation of the adverse weather event, additional staff were made available on August 17, 2024. Additionally, Alectra’s Communications team regularly prepares for emergency situations. On-call staff from the Communications and Government Relations teams were made aware of the incoming weather system and asked to charge devices and remain on standby in case of an event. Additional Comments for Q3: Alectra informed customers of imminent adverse weather conditions based on information from Environment Canada. The special weather statement and associated emergency preparedness messages were communicated to customers via social media channels X (formerly known as Twitter) and Facebook. The messages included information for customers on reporting an outage through the Contact Centre by phone, website forms and web chat, as well as YouTube videos related to safety and emergency preparedness. Additional Comments for Q4: Alectra Utilities has a Corporate Emergency Plan supported by individual Emergency Plans for each of its operational areas. The Emergency Plan is based on the Incident Management System (“IMS”) and requires training exercises to be conducted on an annual basis. Each exercise must be debriefed and critiqued, and a brief written summary of the debriefing is distributed to all staff participating in the exercise. Training of Alectra Utilities system controllers (and others, as required) is performed on an ongoing basis, and continual review of the Emergency Plan is completed. On August 17, 2024, a severe thunderstorm resulted in flooding, road closures and widespread power outages across the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Environment Canada reported a single-day record total rainfall of 128.3mm at Toronto Pearson International Airport. Flash floods occurred in multiple areas within the GTA, and a tornado touched down 90 km west of Mississauga in the community of Ayr. Supply to customers in Alectra’s Mississauga, Brampton, Guelph, Vaughan, Markham, Richmond Hill, and Alliston service territories were impacted. Seventeen sustained outages were caused by lightning and adverse weather. An additional 46 momentary interruptions occurred. The over-voltages from lightning strikes caused equipment failure and adverse weather conditions delayed outage restoration timelines. A total of 39,923 customers experienced sustained outages due to adverse weather conditions during the Major Event. Supply to 90% of the affected customers was restored by 6:36 p.m., approximately 8 hours after the Major Event began. Alectra issued multiple notices via social media channels (primarily X). In addition, Alectra responded to dozens of customers’ inquiries through direct messaging on Facebook and X. Social media response and updated ETRs to customers were ongoing throughout the evening until the power supply was fully restored. Alectra also proactively communicated Safety Messages across X and Facebook. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 39923 4 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes n/a Alectra Utilities Corporation Guelph Hydro Electric Systems Inc. 2018 12-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 11:48 AM Yes, Guelph Hydro was aware of severe weather forecasts leading up to the Major Event. Environment Canada issued a wind warning shortly before 11:00 a.m. on May 4, 2018, indicating that wind gusts between 90 and 100 km/h were possible on this day in Guelph and surrounding areas. Environment Canada noted that damage to buildings and tree branches were possibilities given forecasted high winds. A severe thunderstorm watch was also issued by Environment Canada. Guelph Hydro did not have any extra employees on duty or stand-by other than its normal two-person on-call crew and on-call supervisor. Guelph Hydro did not have any extra employees on duty or standby for communications support; however, Guelph Hydro?s regular communications staff were ready to respond in the event of any power outages during or after normal business hours. The Guelph Hydro Control Room follows its emergency plan and has on-call supervisors who have the authority to declare an emergency and alert the operation crews. The Control Room provides training on its emergency plan once a year. Guelph Hydro?s Communications staff has received training in crisis communications and media relations. The company has a Crisis Communications Plan in place and power outage communications are considered a typical communications function. Customer Service has developed a Crisis Communication Plan designed specifically for Customer Service and Billing. The Crisis Communication Plan is reviewed twice a year. Using the IEEE 1366-2012 method, Guelph Hydro has established a major event day threshold (?Tmed?) of 6.473 Average Customer Minutes for 2018 events. The observed SAIDI of the major event day is 12.28 Average Customer Minutes (679,044 customer minutes)/(55,296 customers). The event involved loss of supply interruptions (which made up 86.21% of the customer minutes interrupted). The event was also related to a wind storm weather event which was outside of the control of Guelph Hydro. Guelph Hydro restored 90% of interrupted customers within 5 hours. With respect to outage communications, there was no assistance required through a third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes, Guelph Hydro issued estimated times of restoration for the Rockwood outage via Twitter when it was learned that there was a loss of supply from Hydro One. (See attached list of tweets ? Appendix A.) Guelph Hydro?s distribution system in Rockwood has been upgraded with the completion of Rockwood MS1 reconstruction. This allows the majority of load in the village to be supplied by either Rockwood MS1 or Rockwood MS2 which are fed by different bulk supply feeders. During this event, all bulk supply outages were related to the Hydro One 73M4 and 73M8 44kV feeders from Hydro One Fergus TS. Guelph Hydro?s Communications staff is on alert for emergencies and major events and regularly reviews the Crisis Communications Plan to ensure Guelph Hydro is prepared at all times. Customer Service staff are trained twice a year related to the Crisis Communication Plan. The Customer Service and Billing Crisis Communication Plan is updated periodically from the master Crisis Communication Plan. Alectra Utilities Corporation Hydro One Brampton Networks Inc. 2017 16-Mar-2017 11-Jan-2017 Yes. Weather Service Warning of high winds, although conditions ended up being far worse. Yes. Two Operators on standby (called in at 03:00). Lines and Substations available via an emergency call in list. General training in Emergency Preparedness, Situational Awareness, etc. but this event was thought to become more of a workload issue. The SAIDI duration of this event exceeded the 5 year Threshold. 3 hours No. Yes. 1) Public web page on the Outage Map via the Outage Management System, 2) Twitter 1) Review of communication protocols between field staff, control room and Management. 2) Streamlining of Environmental clean-up. 3) Tree trimming and feeder patrol options being examined Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2017 10-Aug-2017 11-Jun-2017 Environment and Climate Change Canada issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning shortly before the first storm arrived (@ 4:08pm). Forecasts published earlier in the day predicted the possibility of thunderstorms, though there was no prior warning of the severe intensity of the storm and the number of fallen trees that would result. Not Applicable (N/A) API has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via API?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke API?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. API considered this a Major Event due the unforeseen and uncontrollable nature of the storm?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on API?s network and customer base. The magnitude of the level of destruction, number of interruptions and significant response required confirmed API?s perspective that this episode should be categorized as a Major Event. It took approximately 42 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted by this Major Event. API did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement, however several parties were leveraged to provide assistance throughout the multi-day restoration effort. This included multiple crews and equipment provided by the neighbouring Sault PUC utility; multiple crews and trucks (totalling a workforce of 19) provided by a Forestry contractor that is regularly contracted by API to assist with ongoing vegetation management activities; and a backhoe contractor assisting with the replacement of multiple damaged poles. One ETR was issued to the public during the Major Event, through a published media release on Tuesday June 13th @ 5:00pm. The release was distributed to a local news website, CTV Northern Ontario for their news website, and several radio stations ? local to Sault Ste Marie area and CBC Radio. Due to the nature of the event as described above (over 115 interruptions overall) ETRs were not easily discernable for individual customers or groups of customers, other than the general statement issued in the media release. API?s Twitter feed and Facebook account had the same information published. API conducted a round table discussion with contributors from all company departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2018 21-Nov-2018 21-Sep-2018 00:27 AM Forecasts published earlier in the day predicted the possibility of rainfall and increased winds, though there was no prior warning of the eventual intensity of the storm and the number of fallen trees that would result. Not Applicable (N/A) API has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via API?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke API?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. API considered this a Major Event due the unforeseen and uncontrollable nature of the storm?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on API?s network and customer base. The magnitude of the level of destruction, number of interruptions and significant response required confirmed API?s perspective that this episode should be categorized as a Major Event. It took approximately 20 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. API did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement. All restoration efforts were carried out by API staff. API did not issue any ETR?s during the Major Event. API conducted an event de-briefing meeting with contributors from all company departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2018 04-Dec-2018 04-Oct-2018 00:54 AM The only warning regarding the potential that the Major Event would occur were weather forecasts that predicted strong winds, however the severity of the winds/wind gusts was greater than expected. Not Applicable (N/A) API has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via API?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke API?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. API considered this a Major Event due the uncontrollable nature of the storm?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on API?s network and customer base. The magnitude of the number of interruptions and significant response required confirmed API?s perspective that this episode should be categorized as a Major Event. It took approximately 15 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. API did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement. All restoration efforts were carried out by API staff. API did not issue any ETR?s during the Major Event. API engaged representatives from all departments through a meeting to de-brief on all aspects of the Major Event ? including outage response, effective use of available resources and technological support. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2020 23-Jan-2020 27-Nov-2019 05:58 AM The only warning regarding the potential that the Major Event would occur were weather forecasts that predicted the potential for winter storm-like effects. Environment Canada issued a generalized Special Weather Statement prior to the onset of the deteriorating conditions. Not Applicable (N/A) API has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via API?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke API?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. API considered this a Major Event due the uncontrollable nature of the storm?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on API?s network and customer base. The magnitude of the number of interruptions and significant response required confirmed API?s perspective that this episode should be categorized as a Major Event. It took approximately 11 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. For the outages affecting the remaining 10%, several had a duration longer than 24 hours. API did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement. All restoration efforts were carried out by API staff. A Forestry contractor already engaged in work for API had crews diverted to the restoration efforts. API did not issue any ETR?s during the Major Event. As with previous Major Events, API will engage representatives from all departments through a meeting to de-brief on all aspects of the Major Event ? including outage response, effective use of available resources and technological support. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2020 27-Feb-2020 29-Dec-2019 01:28 PM Yes Environment Canada published several Alerts regarding severe weather and its potential impacts. These alerts were the only warning of the potential for a Major Event. As the initial impact of the multi-day event unfolded (prior to the second MED day), the Supervisor On-Call recognized the increasing severity and started contacting staff that were on vacation and/or off for the weekend to mobilize all available resources – including a crew from the Wawa region of API’s service territory. In addition, two Forestry contractors working for API under ongoing contracts were contacted to leverage any resources they had available (as this was during the Christmas/New Years vacation season these contractors were on hiatus at the time). By the second day of the event, all of the crews that responded to the solicitation for assistance were deployed to the restoration efforts. On December 29th, a winter storm hit the API service territory east of Sault Ste Marie; primarily on St. Joseph Island. With mild temperatures hovering right around the zero-degree mark, precipitation that occurred during this and the following days had a heavy impact on the region. Significant periods of freezing rain and heavy, wet snow – combined with some episodes of gusty winds up to 50+ km/h – contributed to the overall impact of the storm. The freezing rain and snow caked on to trees; weighing them down to the point of bowing over to the ground or breaking off altogether. These trees impacted the power lines in the area, which resulted in many outages – multiple interruptions on the same feeders in some instances. The heavy snow and ice load on vegetation, coupled in some cases with some gusty winds, caused trees to fall onto power lines and cause damage and interruptions. If selected “Other”, please explain: As per Section 2.1.4.2.5 of the RRR filing requirements, the majority of the outages were coded as Tree Contacts (Code 3). This is not on the provided list of values above, so “Other” was selected. Some outages were coded as Adverse Weather (Freezing Rain/Ice – Code 6) so that option was also checked off. As crews triaged the areas of concern and focused their efforts for maximum effectiveness, large groups of customers were restored several times over the first two days of crew response only to lose power again as further tree contacts and damage occurred. Also, response times were hampered by the significant effort required simply to get to affected areas, as crews had to remove trees and debris from roads in order to pass through to the locations of some of the outages. The 90% threshold was finally achieved approximately 71 hours after the event started. API posted 24 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts as well as safety messages, through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Days and the following three days, as the effects of the storm lingered for several days. The Twitter feed is also presented on the main page of API’s website. As well, 3 general safety messages were posted on the company Facebook page during the same timeframe. Finally, there were several messages of similar content released to radio and online news sources. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4547 39 No No Others No Yes No As with previous Major Events, API will engage representatives from all departments through a meeting to de-brief on all aspects of the Major Event – including outage response, effective use of available resources and technological support. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2020 27-Feb-2020 06-Jan-2020 01:18 AM No Early on the morning of January 6th, multiple calls started coming in to report power off in a wide area north of Sault Ste Marie (Goulais and Batchawana). API Supervision along with staff from Hydro One attended the Goulais Substation and confirmed a Loss-of-Supply due to damage on one of the station transformers. Hydro One restored the Batchawana region through an alternate feed, while efforts to address the issue at the Goulais Substation continued. The Substation feed was off for the vast majority of the day, until a collaborative effort with Hydro One was successful in restoring all single-phase customers. The remaining customers were restored after more extensive repairs over subsequent days. API partnered with Hydro One to come up with a solution to restore all single-phase customers serviced from the Goulais Substation. Only 3-phase customers and a handful of other services off of a feed tied to 3-phase service remained off until full repairs could be accomplished at the substation – 37 services in total experienced the full duration of the event. Over the course of the Major Event Day and the following two days, API posted 13 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts through the company Twitter feed. API also posted safety messages and information on regional warming centres. The Twitter feed is also presented on the main page of API’s website. As well, 8 messages with similar content were posted on the company Facebook page during the same time frame. Finally, one message was released to CTV in response to a request for an outage update. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3829 31 Yes No Others No API has, and will continue to, engage with representatives from Hydro One to learn more about what occurred and work to identify any future strategies that would assist in mitigating the impact of subsequent interruptions. As well, API will facilitate a meeting with key personnel to debrief on all aspects of the Major Event – including outage response, effective use of available resources and technical support. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2021 05-Nov-2021 11-Aug-2021 03:38 PM No The only prior warning that API had was a Severe Thunderstorm Warning that was issued @ 2:30pm by Environment Canada. This type of warning, and the timing of the warning (in the latter stages of the crew’s work day) typically does not prompt API to plan for possible impacts. There was no indication that the weather that did occur would be significantly impactful. Severe thunderstorms rolled through the area and carried significant winds that brought trees down on API’s lines and poles – causing severe damage. Unconfirmed reports of a possible tornado in the area were communicated by local residents (pictures of a funnel cloud over a portion of St. Joseph Island – the hardest hit region – were published on social media). As outages did not start happening until later in the day, it took time to mobilize additional crews (beyond the regular on-call crew for the area) and deploy all available resources. As well, for the health and safety of the crews, they were taken off duty at the end of the day (@ 11:30pm) and re-engaged at dawn the next morning. Finally, notifications of a few of the events did not come in until the last two hours of the day, so crews were not assigned to those areas until the next day. Under a recently established mutual assistance agreement, API employed 4 linemen and 2 bucket trucks from the Sault Ste Marie Public Utilities Commission (SSMPUC). In addition, other third-party resources – not affiliated through a formal third party mutual assistance agreement – were also engaged to assist with restoration efforts, including a backhoe operator and two Forestry Contractors that API utilizes for yearly Vegetation Management work (approximately 16 personnel and several pieces of equipment in total). Finally, an internal line crew (2 linemen and a bucket truck) from API’s Wawa service territory was also re-assigned to the area of impact. API posted 16 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts as well as safety messages, through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Day and the following four days, as the outage restoration work took multiple days to complete. The Twitter feed is also presented on the main page of API’s website. As well, 10 messages with similar content were posted on the company Facebook page during the same timeframe. Finally, two messages were released to CTV in response to requests for storm response updates – on the original start date of the event and again two days later (August 13th). Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2345 19 No Yes Others No Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing all restorations, key API personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This continues the process that API employs in de-briefing such major events, in order to learn what worked and what might warrant improvement or a different approach (for such measures as technical application performance, resource deployment prioritization, support services for active crews, etc). Management of this event was informed by past event de-briefings, and incorporated activities that contributed to the success of the efforts. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2022 20-Jan-2022 21-Nov-2021 6:00 PM No The only prior warning that API had was a general weather statement prior to the event, warning of the potential for severe winter weather conditions. As the event unfolded, other warnings were released, including a Snow Squall Watch and a Wind Warning published by Environment Canada. Severe winter weather started in the area @ 6:00pm, with sustained winds of 44-58 km/h and gusts registering up to 86 km/h throughout the rest of the day, along with blowing snow. As a large amount of the overall customers affected came from an interruption that started after several significant initial outages that crews were already engaged in, and ran through the overnight, which contributed to response and restoration delays. API posted 5 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Day and the following day (as some of the interruptions spilled over into the next day after starting the evening of the Major Event Day). The Twitter feed is also presented on the main page of API’s website. There were no communications published on API’s Facebook page, and no Media Releases requested or generated. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4886 39.9 No No Others No Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing all restorations, key API personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This is consistent with the process that API employs in de-briefing such major events, in order to learn what worked and what might warrant improvement or a different approach (for such measures as technical application performance, resource deployment prioritization, support services for active crews, etc). Management of this event was informed by past event de-briefings, and incorporated activities that contributed to the success of the efforts. Algoma Power Inc. Algoma Power Inc. 2022 08-Feb-2022 16-Dec-2021 05:01 AM No The only prior warning that API had was a general weather forecast prior to the event, warning of the potential for severe winter weather conditions. As the event unfolded, other warnings were released, including a Wind Warning at 5:50 am and a Snow Squall Warning issued at 7:00 pm, both published by Environment Canada. Storm conditions started early in the day, with wind and rain at the onset. The precipitation changed from rain, to sleet, and eventually to snow as temperatures dropped throughout the day. Winds remained sustained, with significant gusts. The last outage to be restored – at 1:53am on December 17th, affected approximately 13% of API’s overall affected customers (12.68% to be exact), so the response to the question is listed above as it is. All other interruptions were restored by 9:13pm on December 16th (approximately 16 hours after the first outage was reported). API posted 10 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Day, including current number of customers affected, and general safety content. On the following day (as some of the interruptions spilled over into the next day after starting the evening of the Major Event Day) a message noting that all known outages had been restored was also posted. The Twitter feed is also presented on the main page of API’s website. There were 6 messages published on API’s Facebook page with similar content to the Twitter posts. There were no Media Releases requested or generated. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4975 40.6 Yes No Others No Throughout the course of the event key API personnel were engaged to monitor restoration progress and ensure that all facets of the effort were managed – and that any challenges were addressed – effectively. To remain consistent with the process that API employs in managing such major events, a de-briefing meeting is scheduled to review all aspects and effects of the day’s activities and discuss successes and potential improvements. Atikokan Hydro Inc. Atikokan Hydro Inc. 2017 04-May-2017 19-Jun-2016 No N/A; no prior warning Staff are aware we have a Mutual Assitance Agreement in place in the event additional assitance is required. Atikokan Hydro considers this a major event because as per the definition the major event is beyond thr econtrol of Atikokan Hydro and is unforesseable. Beyond the control of the distributor includes loss of supply events. A substantial number of customers were affected; given all of Atikokan Hydro's customers were affected by the outage. This is using the fixed percentage approach given Atikokan Hydro does not have the ability to use the IEEE Standard 1366 method. It took 6 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. In responding to the Major Event, Atikokan Hydro did not utilize assistance throug ha third part mutual assistance agreement. Atikokan Hydro did not issue any statements of estimated times of restoration to the public during the Major Event. Incoming calls through the emergency on call line were given as much information as possible. Callers were informed it was an outage as a result of loss of supply from Hydro One and required Hydro One to travel from either Fort Frances or Thunder Bay (minimal 2-2.5 hours) to response to the call. If a caller called back they would be informed as much as possible. Given an event out of our control; we only know so much information and given a small crew size; responders are typically busy working on the call out to restore power and as a result resources are limited in information restoration the public. This major event was a result of loss of supply from Hydro One. Atikokan Hydro follows up with Hydro One each outage to determine the cause and what can be done to eliminate such outages occuring again. Hydro One is working on communication cable upgrades with Bell; a contributor to the cause of this outage. Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2017 10-May-2017 08-Mar-2017 On 5 a.m. on March 8, 2017, Bluewater Power ("BWP") received a wind warding for East and West Lambton. At this point BWP began monitoring the weather stations and the Hydro One Networks ("HONI") website for information The outage occurred at noon on March 8th, as such BWP was fully staffed and at that point did not need extra employees. Bluewater has a comprehensive Emergency Response Plan that is continually being updated, with the last update in May 2016. In addition to the plan, a meeting is held annually with the emergency response team to review the emergency plan and any updates. The training process entails a review of the binder, ensuring all contact information is up-to-date, ensuring the after-hours call list is up-to-date, and address any questions from the team. The TMED for 2017 is 18.30154 based on the 2012-2016 period. This outage had a TMED of 44.5069 therefore was considered a Major Event. This event was solely a Loss of Supply event, however it was determined to be a major event because of the number of Bluewater Power customers impacted, and the long duration of the outage. Approx 6.5 hours No, assistance was not required. HONI notified BWP of the outage, and indicated they were patrolling their feeders in order to determine the cause. This HONI outage affected approximately 150 km of their line, and HONI patrolled from the eastern area (near Tillsonburg) to the west. The BWP service area is at the far western boundary of HONI area, therefore it took hours to determine the outage location. Given this, HONI did not provide an ETR to BWP, therefore BWP did not provide any ETR to the public other than that the issue was being investigated. Bluewater was fully prepared for this outage, and handled it in accordance with the Emergency Plan without incident. Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 1:02 PM No. The outage occurred during working hours on May 4, 2018, as such BWP was fully staffed and at that point did not need extra employees. Bluewater has a comprehensive Emergency Response Plan that is continually being updated. In additon to the plan, a meeting is held annually with the emergency response team to review the emergency plan and any updates. The training process entails a review of the binder, ensuring all contact information is up-to-date, ensuring the after-hours call list is up-to-date, and address any questions from the team. The TMED for 2018 is 17.3867 based on the 2013-2017 period. This outage had a TMED of 58.0817 therefore was considered a Major Event. 4 No, assistance was not required. No ETR was provided to customers. Bluewater was fully prepared for this outage, and handled it in accordance with the Emergency Plan without incident. Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2020 22-Oct-2020 07-Sep-2020 12:36 AM No A storm passed through the area with significant lightening strikes. There was a lightening hit on our M26 breaker which caused the main outage. In addition there was a tree branch on a line that caused a smaller outage within the same time period. Bluewater Power has a social media team that is available 24 hours per day every day. When this outage occurred, the social media team provided information and updates real time on both Twitter and Facebook throughout the outage period. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 7299 19.7 No No No further action is required at this time No Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2021 09-Nov-2021 23-Sep-2021 03:13 PM No A wind storm passed through the area, causing multiple outages with trees on lines and lines down. Bluewater Power has a social media team that is available 24 hours per day every day. When this outage occurred, the social media team provided information and updates real time on both Twitter and Facebook throughout the outage period. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 14279 38.5 No No No further action is required at this time No Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2023 20-Jul-2023 13-Jul-2023 02:45am No Summer storm passed through area with high winds causing tree contact and branches on lines in various locations throughout service area The outage began at 2:45am and 90% of the customer were restored by 9:21am - 6 hours, 36 minutes. Communication was provided via social media (Twitter and Facebook) throughout the outage time frame. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8579 23 No No No further action is required at this time No Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation 2023 29-Aug-2023 20-Jul-2023 4:oo pm Yes There were weather watches and warnings through news/weather services about potential threatening storms in the area. We arranged to have extra employees available through the night night as required. A storm with a tornado warning passed through the area with high winds causing tree contact and branches on lines in various locations throughout our service area. 90% of customers were restored 19 hours and 44 minutes. Entegrus Communication was provided via social media (Twitter, Facebook) throughout the outage time frame. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 23907 64 No Yes No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2018 02-Mar-2018 15-Oct-2017 14:18 PM Yes. There were weather advisories that were in place in advance of the storm that warned of high winds and intense storm cells due to a cold front moving across the province. Yes, Burlington Hydro arranged to have extra on call crew available and notified its third-party contractor to be on standby. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. Strong winds with gusts up to 90 km/hour affecting Burlington Hydro?s service area began at 2 pm and were the major cause of outages. 8,785 customers were affected representing approximately 13% of Burlington Hydro?s customers. 90% of the customers were restored by 20:29. Restoration took approximately 10.5 hours. Yes, Burlington Hydro used a third party contractor to support a pole replacement. Yes. 1. ETRs were published on Burlington Hydro?s outage map available on its website. 2. ETRs and other outage information posted on Twitter ? 26 tweets on October 15. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2018 02-Mar-2018 08-Mar-2017 10:16 AM No N/a Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. Strong winds affecting Burlington Hydro?s service area began at 10am and were the major cause of outages. 7,861 customers were affected representing approximately 12% of Burlington Hydro?s customers. 90% of the customers were restored by 16:32. Restoration took approximately 5 hours. No Yes. 1. ETRs were published on Burlington Hydro?s Outage Map available on its website. 2. ETRs were also communicated via Twitter. Burlington Hydro plans to add additional capacity on its server for its Outage Management System to prevent a failure during a major event. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 28-Jan-2019 08-Jan-2018 09:10AM No. Burlington Hydro experienced power outages in multiple areas of the city, including Burloak Drive and Appleby Line. The outages were attributed to pole fires, caused by salt brine from the road accumulating on hydro poles over an extended period of cold weather. Burlington Hydro does take preventative measures to mitigate the risk of pole fires but had no prior warning of the changing weather conditions which contributed to these pole fires. N/A Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. A total of 4.462 customers were affected by the outage representing 6.6% of Burlington Hydro's customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro's control and exceeded Burlington Hydro's daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took 16.8 hours to restore 90% of the customers - they were restored on Jan 9th at 02:37AM. No Yes, via Twitter and Burlington Hydro's Outage Map webpage - http://outagemaps.burlingtonhydro.com/OutageMap/OutageMap.html Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 28-Jan-2019 04-Apr-2018 11:45AM No. Weather reports warned of high winds which were the only indication of a possible Major Event. N/A Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. Strong winds with gusts up to 90 km/hour affected Burlington Hydro's service area beginning at 11:45am and were the major cause of outages. A total of 5,673 customers were affected representing approximately 8.5% of Burlington Hydro's customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro's control and exceeded Burlington Hydro's daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took seven hours to restore 90% of the customers - they were restored by 19:00PM. Yes, Burlington Hydro utilized a third party contractor (K-line). Yes. ETRS were issued on Twitter and indicated on Burlington Hydro's website outage map. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 28-Jan-2019 15-Apr-2018 13:45PM Yes. Environment Canada warned of a multi-day ice storm with the potential to cause widespread power outages across Southern Ontario. Yes, Burlington Hydro arranged to have extra on call crew available and notified its third-party contractor to be on standby. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. Outages in Burlington Hydro?s service area, mainly due to downed wires and trees began at 13:45 and were the major cause of outages. A total of 6,038 customers were affected representing approximately 9% of Burlington Hydro?s customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro?s control and exceeded Burlington Hydro?s daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took approximately 9.25 hours to restore 90% of the customers affected - they were restored by 23:00PM. Yes, Burlington Hydro used a third party contractor (K-line). Yes, ETRs were repeated on social media (Twitter) and indicated on BHI?s outage map. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 28-Jan-2019 04-May-2018 15:00PM There was limited warning from Environment Canada of strong winds and thunderstorms with the potential to cause widespread power outages across Southern Ontario. The wind storm was more serious than forecasted. Burlington Hydro used existing on call crews available. Additional crews and third-party contractors were notified to be on standby after the extent and damage of the wind storm was realized. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. Outages in Burlington Hydro's service area, mainly due to downed wires and trees began at 15:00PM and were the major cause of outages. A total of 28,714 customers were affected representing approximately 43% of Burlington Hydro's customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro's control and exceeded Burlington Hydro's daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took approximately 26 hours to restore 90% of the customers affected - they were restored at 17:26 on May 5th. Yes, contractors and other electric utilities were used as follows: May 4th - KLine; May 5th - KLine; May 6th - KLine, Canadian Niagara Power, Waterloo North Hydro and Oakville Hydro; May 7th - KLine, Canadian Niagara Power, Waterloo North Hydro, Oakville Hydro and Energy+ (Cambridge Hydro); May 8th - KLine, Canadian Niagara Power, Waterloo North Hydro, Oakville Hydro and Energy+ (Cambridge Hydro). Yes, ETRs were issued via Twitter if they were known. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 28-Jan-2019 09-Sep-2018 03:36AM No. Environment Canada issued a special weather statement of a wind/rain storm for areas between Windsor and Cornwall, including Brantford and Brant County and warned that areas along Lake Erie and Lake Ontario could get between 20 and 40 millimetres of rain over the next few days. The storm was the last remnant of Tropical Depression Gordon. However, Burlington Hydro had no indication that this would be a major event. N/A - However, Burlington Hydro arranged to have extra on call crew available and notified its third-party contractor to be on standby. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. A total of 5,180 customers were affected by the outage representing 7.7% of Burlington Hydro?s customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro?' control and exceeded Burlington Hydro's daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took 16.5 hours to restore 90% of the customers affected - they were restored at 20:24PM. No Yes, through information available on the Outage Maps webpage of the Burlington Hydro website and via Twitter. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 18-Nov-2019 01-Oct-2019 16:17 PM There was limited warning from Environment Canada of strong winds and thunderstorms with the potential to cause widespread power outages across Southern Ontario. Thunderstorm and winds were more serious than forecasted. Existing Burlington Hydro on call crew was available. Additional Burlington Hydro crews and third party contractors (K-Line and Beswick) were notified and used in restoration activities after the severity of the storm was realized. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. A total of 21,260 customers were affected by the outage representing 31% of Burlington Hydro’s customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro’s control and exceeded Burlington Hydro’s daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took 9 hours and 33 minutes to restore 90% of the customers affected. Customers were restored at 1:50am on October 2nd. Yes. Contractors K-Line and Beswick Tree Service were used. Although multiple updates were issued (via Twitter), it was difficult to determine specific ETRs. ETRs on the website outage map had to be updated on numerous occasions. In addition, Burlington Hydro was dependent on Hydro One to make repairs to the Cumberland Transformer Station, servicing the downtown core, and delays occurred as crews waited for Hydro One to arrive and make necessary repairs. Delays to repairs were reported via twitter and updated on the outage map. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 18-Nov-2019 02-Oct-2019 14:04 PM There was a minor alert from Environment Canada of mild thunderstorms with the potential to cause limited power outages across Southern Ontario. The previous day’s storm had weakened trees that subsequently fell. Existing Burlington Hydro on call crew was available. Additional Burlington Hydro crews and third party contractors (K-Line and Beswick) were notified and used in restoration activities after the severity of outages was realized. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. A total of 7,669 customers were affected by the outage representing 11% of Burlington Hydro’s customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro’s control and exceeded Burlington Hydro’s daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took 5 hours and 34 minutes to restore 90% of the customers affected. Customers were restored at 20:38. Yes. Contractors K-Line and Beswick Tree Service were used. Yes, via Twitter (see attached Twitter record) and on the website outage map. ETRs would have also been communicated to customers calling in by telephone. Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues in the future. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2019 18-Dec-2019 01-Dec-2019 10:40 AM Yes. The Weather Network issued a winter storm warning with the possibility of freezing rain and wind gusts. Freezing rain accumulation was predicted to be less than 5mm and wind gusts up to 70km/h. Existing Burlington Hydro on call crew was available. Additional Burlington Hydro crews and a tree trimming contractor (Beswick) was also on-call and available if needed. A major event was not expected based on the predicted freezing rain accumulation and wind gusts. Yes. Burlington Hydro works safely to restore power to the largest areas first and then works its way down to single outages. Fire, police and wires down take priority. A total of 17,768 customers were affected by the outage representing 26% of Burlington Hydro’s customers. The event was beyond Burlington Hydro’s control and exceeded Burlington Hydro’s daily SAIDI threshold used to identify a Major Event. It took 5 hours and 10 minutes to restore 90% of the customers affected. Customers were restored at 15:50 on Dec 1st. No Yes, ETRs were issued on our outage maps and through social media (Twitter). Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2020 15-Apr-2020 20-Mar-2020 3:09 PM No The Weather Network did issue a wind warning but expected wind gusts were 70km/h which typically do not cause significant power outages. High winds caused a large tree limb to come into contact with primary feeder circuit. Tree limb was too large to be removed by line crews and tree trimmers were needed. Tree trimmers found tree was snapped at base and entire tree had to be taken down. An upstream switch on same feeder circuit had leads burn off. There was no way to back feed customers until repairs were completed. Information on the outages was issued on Twitter. In addition, information could be gathered by customers from Burlington Hydro’s outage maps. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3880 6 No No Others No Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2020 26-Aug-2020 10-Jul-2020 8:01 PM Yes Weather forecast indicated potential for severe thunderstorms, high winds and lightning. Additional field and Control Room staff were on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. Severe thunderstorm with high winds caused multiple tree contacts throughout Burlington. Several very large trees fell onto primary conductor. Significant work involved to remove fallen trees, replace broken poles and repair primary conductor. A storm alert was issued 2 hours in advance of the storm indicating conditions were favourable for severe thunderstorms with a chance for outages and asking customers to be prepared. 8 tweets were posted during the event, providing ETRs, outage updates, and safety messaging, warning people to stay 10 metres from any fallen powerlines. The Outage Map on the website provided areas affected, customers affected, cause and ETRs. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3616 5 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2020 26-Aug-2020 19-Jul-2020 10:19 AM Yes Weather forecast indicated potential for severe thunderstorms, high winds and lightning. Additional field and Control Room staff were on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. Severe thunderstorm with high winds caused multiple tree contacts throughout Burlington. The majority of customers affected were due to one outage caused by a large tree limb that broke and fell onto primary conductor locking out two primary 27.6kV feeders. A storm alert was issued on Twitter around 9:00 am that day asking customers to be prepared. 13 tweets were posted during the event, providing ETRs, outage updates, and safety messaging, warning people to stay 10 metres from any fallen powerlines. The Outage Map on the website provided areas affected, customers affected, cause and ETRs. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8450 12 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2022 18-Jan-2022 11-Dec-2021 4:50 AM Yes The weather report called for wind gusts of 70 to 90 km/hr. Wind gusts of 90km/hr are the start of the threshold where power outages can occur. A windstorm affecting many customers was not expected. Wind gusts in the Burlington area were over 100 km/hr. Additional On Call staff were placed on standby. Burlington Hydro’s Lines Contractor and Tree Trimming Contractor were asked to have crews available. Windstorm with wind gusts in excess of 100 km/hr. Multiple tree contacts, broken poles, primary conductor and secondary conductor issues as a result of the wind gusts. Estimated Time of Restoration (“ETR”) and information about the outage (locations and causes) could be found on Burlington Hydro’s web-based outage map (except for a brief period where it experienced some technical problems). On social media – Twitter – 18 outage updates were tweeted as power was being restored. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 7397 10.8 No No Others No Yes Yes Burlington Hydro is reviewing the hardware which supports its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2022 12-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:30pm No Intense thunderstorm with winds in excess of 140 km/h. North Bay Power, Canadian Niagara Power and Niagara Peninsula Energy assisted BHI in its restoration efforts A number of outage updates were sent by Twitter during the event, providing the latest information available on restoration efforts. Customers could also access the outage map on BHI’s website – providing Estimated Time of Restorations (“ETRs”) as they became available. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 24566 35.7 No Yes Others Yes Burlington Hydro is reviewing its Outage Management System to mitigate technical issues. This will ensure the public is notified in a timely manner on outages and ETRs. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2022 29-Sep-2022 21-Aug-2022 02:53 AM No The weather forecast called for thunderstorms but they were not expected to be severe. Adverse weather (thunder storm with heavy rain) caused large tree limb to break, fall on hydro lines and lockout two 27.6kv feeder circuits. Hydro One bus protection over tripped and two additional 27.6kv feeder circuits locked out. 9 outage tweets were issued on Twitter, providing outage cause and Estimated Time of Recovery (ETRs). Updates were provided to customers as neighbourhoods came back online. BHI’s website outage map provided details about the outage (location, ETRs) and was updated as customers’ power was restored. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8902 11.9 Yes No Others No Extensive tree trimming was completed in area of fault to better prevent tree contacts in this area in the future. Hydro One will be investigating why Burlington B Bus over tripped. Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2023 15-Sep-2023 27-Jul-2023 4:36AM No Adverse Weather-Wind caused large tree limbs from adjacent property to fall across two feeders in ROW. Eleven social media posts (Twitter and Instagram) kept customers informed about the progress of repairs and estimated times of restoration. Customers were also directed to Burlington Hydro’s Outage Map to stay on top of current estimated restoration times by neighborhood. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 10678 15 No No No further action is required at this time No Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2023 15-Sep-2023 02-Aug-2023 5:23AM No Adverse Environment - Major structure fire at a construction site which was in close proximity to wood pole line with multiple feeders which became engulfed in flames. Customers were provided 4 updates on social media channels (Twitter and Instagram) which kept them up-to-date on repairs and estimated restoration. Customers were also directed to Burlington Hydro’s Outage Map to stay on top of current estimated restoration times and the extent of the outage. Adverse Environment-Fire Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8775 13 No No No further action is required at this time No Burlington Hydro Inc. Burlington Hydro Inc. 2024 05-Sep-2024 11-Jul-2024 5:42 AM No Adverse weather caused a large tree limb to break and fall on the 27.6 kV feeder requiring isolation including the under build 4.16 kV lines. Yes. Customers were provided 5 updates through the social media channel X (formerly Twitter), which kept them up-to-date on repairs and estimated restoration. Customers were also directed to Burlington Hydro’s Outage Map to stay on top of current estimated restoration times and the extent of the outage. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9788 14.1 No No No further action is required at this time No Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2018 04-Jun-2018 04-Apr-2018 06:00 AM On April 3, 2018, Environment Canada issued wind warnings for much of Southern Ontario, indicating that damaging winds were expected on April 4. The extreme winds were forecasted to begin in the early morning hours of April 4. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the overnight hours from April 3-4, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. Additional crews were made available for outage response on April 4, with many crews working into the evening to complete restoration. CNPI has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via CNPI?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke CNPI?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. CNPI considered this a Major Event due to the extreme and uncontrollable nature of the wind?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on CNPI?s network and customer base. The gusting of the wind in this area exceeded the criteria specified in CNPI?s distribution design standards and CNPI could not have reasonably designed its system to avoid all outages in this situation. It took approximately 8 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted by this Major Event. CNPI did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement, however we did utilize a private utility-based contractor. CNPI issued several public media notices on Twitter and website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. The ETR was noted as ?No ETR? as initially the estimate was not known and power was restored prior to further media updates. CNPI conducted a round table discussion with contributors from the company operation departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2018 26-Jun-2018 15-Oct-2017 04:00 AM The weather report indicated there would be some wind over the weekend, however there was no prior warning of the intensity of the wind gusts in the area. Not Applicable (n/a) CNPI has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyberattacks. This plan is available to all staff both via CNPI?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke CNPI?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. CNPI considered this a Major Event due to the unforeseen and uncontrollable nature of the wind?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on CNPI?s network and customer base. The gusting of the wind in this area was unforeseen and unpredictable and CNPI?s perspective that this episode should be categorized as a Major Event. It took approximately 4 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted by this Major Event. CNPI did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement, however we did utilize a private utility-based contractor. CNPI issued several public media notices on Twitter and website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. The ETR was noted as ?No ETR? as initially the estimate was not known and power was restored prior to further media updates. CNPI?s Twitter feed and Facebook account had the same information published. CNPI conducted a round table discussion with contributors from the company operation departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2018 14-Aug-2018 13-Jun-2018 4:20 AM On June 12, 2018, Environment Canada issued wind warnings for much of Southern Ontario, indicating that damaging winds were expected on June 13, 2018. The extreme winds were forecasted to begin in late afternoon early evening on June 13, 2018. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the overnight hours from June 13-14th, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. Additional crews were made available for outage response on June 13th, with many crews working into the overnight and morning to complete restoration. CNPI has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via CNPI?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke CNPI?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. CNPI considered this a Major Event due to the extreme and uncontrollable nature of the wind?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on CNPI?s network and customer base. The gusting of the wind in this area exceeded the criteria specified in CNPI?s distribution design standards and CNPI could not have reasonably designed its system to avoid all outages in this situation. It took approximately 4 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted by this Major Event. CNPI did not utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement, however we did utilize a private utility-based contractor to assist with restoration efforts. CNPI issued several public media notices on Twitter and website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. The ETR was noted as ?No ETR? as initially the estimate was not known and power was restored prior to further media updates. CNPI conducted a round table discussion with contributors from the company operation departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2019 12-Apr-2019 24-Feb-2019 01:21 PM On Friday February 22, 2019, Environment Canada issued wind warnings for much of Southern Ontario, indicating that damaging winds were expected on Sunday February 24, 2019. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the overnight hours from Feb 24-26, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. Additional crews were made available for outage response on Feb 24, with many crews working into the evening to complete restoration. CNPI has a Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan that is periodically updated and reviewed at the management level. This plan is designed to assist in the response to natural disasters, accidents, major outages, environmental disasters, municipal emergencies, and cyber-attacks. This plan is available to all staff both via CNPI?s corporate intranet, and hard copy. For major outages, this plan covers responsibilities and procedures for all outage restoration and communication efforts, and consolidates contact information for internal staff and key external agencies. The scope of the outage described in this report did not invoke CNPI?s Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan. CNPI considered this a Major Event due to the extreme and uncontrollable nature of the wind?s intensity and the resulting substantial impact on CNPI?s network and customer base. The gusting of the wind in this area exceeded the criteria specified in CNPI?s distribution design standards and CNPI could not have reasonably designed its system to avoid all outages in this situation. It took approximately 11.5 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted by this Major Event. CNPI did utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement (NPEI), as well as we did utilize a private utility-based contractor(Gams & K-Line). CNPI issued several public media notices on Twitter and website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. The ETR was noted as ?No ETR? as initially the estimate was not known and power was restored prior to further media updates. CNPI conducted a round table discussion with contributors from the company operation departments, to review all facets of the Major Event, including the event itself, response and restoration efforts, resource allocation and technological assistance. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2021 12-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 01:30 PM Yes Environment Canada published several Alerts regarding severe weather and its potential impacts (see Appendix A). These alerts were the only warning of the potential for a Major Event. A normal operations complement was on-call during the overnight hours on November 15, 2020, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. The Regional Manager recognized the potential severity and started contacting staff that were on vacation and/or off for the weekend to mobilize all available resources. Additional crews were made available for outage response on November 15, with many crews working into the following days to complete restoration. On November 15th 2020, an extreme windstorm affected all of the CNPI service territory. A significant period of extreme winds reaching over 130km along with the ground saturation from previous rains contributed to the overall impact of the storm. The winds caused multiple trees to come down resulted in many outages – multiple interruptions on the same feeders in some instances. The falling trees caused multiple broken poles and equipment damage at various locations to the system. As crews triaged the areas of concern and focused their efforts for maximum effectiveness, large groups of customers were restored several times during the first day of crew response only to lose power again as further tree contacts and damage occurred. Also, response times were hampered by the significant effort required simply to get to affected areas, as crews had to remove trees and debris from roads in order to pass through to the locations of some of the outages. The crew also had to wait until City or Town crews cleared roadways in some instances. The 90% threshold was achieved approximately 8.5 hours after the event started. CNPI used private utility-based contractors (GAMS and Pineridge) to supplement its internal line crews and to assist with tree removal efforts. Welland Hydro also provided assistance with additional outage restoration efforts on November 16. CNPI posted 16 general updates (some with ETR’s if it was known) on the progress of its restoration efforts, some posts also included a safety message, Via Facebook & Twitter over the course of the Major Event. CNPI’s Twitter presented on the main page of CNPI’s website. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 21341 72 Yes Yes Others No Yes Yes In consideration of the impact of tree-caused outages during this and other recent events, CNPI is reviewing the prioritization and overall scope of its tree-trimming program, including seeking input from customers through its DSP engagement survey. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2022 18-Jan-2022 06-Dec-2021 01:11 AM Yes CNP’s Operations Supervisor emailed the CNP Operations Department regarding the potential wind speeds prior to the storm. As the event unfolded a wind warning was published by Environment Canada. Applicable Operations Staff attended a preparation meeting prior to the storm event to discuss storm event procedures and staff availability. Contractors for line locates and line work were notified of the upcoming weather event to leverage any resources they had available as repairs commenced for two days. On December 6th, a wind storm hit the CNP service territory including Fort Erie and Port Colborne. Wind gusts of up to 95 km/h caused multiple trees to fall onto and damage CNP line infrastructure, which resulted in many outages. A large amount of the overall customers affected came from an interruption that started after several significant initial outages that crews were already engaged in, which contributed to response and restoration delays. CNP posted 24 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts and the special weather statement issues by Environment Canada, through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Day and the following day, as the effects of the storm lingered for one additional day. A link to the Twitter account is located at the bottom of the main page of CNP’s website. There were no communications published on CNP’s Facebook page, and no Media Releases requested or generated. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9201 35 No No Others No Yes No Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing restorations, key CNP personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges CNP and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This helps understand what worked and what requires improvement or a different approach. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2022 08-Feb-2022 11-Dec-2021 03:00 PM Yes On Friday, December 10, 2021, Environment Canada issued wind warnings for much of Southern Ontario, indicating that damaging winds were expected on Saturday, December 11, 2021. CNPI’s Operations Supervisor emailed the CNPI Operations Department regarding the potential wind speeds prior to the storm. Appendix A, depicts the weather conditions for December 11, 2021. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the daytime on December 11th, 2021, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. Additional crews were made available for outage response on December 11, 2021, with many crews working into the following days to complete restoration. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the daytime on December 11th, 2021, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. Additional crews were made available for outage response on December 11, 2021, with many crews working into the following days to complete restoration. CNPI did utilize assistance through a third party mutual assistance agreement (Welland Hydro), and also used a number of private utility-based contractor (Gams, Peters Excavating & Pineridge Tree Service). CNP posted 20 general updates (without ETR’s) on the progress of its restoration efforts and the special weather statement issues by Environment Canada, through the company Twitter feed, over the course of the Major Event Day and the following two days, as the effects of the storm lingered. A link to the Twitter account is located at the bottom of the main page of CNPI’s website. CNPI also posted about the event via its Facebook page. There were no Media Releases requested or generated. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 22109 83 No Yes Others No Yes Yes Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing restorations, key CNP personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges CNP and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This helps understand what worked and what requires improvement or a different approach. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2023 21-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 02:00 AM Yes On Wednesday, December 21st, 2022, Environment Canada issued wind warnings for much of Southern Ontario, indicating that damaging winds were expected on Friday December 23rd and Saturday December 24th. CNPI’s Regional Manager held numerous meetings with the Operations Department during the week of December 19th regarding the potential wind speeds prior to the storm. Appendix A depicts the Special Weather Statement from Environment Canada and the High Wind Watch from the National Weather Service. All arrangements for standby were made before the storm began. CNPI secured internal resources for the holiday weekend prior to December 23rd. CNPI sent employees home for rest time on December 22nd in order to optimize the available staff hours to respond to the impending storm. On December 23rd and 24th, a snow and wind storm hit the CNPI service territory. Wind gusts of up to 125 km/hr caused trees to fall onto and damage CNPI line infrastructure, which resulted in outages. Blowing snow caused very poor visibility, and vehicles were unable to safely travel on the roadways. Due to the ongoing poor weather, new outages began throughout the period (including on December 23, 24, 25, etc). That is to say, these 90% of interruptions did not all begin with the first outage. CNPI utilized assistance from the following companies through third party mutual assistance agreements: • Welland Hydro • Niagara Peninsula Energy • NOTL Hydro • Burlington Hydro • Cornwall Electric * CNPI also used a number of private utility-based contractors: • Ground Aerial Maintenance Services • Peters Excavating • Pineridge Tree Service • PowerNorth Utility Group • Hyline Utility Solutions • Spark Power Group • Holland Power Services CNPI posted 58 updates on both Twitter and Facebook social media channels (without ETR’s). The postings provided progress of restoration efforts, special weather statements issued by Environment Canada and emergency related communication in cooperation with both the Town of Fort Erie and City of Port Colborne, over the course of the Major Event Days. There were also five website alerts posted on a daily basis to summarize current restoration status and various customer support recommendations from ESA and local warming centre information. 5,306 customer calls were taken during the Major Event Day period via CNPI’s partner call centre. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 32088 106 No Yes Others No Yes Yes Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing restorations, key CNPI personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges CNPI and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This helps understand what worked and what requires improvement or a different approach. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. Canadian Niagara Power Inc. 2023 19-Apr-2023 22-Feb-2023 23:20 PM Yes On Wednesday, February 22nd, 2023, Environment Canada issued freezing rain warnings for Southern Niagara, indicating that freezing rain leading to build-up and high winds were expected on Wednesday February 22nd and Thursday February 23rd. CNPI’s Regional Manager held meetings with the Operations Department on Tuesday February 21st and Wednesday February 22nd regarding the potential freezing rain and wind speeds prior to the storm. Appendix A depicts the Special Weather Statement from Environment Canada and the High Wind Watch from the National Weather Service. All arrangements for standby were made before the storm began. CNPI had a normal complement on-call during the daytime on February 23rd, 2023, with the ability to call in additional crews if required. CNPI hired Hyline Utility to provide two crews on standby ready to work from Tuesday February 21st to Wednesday February 22nd, but they were not utilized. On February 22nd and 23rd, a freezing rain and wind storm hit the CNPI service territory. Wind gusts of up to 66 kmph caused trees covered with ice to fall onto and damage CNPI line infrastructure, which resulted in outages. The ice accumulation on CNPI's equipment and lines were over 25mm thick in our southern service territory and 12mm thick in our northern service territory. The broken trees, conductors, and other equipment delayed the power restoration significantly. Between February 23rd and 24th, CNPI issued approximately 8 social media posts denoting the approximate number of customers without power and the general areas affected by the outages. ETRs were not provided due to the extent of infrastructure damage which made estimating difficult. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 11968 39 No No Others No Yes Yes Additional comments: Throughout the course of the event, and shortly after completing restorations, key CNPI personnel were in regular communication to discuss challenges CNPI and successes in managing all facets of the restoration efforts. This helps understand what worked and what requires improvement or a different approach. The following items are included during the preparation a potential major event: - Storm task list - Outreach readiness emails to Town of Fort Erie, City of Port Colborne and PowerAssist - Social media posts are made to customers referencing Environment Canada weather alerts Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 04:03 PM Yes, Centre Wellington Hydro was aware of severe weather forecasts leading up to the Major Event. Environment Canada issued a wind warning shortly before 11:00 a.m. on May 4, 2018, indicating that wind gusts between 90 and 100 km/h were possible on this day in Centre Wellington and surrounding areas. Environment Canada noted that damage to buildings and tree branches were possibilities given forecasted high winds. A severe thunderstorm watch was also issued by Environment Canada. CWH ensured that all staff was available and able to respond if required, including the regular scheduled on-call crew as well as those line crew members who were not scheduled to be on-call. Yes, CWH, through daily work, training and preparedness ensures that the operation staff and equipment are ready to respond when required. CWH calculates the TMED based on the previous 5 year historical years outages. This specific event had a value greater than the 5 historical average. This specific outage damaged CWH’s overhead plant equipment which caused a large customer base to have their power interrupted. This event was also beyond the control of CWH. It took CWH 1 hour to restore all customers. No. CWH used its Twitter account, @cwhydro, to post updates that included being made aware of the areas affected. CWH updated its outage map, during the outage and directed customers to review the map for updates, it is accessible via our website to anyone. No ETR’s were posted. CWH was prepared to respond for this major event and continues to replace aging infrastructure through capital investments, repairs and maintains equipment on appropriate schedules and completes adequate training in preparedness to mitigate the impact of similar future events. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2021 19-Feb-2021 05-Feb-2021 3:30PM No The outage was due to a Loss of Supply. On February 5th at 3:30 pm all customers of Centre Wellington Hydro had an interruption to their hydro service, due to the Fergus TS losing all supply feeders to CWH. CWH's management contacted Hydro One to check the status of CWH’s feeders. Our management was told power would be restored within 10 minutes. All CWH customers had their power restored at 3:44 PM. The outage lasted 14 minutes, 0.25 hours. No, once information on anticipated restoration from Hydro One was determined it was approximately only 5 minutes before power was restored. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 7398 100 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2021 04-Mar-2021 24-Feb-2021 12:02 PM No The outage was due to a Loss of Supply. On February 24th at 12:02 pm all CWH’s Fergus (fed from the M3) customers had an interruption to their hydro service. It took just over 1 hour (67 minutes), for all affected customers to have their power restored. CWH used it’s Twitter account, website and changed our phone answering service to provide our customers with information. Our first tweet was posted at 12:08 pm advising customers that we were aware of an outage. We also put a pop up on our website advising of this information. CWH staff also updated our outage map on our website to show the affected area. Due to the high volume of calls CWH management turned our phones over to change the initial greeting to state we are aware of an outage. At 12:55pm CWH put out another tweet, “Operations is now saying approx. 1 hr for restoration.” CWH’s final tweet regarding the outage was at 1:11pm stating power had been restored to Fergus customers and to call CWH’s office if customers were still experiencing an outage. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5124 69 No No Process improvements No A management meeting was held the following day to review the phone process. In January 2021 CWH changed our phone service provider and the process and procedures for outages are being updated to reflect the changes regarding the upgrade to the phone service. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2022 07-Jul-2022 17-Jun-2022 6:50 PM Yes There were wind warnings on local and provincial media outlets warning of 70km plus winds from midday until late evening. The wind warnings were discussed prior to the end of the normal work day with Operations staff with the expectation that outages were potentially going to occur. Staff was aware of availability. On June 17th, 2022 CWH encountered two individual outages that affected two different feeders. Both outages were caused by trees being blown onto lines during a windstorm. Both incidents are categorized as cause code 6 – adverse weather. The outages affected a total of 1,169 customers. This represents 15% of CWH’s total number of customers. The Elora EMS2-F4 feeder outage affected 421 customers and the Fergus FMS4-F-9 feeder outage affected 748 customers. It took 1 hour and 30 minutes to have all customers restored. The EMS2-F4 feeder outage was for 80 minutes and the FMS4-F9 feeder outage had a duration of 91 minutes. Yes, CWH used Twitter and its website to inform customers of affected areas and restoration timeframes. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1169 15 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes No A debrief with Operations staff after the major outage was discussed with no alterations to current practices in addressing such outages being required. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2022 11-Aug-2022 01-Aug-2022 7:04 pm No Loss of supply (cause code 2) due to upstream distributor equipment failure (pole fire due to tracking insulator). CWH used Twitter and its website to inform customers of affected areas and updates. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5124 68 Yes No No further action is required at this time No A debrief with Operations staff after the major outage was discussed with no alterations to current practices in addressing such outages being required. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. Centre Wellington Hydro Ltd. 2022 11-Aug-2022 03-Aug-2022 6:11 pm Yes There was Environment Canada Severe weather and Tornado warning at approximately 5:45 pm. The warning was released after the end of the normal workday for operations staff. CWH encountered an outage that affected all customers in Elora. The outage cause was due to numerous trees and tree limbs breaking and coming into contact with the 44kv, M7 circuit fed from Hydro One. This incident is categorized as cause code 2 – Loss of Supply. It took 7 hours and 20 minutes to have all customers restored. CWH used Twitter and its website to inform customers of affected areas and updates. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2060 27 Yes No No further action is required at this time No No No A debrief with Operations staff after the major outage was discussed with no alterations to current practices in addressing such outages being required. Cornwall Street Railway Light and Power Company Limited Cornwall Street Railway Light and Power Company Limited 2023 05-Jun-2023 05-Apr-2023 12:32 PM Yes Cornwall Electric thoroughly monitors Environment Canada notices to proactively identify and prepare for potential emergency outage restoration efforts. On April 4, Environment Canada issued a freezing rain warning, outlining the potential for a significant storm affecting eastern Ontario. On April 5, prior to the weather event, CE Management prepared for the event by assessing internal resources, materials, etc. and securing additional external resources. These resources were retained as part of the restoration efforts. All arrangements for standby/on-call were made before the storm began. CE secured internal resources. Since the majority of the outages occurred during daily-light hours – Assessors were sent out to assess the damage early – to determine the resources required to safely restore power in a timely manner – and determine if sufficient mutual assistance secured. Just after noon on Wednesday April 5, 2023, Cornwall Electric began to experience outages caused by severe weather affecting much of Southern and Eastern Ontario and Quebec. Severe thunderstorms and freezing rain impacted Cornwall directly, while tornado warnings were issued for other parts of the province. Large branches fell on power lines as a result of the significant ice accumulation, with the early budding on birch & soft maple trees increasing the ice accumulation. CE’s crews worked overnight to restore power to the majority of customers, however the full restoration efforts lasted until April 7, being further encumbered by flooding occurring on April 6. Throughout the restoration efforts, CE issued numerous updates via its social media and website as well as remained in contact with the City, Townships and Mohawk Council. The website notices also included information for Cornwall residents from local authorities regarding the availability of warming centres. CNPI, EOP, and other contracted services such as OLC, Spark Power and equipment from T&T (ie: bucket truck). Yes, CE provided several updates via social media and CE’s website. Please refer to Appendix A for an outline of the posts. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 16929 65.8 No Yes No further action is required at this time No Yes No CE found that its frequent communications via social media and contact with the City, Townships and Mohawk Council were helpful in maintaining customers’ awareness of the restoration efforts and other critical information. CE also found the use of a Command Centre and regular communication for internal updates provided for awareness of the outages and challenges in the field. Another area CE received positive feedback from customers was on a communications directly with specific groups of affected customers to advise them of the timeframe expected to restore their power. CE individually contacted customers that remained off more than 36-40 hours to advise them of the expected timeframe and Plan to restore power. For this storm, resources were able to be assigned to speak directly with each customer and during the post-storm meeting. Although this was manageable for these restoration efforts it is recognized this may not always be practical. A plan to call blast for larger groups of customers was discussed as part of the post-storm review meeting. Although considered a good practice, it is recognized that depending on the number of customers remaining without power, it may not always be possible to issue individualized communications, but will be a part of the future consideration in the Plan. E.L.K. Energy Inc. E.L.K. Energy Inc. 2023 21-Apr-2023 22-Feb-2023 5:00 PM Yes Yes. Environment Canada issue Winter Storm Watch for majority of areas in Southwestern Ontario. On February 21st, Environment Canada changed from Winter Storm Watch to Freezing Rain Warning. On February 22nd, Environment Canada issued Freezing Rain Warning for Windsor-Essex region. Yes, E.L.K. had the regular on-call staff that responded to the initial power outage calls. As a result of adverse weather warnings issued by Environment Canada, there were additional E.L.K. crews on standby and responded immediately after the first outage reports. Additional, E.L.K. had local pole line contractor on stand by and were deployed on February 23rd. There were two main contributing cause of the Major Event i.e., Adverse Weather – Tree Contact and Adverse Weather – Equipment Breakage. The storm caused the ice to be accumulated on the trees, power lines and equipment. As a result of the heavy ice accumulation, the trees and tree branches broke and fell on the power lines. The ice accumulation on power line caused equipment breakage that resulted in downed power lines. It took E.L.K. approximately 27 hours to restore power to 90% of customers interrupted (not related to Loss of Supply) It took a total of approximately 48 hours to restore power to 90% of customer interrupted (included Loss of Supply) Yes, E.L.K. continued posting on its Twitter account regarding estimated time of restoration, where known, as well as any areas that were being restored. E.L.K. also received information from its transmitter and shared their estimated time of restoration with the customers. E.L.K. also continuously reminded public to keep safe distance from downed power lines. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 3077 24 Yes No Others Yes Yes Yes E.L.K. has had discussion internal and with its Board regarding the improvements and mitigation plans for future major events. These ongoing investments and discussions are as follows: • Dedicated inventory supply available for Major Events • Obtain membership with Ontario Mutual Assistance Program (OnMAG) • Continued focus investment in vegetation control program as committed by E.L.K. in EB-2021-0016 E.L.K. Energy Inc. E.L.K. Energy Inc. 2023 22-Sep-2023 26-Jul-2023 4:15 PM Yes Yes, Environment Canada issued a severe thunderstorm warning for the southwestern region of Canada, effective from late afternoon through the evening of July 26th. In addition to the thunderstorm alert, Environment Canada also issued warnings for potential tornadoes, damaging wind gusts, heavy rainfall, and the possibility of hail. Yes, E.L.K.'s standard on-call personnel promptly addressed the initial power outage reports. After conducting their initial assessments, E.L.K. efficiently divided the crews into two shifts, enabling the restoration work to proceed continuously throughout the day and night. Recognizing the scope of the situation from their initial evaluation, E.L.K. acted immediately to initiate the activation of the Ontario Mutual Assistance Program (OnMAG), reaching out to neighboring utility companies to secure additional assistance. The Major Event's primary factors contributing to its occurrence were the Adverse Weather conditions, Loss of Supply, and Tree Contacts. According to reports from Environment Canada, wind gusts reached speeds of up to 91km/h, resulting in significant damage to utility poles. The high winds led to the breakage of tree branches from nearby trees, which then fell onto power lines. In certain cases, large trees were uprooted, collapsing onto the power lines and causing extensive damage to the electrical infrastructure. During the Major Event, a total of 5,028 customers experienced interruptions. E.L.K. serves a customer base totaling 12,101 individuals, and the Major Event accounted for approximately 41% of these interruptions, resulting from various factors such as Loss of Supply, Adverse Weather, or Tree Contact. It took E.L.K. approximately 38 hours to restore power to 90% of customers interrupted. In the earlier part of 2023, E.L.K. joined the Ontario Mutual Assistance Program (OnMAG). As soon as the initial outage call came in, E.L.K. took immediate action, activating OnMAG within one hour to seek assistance from fellow utility providers. During the subsequent meeting with other OnMAG members, several utilities generously offered to dispatch their crews to aid in the restoration efforts. E.L.K. gratefully accepted the offers extended by Bluewater Hydro, Entegrus, and Essex Powerlines, as these utilities were situated in close proximity to E.L.K.'s service area. Yes, E.L.K. maintained an active presence on its Twitter account, consistently sharing updates on estimated restoration times where available and notifying customers about areas that were currently undergoing restoration efforts. Importantly, the company consistently emphasized the crucial safety measure of maintaining a safe distance from downed power lines to protect the public from potential hazards. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5028 41 Yes Yes System upgrades No Yes Yes Before the onset of this Major Event, E.L.K. had a pre-existing plan to implement auto reclosers in communities receiving dual feeds from Hydro One, namely Essex and Harrow. E.L.K. had taken proactive steps by placing an order for these auto reclosers. Once installed, these auto reclosers will enhance E.L.K.'s capability to manage load transfers during instances of Loss of Supply. Furthermore, E.L.K. is committed to enhancing its tree trimming program, with a focus on completing comprehensive tree clearing initiatives for two entire towns each year. This program encompasses the maintenance of both primary and secondary circuits, ensuring the reliability and resilience of the electrical infrastructure. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. 2018 12-Sep-2018 06-Aug-2018 13:16 PM Yes, there was a severe weather warning. The weather warning did not provide much time before the storm hit. Crews were called but were not on site until after the Major Event began. Yes - we hold "mock storms" and annual storm training to refresh procedures with staff. This storm met criteria as per IEEE 1366. There were 15,313 customer hours of outage time experienced on this day. 1 hour and 2 minutes. No Twitter messages included some overarching estimates of restoration timeframe for the city. ETRs specific to each area were not posted. Communications staff have signed up for Environment Canada weather alerts by email. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. 2022 08-Apr-2022 18-Feb-2022 12:55 AM No There was a localized ice storm at the time of the outage which adversely affected Hydro One's 115kV supply lines in the City of Windsor, resulting in Loss of Supply. There was a localized ice storm at the time of the outage which adversely affected Hydro One's 115kV supply lines in the City of Windsor. As the Major Event started at 12:55 a.m. and was resolved by 4:38 a.m., the outage was a non-issue for most customers, with the exception of some large manufacturers that operate overnight. 16,692 individual customers were each interrupted 3 times during the Loss of Supply which caused the Major Event. It took 3.7167 hours to restore 90% of customers who were interrupted. As the outage occurred during the early morning hours of February 18, and restoration was fully achieved by 4:38 a.m. before most customers woke up, no information was sent out to the public during the outage. However, two tweets were issued at 11:23 a.m. on February 18 advising that an overnight outage had occurred and was caused by a loss of supply from Hydro One that was precipitated by ice build-up on their lines. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 16692 18 Yes No No further action is required at this time No The Major Event was related to Loss of Supply, and ENWIN’s Control Room is trained to manage such events. ENWIN was able to remotely reconfigure its distribution system which shortened the outage for customers by approximately 2 hours. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. 2022 16-Sep-2022 22-Jul-2022 12:19 AM No There was a thunderstorm that came through the City of Windsor that affected three 27.6 kV feeders in the downtown and central Windsor area. All three feeders were affected around the same time resulting in a Major Event Day. There was a thunderstorm that came through the City of Windsor that affected three 27.6 kV feeders in the downtown and central Windsor area. Large tree limbs fell into the primary powerlines due to the storm. All three feeders were affected around the same time starting at 12:19am and full restoration was achieved at 5:48am. None ENWIN tweeted out the areas that were affected by the storm and an approximate restoration time when that information was determined. The outage map on the ENWIN website also had this information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 19661 21 No No No further action is required at this time No The Major Event was caused by a strong thunderstorm which are frequent in the Windsor area. ENWIN’s Control Room was able to dispatch standby employees, call in extra employees and remotely reconfigure the distribution system to restore power efficiently. Unfortunately, three 27.6 kV feeders were affected around the same time with large tree limbs in the primary powerlines due to the storm. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. 2023 21-Apr-2023 22-Feb-2023 2:15 PM Yes Local media and Environment Canada had issued warnings and news coverage of the potential of a freezing rain event. The first outages caused by the freezing rain event started at approximately 2:00 pm during a regular weekday. Full staffing was working at the onset of the storm. There were several small outages at the onset of the storm, which were dealt with by staff that had arrived for their afternoon shift, and staff that had been carried over from their day shift. These outages were restored between 5:00 pm and 6:00 pm. Between 6:00 pm and 7:00 pm, the storm began to create many widespread outages. Once the event was creating widespread power outages, more staff were called in and mobilized to provide power restoration. Management simultaneously made arrangements to have crews working shifts to enable 24-hour storm restoration efforts. Shifts of crews worked 24 hours per day beginning in the afternoon of February 22, 2023. All available line staff were engaged in power restoration until the last customer that could be re-connected, was re-connected. A freezing rain event impacted the entirety of the City of Windsor beginning in the afternoon of Wednesday, February 22, 2023, and continuing into the mid-morning of Thursday, February 23, 2023. The ice accumulation on lines, trees and structures caused numerous power outages from falling trees which downed powerlines. From the peak at 11:18 pm on February 22, 90% of that load was restored by 5:20 pm on February 23, 18 hours, 2 minutes after the peak outage occurred. ENWIN engaged in a significant communications effort to keep its customers apprised of the status of ongoing restoration efforts. A summary is provided below: -Social media posts were made outlining areas affected by the storm, and once determined, an approximate restoration time. This included over 13 original posts and over 40 system-generated posts. Information included directions to visit the ENWIN website to view the outage map and to read information about power restoration, tips during prolonged power outages, and safety information. -ENWIN worked closely with local media throughout the event, issuing six press releases between February 23rd and 24th. -ENWIN team members also contributed to 12 interviews and media updates, with any update/media release being posted to the ENWIN website. Banners on the website were also made to direct visitors to ENWIN’s online outage centre. -Additional call centre staff were made available to handle increased customer call volume (e.g. reporting power out or lines down) during and after the storm. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 25595 27.4 No No System upgrades No Yes Yes The Major Event was caused by a multiple hour freezing rain event. ENWIN has made significant investments in system automation and remote operation that allow for remote reconfiguration of the distribution feeders in the event of an upset. These system automation devices are in place to allow for the smallest area of feeder circuit to be automatically isolated due to the fault condition, while allowing for quick restoration of the remaining load. This automation, in addition to ongoing staff training, proved beneficial during the storm, to reduce the duration of the outages to the extent possible. ENWIN also continues to focus on continual improvement. It is currently working on upgrades to its outage management system, which will offer enhancements to its customer outage map, with more granularity of information provided to customers including confirmation of the outage area and estimated times of restorations for each outage. This will also assist with process improvements to further enhance outage response and reporting. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. ENWIN Utilities Ltd. 2023 23-Oct-2023 24-Aug-2023 10:27 pm Yes Environment Canada had issued warnings in the late afternoon and evening of August 24, 2023, describing the potential of a storm with high winds and a risk of tornado activity. ENWIN was aware of the potential for approaching severe weather during the afternoon and evening of August 24, 2023. However, the Environment Canada warnings of a potential windstorm were received later in the evening, with the storm ultimately reaching Windsor at approximately 10:27 pm. Due to the timing of the weather alert and the uncertainty of potential impacts, ENWIN did not call-in additional employees to standby in advance of the storm. ENWIN regularly maintains an afternoon shift of a single bucket truck, and this crew was on shift the evening of August 24, 2023. This crew was immediately mobilized to assess the damage and address hazards during the weather event. As the scale of outages became evident shortly after the beginning of the storm, a call out for additional ENWIN line crews was executed. ENWIN management simultaneously scheduled field crews, system control, and supervisory staff to provide 24-hour storm restoration. Shifts of crews worked 24 hours per day beginning August 24, 2023. As noted below, approximately 90% of customers were restored in under 6 hours of the outage peak occurring. A significant summer storm was experienced in southwestern Ontario during the evening of August 24, 2023. The storm produced very high winds, which post-event, were determined to also include two separate tornado touch downs within ENWIN’s service territory. There were many incidents of fallen trees, broken poles and similar wind-driven damage throughout the City of Windsor. A peak of approximately 19,800 customers were without power. The outage peak occurred at approximately 12:30 am on August 25, 2023. At that point, approximately 19,800 customers were without power. By 6:15 am August 25, 2023, greater than 90% of the peak load loss had been restored. Essex Powerlines Corporation Assistance was also provided by a third-party line contractor, Black & McDonald. ENWIN posted tweets describing areas affected by the storm and an approximate restoration time when that information was determined. Tweets included directions to visit the ENWIN website to view the outage map, to read information about power restoration, and actions to take during prolonged power outages. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 19800 21.2 No Yes System upgrades No No Yes "Process Improvements" also apply. The Major Event was caused by a storm with very high winds, which post-event, was determined to include two separate tornado touch downs within ENWIN’s service territory. ENWIN has invested in system automation/remote operation that allow for remote reconfiguration of distribution feeders in event of upset. These system automation devices are in place to allow for the smallest area of feeder circuit to be automatically isolated due to the fault condition while allowing for quick restoration of the remaining load. ENWIN also continues to focus on continual improvement. It is currently working on upgrades to its outage management system, which will offer enhancements to its customer outage map, with more granularity of information provided to customers including confirmation of the outage area and estimated times of restorations for each outage. This will also assist with process improvements to further enhance outage response and reporting. EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario Inc. EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario Inc. 2020 20-Oct-2020 29-Aug-2020 12:29:PM No EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario had NO prior warning. The tree that fell peeled off at the base or trunk due to internal rot which is very difficult to predict or prevent. This tree took down several other trees in its path closer to the line. Additionally, as a result of a tree contact in June 2019 EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario had additional tree trimming and visual inspection completed in this specific area. This additional works resulted in a much expanded tree to power line separation with NO visual decay observed. The Cause of Interruption was identified as Cause Code 3.2: Tree Contact Unpreventable On Saturday, August 29th after a prolonged period of heavy rainfall and substantial wind a tree fell and made contact with a major 44Kv feeder and a 4Kv underbuild feeder. The contact resulted in a direct fault on the M3 44Kv circuit as well as the MS # 2. Feeder #1 - 4kV circuit. The outage affected 9841customers which is approximately 54.3% of the entire customer base. 9087 customers or 92.3% of those interrupted were restored at 2:06 PM (1.62 hours) Yes, EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario is part of the Cornerstone Hydro Electric Concepts Association Inc. Emergency Mutual Assistance Agreement. 18 Ontario distributors are members of this Association. Note: EPCOR Electricity Distribution Ontario did not require mutual assistance with the restoration process during this event. Yes, information was posted on the LDC website which included a map of the area affected and Twitter posts were also posted regarding the outage. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9841 54 No Yes System upgrades No EPCOR investigated the possibility to either relocate existing overhead switch locations or add additional switches to normally isolate this portion of the line in the summer given the residual risk of tree contact. A review with Hydro One has projected costs of approximately $200k to provide options to isolate this line either normally or during outages. This would also require seasonal adjustments with Hydro One to balance the load as it is a shared feeder. However, a review of the feeder that could offset the load from this line once isolated is already too loaded in the summer making this option unfeasible. Complete tree removal or circuit relocation (underground) are not viewed as feasible options. EPCOR will continue to ensure its outage response capability is as efficient as possible to restore customers as quickly as can be safely achieved. ERTH Power Corporation ERTH Power Corporation 2017 10-May-2017 22-Jul-2016 NO PRIOR WARNING N/A STAFF TRAINED ON ERIE THAMES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ERIE THAMES USES FIXED PERCENTAGE APPROACH TO DETERMINE MAJOR EVENT. 10 % OF TOTAL CUSTOMERS WITH AN OUTAGE OF GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES. THIS EVENT FELL WITHIN THE CRITERIA/ 4 HOURS NO YES, THROUGH WEBSITE, FACEBOOK AND TWITTER NOT APPLICABLE -LOSS OF SUPPLY ERTH Power Corporation ERTH Power Corporation 2024 29-Feb-2024 12-Jan-2024 05:45 PM Yes Environment Canada had issued a Winter Storm Warning for parts of our service territory and a Winter Travel Advisory for others. On-Call staff were prepared and available while remaining crews were briefed on the weather and the potential need for extra help and sent home. During the event, additional Powerline Technicians and Operations Management staff were called in to assist. The main cause of the outages during the Major Event was “5 Equipment Failure” for a connection that failed in the wind. It took 14.5 hours from the beginning of the Event until 90% of interrupted customers were restored. Given the geography of our service territory the longest any individual customer was interrupted was 7.25 hours. Updates were provided via social media and ERTH Power’s Outage Map. This information is also made available through our website. Messages included the towns that were affected, any potential restoration time and information about how to stay safe during outages. Messages were also posted once all power was restored so individual customers still without power would know to call in. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4107 16.5 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes ERTH Power is in the process of increasing its capacity for fault detection to more quickly pinpoint the source of outages and reduce outage times. ERTH Power’s Operations department will review a procedure for debriefing meetings to discuss successes and areas for improvement following large outages. Given the popularity of social media posts and outage maps during outages, ERTH Power will look to improve on their use during outages that occur outside of office hours. This will be achieved by improving lines of communication from Operations and improving access for those that are responsible for social media posts and outage map updates. The goal is to eventually have these means of communication accurate 24 hours a day whereas now they’re largely only updated during office hours and for large outages. ERTH Power Corporation ERTH Power Corporation 2024 16-Jul-2024 25-Jun-2024 12:05 PM No No, there were no warnings or watches for inclement weather prior to the event. The main cause of the outages during the Major Event was “6.1 – Tree Contact - Weather”. Yes, updates were provided via social media and ERTH Power’s Outage Map. This information is also made available through our website. Messages included the towns that were affected, any potential restoration time and information about how to stay safe during outages. Messages were also posted once all power was restored so individual customers still without power would know to call in. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5205 20.9 Yes No Process improvements No ERTH Power is in the process of increasing its capacity for fault detection to more quickly pinpoint the source of outages and reduce outage times. ERTH Power’s Operations department will conduct a debriefing meeting to discuss successes and areas for improvement. Given the popularity of social media posts and outage maps during outages, ERTH Power will look to improve on their use during outages that occur outside of office hours. This will be achieved by improving lines of communication from Operations and improving access for those that are responsible for social media posts and outage map updates. The goal is to eventually have these means of communication accurate 24 hours a day whereas now they’re largely only updated during office hours and for large outages. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2020 09-Mar-2020 25-Jan-2020 02:00 AM Yes The Major Event was due to a loss of supply from Hydro One. Less than 48 hours prior to the outage, Elexicon Energy received a call from Hydro One advising of urgent emergency repair work that was required at the Belleville Transmission Station which would affect over 10,000 Hydro One customers and over 17,800 Elexicon Energy customers within the City of Belleville. On short notice, Elexicon Energy worked with Hydro One to minimize impact to customers and to coordinate communication efforts. The outage was scheduled outside of regular business hours from approximately 2:00 – 4:30 am on a Saturday morning. The following extra employees were in place during the scheduled outage: • 4 Line staff plus 1 Supervisor • 1 additional Control Room Operator • 3 Customer Experience staff • 1 Corporate Communications Representative The Major Event was due to a Loss of Supply from Hydro One. On short notice, Hydro One was required to conduct emergency repair work to replace damaged equipment at Belleville Transmission Station which serves Hydro One customers along with Elexicon Energy customers in Belleville and the surrounding area. Due to the location of the damaged equipment, the station had to be de-energized while crews completed the critical work. The work was completed in advance of a winter storm that was anticipated in order to eliminate the risk of further damage and a more prolonged outage. Please be advised for question 6., the actual hours it took to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted was 2.5 hours. A Media Alert was issued by Hydro One and shared with Elexicon Energy’s communication representative. Elexicon Energy took the following steps to further ensure information about the event was available to customers and key stakeholders through the following channels: • Front page alert was activated on Elexicon Energy’s website landing page with link to the outage release • Front page alert was activated on legacy Veridian Connections website and release posted • Website outage map • Twitter messages, My Alerts • Calls to large 44 kW connected customers and other identified customers with critical needs • Release distributed to the Customer Experience team • Planned outage release was sent to media outlets, City of Belleville officials, and Elexicon Corporation and Elexicon Energy Boards • Meeting with City Emergency staff Following communication with the City of Belleville, the Mayor held a media-like conference the day before the outage to further communicate notice of the planned outage to residents and businesses. In addition, Hydro One advised Elexicon Energy that it distributed the media alert and engaged local media to share the message; contacted local elected officials; and used its social media channels to assist in communication of this event. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 18071 11 Yes No Others No Yes Yes The topic of a single supply station (Belleville TS) with no backup has been identified and is included in the current OEB Regional Planning discussions for this region. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2020 10-Sep-2020 19-Jul-2020 11:45 AM Yes Environment Canada issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for Pickering, Whitby and Ajax areas, and a Tornado Watch in Gravenhurst. Normal Elexicon on-call staff were available to assist. Additional Contractor staff were on standby to assist if required. Elexicon Energy experienced high winds and rain in a number of areas it services on July 19. Tree contacts with conductors produced a number of customer outages or resulted in loss of supply for Elexicon customers. Approximately 12 tweets were published on Elexicon Energy’s Twitter account (@ElexiconEnergy) during the event. These tweets link to Elexicon’s online outage map, which provides estimated times of restoration. The company’s Outage Information Hotline (1-866-579-6819) also provided estimated times of restoration. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 17989 11 Yes No Process improvements No Yes No A power restoration drill will be scheduled before the end of 2020 to further improve coordination of resources and staff during larger scale power outage events. Elexicon is also in the process of updating its power restoration plan in Q3/Q4 2020 and will incorporate into that update any learnings from the July 19 event. Elexicon is also evaluating improved weather monitoring tools to assist its Control Room staff. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2020 24-Nov-2020 23-Oct-2020 5:55:00 PM Yes Storm warnings received late afternoon Friday Oct 23. Additional control room staff brought in. Notification to staff of possible need for extra help due to storm damage. N/A Approximately 45 tweets were published on Elexicon Energy's Twitter account (@ElexiconEnergy) during the event. These tweets link to Elexicon's outline outage map, which provides estimated times of restoration. The company's Outage Information Hotline (1-866-579-6819) also provided estimated times of restoration. Updates to restoration times were provided during course of outage on Elexicon's online outage map. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2614 2 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes Improvements will be pursued related to streamlined local outage management Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2021 13-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 15:00 Yes Environment Canada weather warnings of potential high winds. Customer care staff were put on standby, add’l control room operator brought in, additional Lines staff put on standby. Very high winds, lots of outages, possibly due to trees or other objects contacting lines in the wind. Approximately 70-plus tweets were published on Elexicon Energy’s Twitter account (@ElexiconEnergy) during the event. These tweets link to Elexicon’s online outage map, which provides estimated times of restoration. The company’s Outage Information Hotlines also provided estimated times of restoration. Elexicon’s Communications Team also issued a news release, providing an update on the company’s power restoration efforts in Gravenhurst, and provided frequent updates to the Town’s Mayor and Council. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 22892 14 Yes No Additional staff training No Yes Yes Additional staff training on Elexicon’s Power Restoration plan will be conducted. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2021 27-Jan-2021 25-Nov-2020 07:55 AM No An incorrect conductor sleeve was used in a 44kV circuit >40 years ago by a predecessor utility to Elexicon. Once installed, it is very difficult to discover the incorrect application. As a result, this particular sleeve has been in service at this location ever since its installation. On Nov 25, 2020, the sleeve failed and caused an inter-circuit fault between multiple overhead feeders. Duration of this outage was extended by approximately 60 minutes in order to proactively replace similar vintage compression sleeves on the other phase conductors at this location. Approximately 12 tweets were published on Elexicon Energy’s Twitter account (@ElexiconEnergy) during the event. These tweets link to Elexicon’s online outage map, which provides estimated times of restoration. The company’s Outage Information Hotline also provided estimated times of restoration. Elexicon’s Communications Team issued a news release following the event with details of what caused the outage and a statement from a company representative. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 17540 10.4 No No No further action is required at this time No This failure of a predecessor utility installed sleeve is a first time occurrence. Elexicon will develop an approach to the inspection of other similar inherited sleeve installations. Even though current Elexicon staff did not install the failed sleeve, proper sleeve installation techniques and work practices will be reviewed with staff as a learning opportunity. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2021 20-Jul-2021 26-May-2021 22:09 PM No Hydro One lost one of their transmission circuits, T24C, feeding Thornton TS and part of Whitby TS. At the time of that circuit outage, the backup transmission circuit for these facilities, T26C, was out of service for planned work. As a result, Elexicon customer’s supplied from those facilities lost power. The actual number time it took to restore 90% of the interrupted customers was: 1 hour 38 minutes Elexicon Energy’s Communications team was active on its Twitter account, responding to customer questions and concerns, and providing estimated times of power restoration based on information from its Operations team and Hydro One. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 38055 22 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2022 17-Jan-2022 11-Dec-2021 12:00 AM Yes Early reports of high winds being expected were received on Dec 10, 2021. Yes, additional Elexicon staff were put on standby in all Districts expected to be affected (all Elexicon districts in this case). As well, arrangements were made with key contractors to provide staff if called upon. Windstorm Interrupted customers represent 17.6% of the distributor's total customer base. Updates provided by system control direct to social media on a regular basis with Estimated Restoration Times (ERTs) where possible, supplemented with custom messaging from the Communications team providing supplemental information and responses to specific questions. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 30471 17.6 Yes No Additional staff training No Yes No Additional staff training and Process Improvements. Elexicon carried out an event debrief meeting and has created a lessons learned register from this event (and future events) that will be used to continuously improve its Power Restoration Plan (PRP) and associated protocols and procedures. Follow up meetings to discuss specific areas of improvement, primarily relating to communication processes between field operations, system control and Communications, are scheduled for early 2022. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2022 13-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:30 PM Yes Yes, Elexicon Energy Inc. (“Elexicon”) had very limited prior warning based on reports of high winds advancing into its service territory. However, Environment Canada’s Severe Thunderstorm Warnings for Uxbridge and Northern Regions of Durham, Pickering, Oshawa, Southern Durham Region were not issued until after Elexicon had issued its own Pre-Event Readiness warning internally on May 21, 2022. Elexicon issued a Pre-Event Readiness warning internally on May 21, 2022. This Readiness warning alerts staff to the possible need for their assistance should the conditions require it. On May 21, 2022 a derecho storm swept through the province of Ontario and large portions of Elexicon’s service territory. This widespread and fast-moving storm caused extensive damage to Elexicon’s infrastructure thereby leading to prolonged power outages for the majority of Elexicon’s customers. During the course of this Major Event, Elexicon issued several communications to the public to keep them well informed. These included: * Outage map on website displaying information about outage locations and estimated restoration times (“ETRs”). * Website banner display that contained information about power restoration efforts, the number of customers affected, restoration time as a whole, contact information about where to call if customers see a downed power line or tree or to report an outage, including new storm email inbox, and Electrical Safety Association (“ESA”) information for customer owned infrastructure and connections. During the Major event, Elexicon had 689,539 page views on its website. * Updated news releases posted to public facing website, twitter and sent to all local and major GTA media outlets to inform about Elexicon’s power restoration efforts including critical information to ensure public safety. * News interviews to continue to update and communicate to customers through traditional media that was carried on Global and CTV News locally (Durham) and provincially. * Social media updates including real-time posts from system control that aligned with outage map on location of outages and ETRs/supplemental posts on restoration efforts/images of damage and crews conducting restoration efforts/safety messages/conservation messaging to ensure ongoing reliability in areas where load needed to be transferred and shared with another substation/information about local community relief locations/power outage survival checklists and emergency management for those who require electricity for critical life support/review and triaging of all messages from customers to ensure follow up by distribution operations and crews. * Direct communications as well as regular updates to Mayors, City and Town Councilors and CAOs of all affected regions to ensure most up-to-date local information can be provided to the public through their own communication channels as civic leaders. * Direct communications to customers and the public through our call centre and specialized storm communication email address that was actively monitored throughout the major event Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 126456 73 Yes No Additional staff training Yes Yes No Additional actions are: Process Improvements and System upgrades. Elexicon is currently undertaking an organization-wide event postmortem, including Lessons Learned from this event that will inform specific improvements related to staff training, process improvements and potential system upgrades. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2022 04-Aug-2022 16-Jun-2022 13:40 PM Yes Yes, Elexicon Energy Inc. (“Elexicon”) issued internal warnings of possible thunderstorms based on Environment Canada warnings for the Brock area on June 16 at 12:48PM and for Belleville at 2:40PM. As the warnings occurred during regular working hours, all staff were considered to be on standby for possible storm related repairs. Another main contributing cause is the: Adverse Weather-Wind A severe thunderstorm passed through the region of Belleville, resulting in downed trees and conductors. Hydro One lost two feeders during the storm which supplied Elexicon stations. As a result, Elexicon customers supplied from those facilities lost power. After Hydro One restored power, downed trees on Elexicon lines further hindered restoration efforts. 25 Hours and 42 minutes During the course of this Major Event, Elexicon issued several communications to the public to keep them well informed. These included: ? Outage map on website displaying information about outage locations and estimated times of restoration (“ETRs”). ? Website banner display that contained information about power restoration efforts, the number of customers affected, restoration times as a whole, and contact information for customers to call to report a downed power line, trees/branches on power line and outages. ? Elexicon was contacted by local newspapers and radio stations daily for updates and media statements. ? Social media updates including real-time posts from Elexicon’s System Control Centre that aligned with the outage map on location of outages and ETRs/supplemental posts on restoration efforts/images of damage and crews conducting restoration efforts/safety messages. ? Direct communications as well as regular updates to the Mayor by Elexicon’s President and CEO and City Councillors and CAOs of all affected regions to ensure most up-to-date local information can be provided to the public through their own communication channels as civic leaders. ? Direct communications to customers and the public through our call centre. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 22549 12.9 Yes No Additional staff training No No Yes Other Steps were: Process Improvements and System Upgrades The Lessons Learned from the ongoing organization-wide May 21, 2022 Wind storm event postmortem are expected to be useful in events such as the June 16, 2022 Belleville storm. Elexicon anticipates leveraging the Lessons Learned from both of the aforementioned storms in order to plan for future events. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2023 02-Feb-2023 03-Dec-2022 11:22 AM Yes Elexicon Energy only had a standard public safety weather warning. These are not aimed at or equipped to inform impacts to the distribution system. There were extra employees put on Standby for that weekend. 2 extra employees in Whitby as well as 2 extra employees in Belleville. All districts were advised to ensure staff was prepared to respond to higher call volumes. Forestry crews were also put in place on standby for possible wind/tree contact issues. A high winds event caused a loss of supply to our Newcastle customer base. Given that the impacted device was an asset owned by Hydro One Networks Inc., Elexicon Energy had limited control in restoring customers in a more timely fashion. 5.5% of the total customer base were interrupted and it took 9 hours, 28 minutes to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. Elexicon Energy provided timely and informative updates during the Major Event. Outage details – including areas, crew status and estimated times of power restoration – were posted on the utility’s online Outage Map, Twitter feed and Outage Information Hotline. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9727 6 Yes No Others No Yes Yes The Control centre researched alternative power restoration paths to increase flexibility, reliability and redundancy. This work was passed on to the field operations team who did a field visit to validate and clarify the findings. Hydro One owns most of this feeder, and Elexicon Energy does not have major concerns in its portion of the feeder. Most of the outages on this feeder are related to Loss of Supply. Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2023 15-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 09:45 am Yes Public advisory weather warnings. Typically, these are public safety reports that are not reliable for operating a distribution network. Staffing was arranged to maximize working hours according to region to ensure Elexicon Energy could provide a 24/7 response. An historic winter storm including blizzards, high winds and snowfall swept through the region from December 23rd to 25th causing widespread outages. High winds brought down trees and power lines resulting in damage to critical infrastructure. 30 hours, 4 minutes Elexicon Energy provided timely and informative updates during the Major Event. Outage details – including areas, crew status and estimated times of power restoration – were posted on Elexicon’s online Outage Map, Twitter feed and Outage Information Hotline. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 52334 30 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Elexicon Energy Inc. Elexicon Energy Inc. 2023 20-Mar-2023 25-Jan-2023 03:52 PM Yes Elexicon Energy only had a standard public safety weather warning. These are not aimed at or equipped to inform impacts to the distribution system. Additional crews were scheduled to be on stand-by. An incident management structure was initiated to continually monitor and assess for operational needs and public communications A snowstorm swept through the region with winds gusts and heavy snowfall resulting in power outages. Heavy snow fall accumulation between 15 to 20cm during rush hour traffic. The timing of the storm complicated matters. Unplowed roads at rush hour traffic restricted the movement of crews and our ability to restore customers. Interrupted customers represent 7.6% of the Distributor's total customer base. It took 5 hours, 20 minutes to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. Elexicon Energy provided updates, when available, during the Major Event. Outage details, including affected areas, crew status and estimated times of power restoration, were posted on Elexicon’s online Outage Map, Twitter feed and Outage Information Hotline. Adverse Weather-Snow Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 13330 7.6 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Elexicon Energy Inc. Veridian Connections Inc. 2018 05-Jun-2018 04-Apr-2018 11:55 AM Yes, Environment Canada issued a Wind Warning for Southern Ontario on April 3rd at 15:21 noting the pending wind and then again on April 4th at 15:50. Veridian enacted its Power Restoration Plan, which dictates the requirements for extra standby of employees. These included, but were not limited to: Customer Care Staff, Lines Staff, System Operators, Communications Personnel and Management. The event occurred during business hours so all available staff were already at work. Veridian performs a tabletop exercise of its Power Restoration Plan in November of every year, where Veridian carries out roundtable discussions of how to tackle a hypothetical major event. The weather event on April 4 was beyond the control of the utility which satisfies elements of being unpreventable or unavoidable. When assessed using the IEEE 1366 2.5 beta method applied to five years of historic reliability data, the result exceeds the daily SAIDI threshold and therefore April 4 was deemed as a major event day. 7 hours, 90% of customers were restored by April 4, 18:47. No. Outside assistance wasn?t required. Estimated times of restoration were provided thru Veridian?s 24?hour Outage Hotline, Twitter account, my.alerts (Outage Notification System) and Call Centre. All Twitter notices were also displayed on the home page of Veridian?s website, as is routine practice. Per the Veridian Power Restoration Plan, a debrief session takes place after each major event. This debrief session is used to analyze the response to the outage to determine the requirement for further training, process, policy and/or Power Restoration Plan enhancements based upon lessons learned. Elexicon Energy Inc. Veridian Connections Inc. 2018 18-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 21:40 Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement on April 12th stating a potential ice storm for parts of southern Ontario for Saturday April 14th through to Sunday April 15th. Veridian enacted its Power Restoration Plan, which dictates the requirements for extra standby of employees. These included, but were not limited to: Customer Care Staff, Lines Staff, System Operators, Communications Personnel and Management. Veridian performs a tabletop exercise of its Power Restoration Plan in November of every year, where Veridian carries out roundtable discussions of how to tackle a hypothetical major event The weather event on April 16th was beyond the control of the utility which satisfies elements of being unpreventable or unavoidable. When assessed using the IEEE 1366 2.5 beta method and applied to five years of historic reliability data, the result exceeds the daily SAIDI threshold. Therefore April 16th was deemed as a major event day. 21 hours, 90% of customers were restored by April 16th, 19:10. No. Outside assistance was not required. Estimated times of restoration were provided through Veridian?s 24-hour outage hotline, Twitter account, my.alerts (Outage Notification System) and call centre. All Twitter notices were also displayed on the home page of Veridian?s website, as is routine practice. Per the Veridian Power Restoration Plan, a debrief session takes place after each major event. This debrief session is used to analyze the response to the outage to determine the requirement for further training, process, policy and/or Power Restoration Plan enhancements based upon lessons learned. Elexicon Energy Inc. Veridian Connections Inc. 2018 05-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 16:10 Yes, Environment Canada issued a special weather statement at 04:47 on May 4th noting potential winds later in the day. At 10:45 the same day, they issued a Wind Warning for all of Southern Ontario. Veridian enacted its Power Restoration Plan, which dictates the requirements for extra standby of employees. These included, but were not limited to: Customer Care Staff, Lines Staff, System Operators, Communications Personnel and Management. Veridian performs a tabletop exercise of its Power Restoration Plan in November of every year, where Veridian carries out roundtable discussions of how to tackle a hypothetical major event. The weather event on May 4th and 5th was beyond the control of the utility which satisfies elements of being unpreventable or unavoidable. When assessed using the IEEE 1366 2.5 beta method and applied to five years of historic reliability data, the result exceeds the daily SAIDI threshold. Therefore May 4th and May 5th were deemed as a Major Event. 29 hours, 90% of customers were restored by May 5th, 21:17. No. Outside mutual aid assistance was not required. Estimated times of restoration were provided through Veridian?s 24-hour Outage Hotline, Twitter account, my.alerts (Outage Notification System) and Call Centre. All Twitter notices were also displayed on the home page of Veridian?s website, as is routine practice. Per the Veridian Power Restoration Plan, a debrief session takes place after each major event. This debrief session is used to analyze the response to the outage to determine the requirement for further training, process, policy and/or Power Restoration Plan enhancements based upon lessons learned. Elexicon Energy Inc. Veridian Connections Inc. 2018 02-Nov-2018 21-Sep-2018 16:06 Yes, Environment Canada issued wind and severe thunderstorm warnings on September 21st for Gravenhurst, Belleville, Port Hope, Orono, Newcastle, Ajax, Pickering, Clarington and Brock. Veridian enacted its Power Restoration Plan, which dictates the requirements for extra standby of employees. These included, but were not limited to: Customer Care Staff, Lines Staff, System Operators, Communications Personnel and Management. Veridian performs a tabletop exercise of its Power Restoration Plan in November of every year, where Veridian carries out roundtable discussions of how to tackle a hypothetical major event. The weather event on September 21st was beyond the control of the utility which satisfies elements of being unpreventable or unavoidable. When assessed using the IEEE 1366 2.5 beta method and applied to five years of historic reliability data, the result exceeds the daily SAIDI threshold. Therefore September 21st was deemed as a Major Event Day. 10 hours, 90% of customers were restored by September 22nd 02:31. No. Outside mutual aid assistance was not required. Estimated times of restoration were provided through Veridian?s 24-hour Outage Hotline, Twitter account, my.alerts (Outage Notification System) and Call Centre. All Twitter notices were also displayed on the home page of Veridian?s website. Per the Veridian Power Restoration Plan, a debrief session takes place after each major event. This debrief session is used to analyze the response to the outage to determine the requirement for further training, process, policy and/or Power Restoration Plan enhancements based upon lessons learned. Elexicon Energy Inc. Whitby Hydro Electric Corporation 2018 23-Feb-2018 28-Dec-2017 12:44 AM No. While Whitby was one of many areas in the province that was under an extreme cold weather alert, conditions were not expected to trigger a major event. No prior warning. Regular on call/standby operational resources were in place prior to the major event. This included line department employees (2) on call as well as a control room system operator (1) and stations employee (1) on standby. Operations supervisor/s are contacted for assistance if required. Whitby Hydro engages the services of a third party call centre who provides 24/7 outage assistance for customers and answers customer calls after-hours. Whitby Hydro operations (including line, control room and stations) employees are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures operations staff are available 24/7 and prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying significance. Applicable staff are trained on the outage management system, customer call handling and routine website updates. Processes for communication between Whitby Hydro and its third party call centre are in place to ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. Operations management will contact appropriate staff to communicate, provide or engage additional resources if required to address a major event. On December 28, the IEEE 1366 TMED threshold was exceeded. It was determined that an adverse weather related jolt of a pole occurred due to the extreme cold which caused conductor movement. There was no other plant damage found. Because of the weather-related equipment issues, Whitby Hydro?s system experienced a feeder lockout. Power was restored but intermittent outages continued while crews investigated until they were able to identify the main cause and isolate the equipment for repairs. The event was unexpected, unpredictable and unavoidable. The event initially caused an outage at 6:28pm on December 27, 2017 where more than 90% of affected customers were restored within 5 minutes. An additional five related outages occurred intermittently between 12:44am and 7:17am on December 28, 2017 and efforts were made to restore power to customers quickly and safely each time despite the extreme cold weather conditions and limitations from night time visibility until the issue was identified and fully addressed. While customers who experienced the outage had power periodically during that window of time, overall it took just over 5 hours to fully restore the power to more than 90% of customers affected by the outage. No. Additional assistance was not required. Yes, there were estimates released to the public during the major event through media statements, a media interview, two website updates and through our website blog/Twitter. The following additional steps are being taken to ensure a state of readiness for major events: - Continue to review and update Whitby Hydro?s emergency protocols including coordination with the Town of Whitby for larger scale emergencies. Continue participation in mock emergency drills with the Town of Whitby. - Enhance stand-alone communications protocol which includes refreshing our Twitter guidelines, followed by education/training to staff. - Subscribe to a media newswire service to ensure faster distribution of media statements. - Continue to look for opportunities to make effective system improvements to maximize benefits to the system with a view to reduce outages. - Arrange meeting/tour with third party call centre to gain further insight into processes and opportunities to leverage their services and experience related to major events. - Continue to explore possible opportunities to further leverage system technology. Elexicon Energy Inc. Whitby Hydro Electric Corporation 2018 28-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 17:25 PM High wind warnings were forecasted by Environment Canada prior to the event. Yes. Regular on call/standby operational resources that were in place included line department employees (2) on call as well as a control room system operator (1) and stations employee (1) on standby. In addition, arrangements were made with a number of regular staff, supervisors and managers to be available if needed and a third party contractor was also placed on call along with a forestry crew from the Town of Whitby who was on notice to assist if needed. Whitby Hydro engages the services of a third party call centre who provides 24/7 outage assistance for customers and answers customer calls after-hours. Whitby Hydro operations (including line, control room and stations) employees are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures operations staff are available 24/7 and prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying significance. Applicable staff are trained on the outage management system, customer call handling and routine website updates. Processes for communication between Whitby Hydro and its third party call centre are in place to ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. Operations management will contact appropriate staff to communicate, provide or engage additional resources if required to address a major event. For the event that spanned May 4-5, the IEEE 1366 TMED threshold was exceeded. During this timeframe Whitby Hydro experienced a loss of supply from Hydro One. High winds and gusts ranging up to 120 km/hour also contributed to the major event. The event was not preventable by Whitby Hydro. The event initially caused an outage at 5:25pm on May 4, 2018 due to adverse weather. At 5:49pm, a large number of customers were affected by the loss of supply from Hydro One. Over 70% of customers affected had their power restored in less than 2 hours and within 3.5 hours just under 90% of customers had power restored. No. Yes, there were estimates released to the public during the major event through media statements, website updates and through Twitter. The following additional steps are being taken to ensure a state of readiness for major events: - Continue to review and update Whitby Hydro?s emergency protocols including coordination with the Town of Whitby for larger scale emergencies. Continue participation in mock emergency drills with the Town of Whitby. - Continue to look for opportunities to make effective system improvements to maximize benefits to the system with a view to reduce outages. - Continue to explore possible opportunities to further leverage system technology. Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2018 13-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 3:50PM Several days prior to the storm, Environment Canada began issuing alerts warning of a ?potential major ice storm? for the upcoming weekend. Regular on-call operational resources were in place prior to the event. This included Distribution department employees (2 Powerline Technician?s and 1 Foreman), 24/7 Control Room and 1 Supervisory/Emergency Management person. Call Centre staff were notified prior to the event that the afterhours call centre could be activated KWHI Operations staff are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures that staff are available 24/7 and are prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying magnitude. Applicable staff are trained on the Outage Management System (OMS), customer call handling and routine website and social media updating. Outage response processes are in place to notify Senior Management and Communications to ensure escalation of response and ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. The ice storm of April 15th meets the definition of a Major Event as defined by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Filing Requirements. That is, the event is ?beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable.? The impact to the distribution system as a result of the storm was unavoidable and unpredictable from a planning perspective. The accumulation of ice on trees and wires combined with wind gusts of up to 85 km/h were responsible for a number of fallen trees and broken limbs which took down power lines and caused widespread power outages Using the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366, the KWHI calculated threshold for a major event (TMED) for 2018 is 5.36 minutes/customer. The impact of this event was 9.56 minutes/customer which exceeds the TMED. The only cause for the outages during that day was the adverse weather. The power was restored to over 90% of the customers in approximately 4 hours. Additional resources through our Mutual Assistance Plan or by Contractor were not required for this event. Yes, when available, ETRs were issued on KWHI?s outage map and shared publicly using Twitter. In addition, customers who called in to the call centre were informed of ETRs. While KWHI?s response to the Major Event was successful there are areas of improvement that the organization continues to explore to be able to better respond to the next event. The following steps are being taken: ? Review backup power supply systems for communication equipment to ensure that they are available in the event of loss of power to main building. ? Continue with investigation of an automated crew call out application. ? Continue to train CSRs in use of the OMS for logging of customer calls. ? Continue to have debriefing with relevant staff members after each storm and/or major event. Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2018 13-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 2:53 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a wind warning and severe thunderstorm watch the morning of May 4th. Regular on-call operational resources were in place prior to the event. This included Distribution department employees (2 Powerline Technician's and 1 Foreman), 24/7 Control Room and 1 Supervisory/Emergency Management person. The event occurred toward the end of regular office hours, so Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc.'s (KWHI) call centre was already staffed and personnel stayed afterhours to maintain the call centre response through the event. KWHI Operations staff are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures that staff are available 24/7 and are prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying magnitude. Applicable staff are trained on the Outage Management System (OMS), customer call handling and routine website and social media updating. Outage response processes are in place to notify Senior Management and Communications to ensure escalation of response and ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. The wind storm of May 4th meets the definition of a Major Event as defined by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Filing Requirements. That is, the event is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable. The impact to the distribution system as a result of the storm was unavoidable. Wind speed increased from 57 km/h up to 122 km/h resulting in a number of fallen trees and broken limbs which took down power lines and caused widespread power outages. Using the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366, the calculated KWHI threshold for a major event (TMED) for 2018 is 5.36 minutes/customer. The impact of this event was 33.16 minutes/customer which exceeds the TMED. The primary cause for the outages during the day was the adverse weather. Approximately 97% of outage time on May 4th was caused by adverse weather. The power was restored to 90% of the customers in approximately 7 hours. Additional resources through our Mutual Assistance Plan or by Contractor were not required for this event. Yes, when available, ETRs were issued on KWHI's outage map and shared publicly using Twitter. In addition, customers who called in to the call centre were informed of ETRs. This was the second Major Event in 2018 for KWHI and the company's response to the event was timely and successful. However, the organization continues to explore options to improve response to future Major Events. The following steps are being taken: - Commenced discussion to design "door hangers' with instruction to customers, who are not at home, about the process required for making repairs to customer-owned equipment before their supply can be re-connected. - Commenced investigation into having KWHI's CSRs available throughout the entire duration of a storm (including overnight) or utilizing a third party service provider - Continue with investigation of an automated crew call out application to improve the process of crew call out. - Continue to train CSRs in use of the OMS for logging of customer calls. - Continue to have debriefing sessions with relevant staff members after each storm and/or major event. - Investigating process changes to communication practices during Major Events. Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2018 23-Aug-2018 24-Jun-2018 12:35 AM No, the event was the result of a motor vehicle accident Not applicable KWHI Operations staff are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures that staff are available 24/7 and are prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying magnitude. Applicable staff are trained on the Outage Management System (OMS), customer call handling and routine website and social media updating. Outage response processes are in place to notify Senior Management and Communications to ensure escalation of response and ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. The power outage event on June 24th meets the definition of a Major Event as defined by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Filing Requirements. That is, the event was ?beyond the control of the distributor and was unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable.? This event was the result of a motor vehicle accident involving a distribution pole with two, three-phase circuits on it. Power was interrupted to a large number of residential customers for almost eight hours. Using the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366, the calculated KWHI threshold for a major event (TMED) for 2018 is 5.36 minutes/customer. The impact of this event was 16.91 minutes/customer which exceeds the TMED. Over 99% of the outage time on June 24th was due to the motor vehicle accident. It took 9.4 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. Additional resources through our Mutual Assistance Plan or by Contractors were not required for this event. Yes, when available, ETRs were issued on KWHI?s outage map and shared publicly using Twitter. Following the event, KWHI met with its Operations staff to discuss how to make future accident sites safe in a timelier manner and allow first responders to get to victim(s) as soon as possible. Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2020 24-Jan-2020 01-Dec-2019 06:18 AM Environment Canada issued alerts warning of possible inclement weather the day prior to the event. Regular on-call operational resources were in place prior to the event. Arrangements for additional staff on duty or on standby were not made for this event. KWHI Operations staff are provided job-related training and are on-call or on standby as part of their regular employment. This ensures that staff are available 24/7 and are prepared to respond quickly to address outages of varying magnitude. Applicable staff are trained on the Outage Management System (OMS), customer call handling and routine website and social media updating. Outage response processes are in place to notify Senior Management and Communications to ensure escalation of response and ensure information is made available to customers calling in, and through social media (Twitter) and a website outage map. The wind/ice storm on December 1st meets the definition of a Major Event as defined by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB’s Electricity Reporting and Filing Requirements. That is, the event is “beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable.” The impact to the distribution system as a result of high winds and freezing rain was unavoidable. Wind speed gusted at 74 km/h resulting in several broken tree branches coming in contact with the power lines and galloping of conductors in some areas causing widespread outages. Using the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366, the calculated KWHI threshold for a major event (TMED) for 2019 is 4.76 minutes/customer. The impact of this event was 9.22 minutes/customer which exceeds the TMED. The primary cause for the outages was the ice build-up and the high winds in the morning, and trees falling on lines. It took 6 hours to restore 90% of the customers. Additional resources through our Mutual Assistance Plan or by Contractor were not required for this event. Yes, when available, ETRs were issued on KWHI’s outage map and shared publicly using Twitter. While KWHI’s response to the Major Event was successful there are areas of improvement that the organization continues to explore to be able to better respond to the next event. The following steps are being taken: o Exploring the feasibility of having a KWHI resource with overall responsibility for maintaining and updating the public outage map with estimated time to restore (ETR). o Finalizing deployment of a crew call out software to reduce the time spent by Control Room Operators in dialing telephone numbers for crews to come in and respond to outages during Major Events. Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2020 17-Sep-2020 19-Jul-2020 12:00 PM No There was a tornado warning issued by Environment Canada at 11:36 AM. There were short but intense winds gusting up to 93 mph, accompanied by rain, and lightning. The result was extensive outages within the North-East section of KWHI’s service territory. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. provided the public with 6 general updates about restoration efforts and safety tips via Twitter, as well as responding directly to customer enquiries on Twitter and Google. There were no restoration times provided as the nature of the event and the resulting damage made repair times difficult to predict. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 6881 7 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2021 26-Aug-2021 29-Jun-2021 5:30 PM Yes KWHI warned its customers on social media of a severe thunderstorm warning. Regular on-call operational resources were in place prior to the event. Arrangements for additional staff on duty or on standby were not made for this event. The windstorm including heavy rainfall and lightning started approximately 5:30 PM and lasted for about 15 minutes. The storm was short but very intense with high winds (winds gusting at 120 km/h), heavy rainfall, and lightning. The north-east section of Kitchener was mostly impacted. There were six feeder outages – 4M11, 4M14, 5M21, 5M23, 5M25, and 6M17 and numerous line section and transformer outages. Majority of the damages were due to trees falling on primary and secondary power lines. At the peak of the storm over 12,200 customers were affected by an outage. Throughout the event, customers were provided with safety information, updates about restoration efforts and estimated restoration times through KWHI’s Outage Map and on social media. The information was picked up and shared by media outlets, amplifying the messages. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 14572 14.7 No No Process improvements No No Yes Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2022 07-Feb-2022 11-Dec-2021 1:04 pm Yes KWHI warned its customers on social media of high winds in the forecast. Regular on-call operational resources were in place prior to the event. Arrangements for additional staff on duty or on standby were not made for this event. In the early afternoon of Saturday, December 11, 2021, Waterloo Region experienced a windstorm with winds reaching 65 km/hour and wind gusts of over 90 km/hour. Trees and/or branches fell on overhead power lines, interrupting power to customers during the windstorm which lasted until about 7 pm. The main places affected were in the Township of Wilmot, including the village Mannheim, where a tree fell and broke a pole and in the villages of St. Agatha and Petersburg where another tree took also broke a pole and impacted an entire distribution feeder. Updates were provided to customers on Twitter starting in the early afternoon and until power was restored. Estimated restoration times are provided on our outage map. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 10476 9.5 No No No further action is required at this time No No Yes Enova Power Corp. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc. 2022 14-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:13 pm No In the early afternoon of Saturday, May 21, 2022, Waterloo Region experienced a rare class of damaging wind – a derecho -a windstorm with wind gusts reaching 130 km/hour. Trees fell on overhead power lines, poles were broken and transformers needed to be replaced interrupting power to customers during the short windstorm. Waterloo North Hydro and K-Line Maintenance and Construction assisted throughout the event. Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro provided regular updates about outage, including causes and estimated restoration times on Twitter and on its website and outage map. Vice-President of Operations Wilf Meston also did an on-camera interview with CTV News Kitchener to provide an overview of the storm damage and the restoration efforts. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 19385 19 No Yes Additional staff training No Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2017 18-May-2017 30-Mar-2017 The Weather Network, Environment Canada and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and freezing rain warnings in advance of the major event. WNH normal after hours on call staff were readily available. This is comprised of (1) Line Supervisor, two (2) Powerline Maintainers (PLM’s,) one (1) Protection and Control Technician (P+C Tec) and one (1) Meter Technician. In addition, all PLM’s are on a call out list. Additional PLM staff were called out and utilized on March 30, 2017. WNH Operations employees are on call or on standby as part of their employment. Expectations to respond and work long days if required are known. Non-Operations staff were not utilized during this Major Event Day. Training was provided for Call Handling and Outage Case management through the implementation of WNH Outage Management System. Training was also provided to staff for providing updates on our website and social media (Twitter and Facebook) as well as fielding customer inquiries on social media Twitter and Facebook) March 30, 2017 has exceeded the IEEE 1366-2012 2.5ß threshold at 0.0990 SAIDI/day. WNH utilizes the preferred method of 2.5ß and has calculated the 2017 TMED (Threshold, Major Event Days) to be 0.0709 SAIDI/day by using 2012 through 2016 historical data. The most prominent contributing interruption of this Major Event Day was a tree which had fallen during a freezing rain event and therefore considered unforeseen. Less than two hours from the start of the most prominent outage event. No. Yes, through WNH’s web site, Customer Public Outage Map (wnhdro.com/outages). WNH deployed tree trimming crews to this area for additional, more aggressive tree trimming or tree clearing. Continued awareness and continued advanced preparation of additional On Call resources. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2018 09-May-2018 15-Apr-2018 00:00 AM The Weather Network, Environment Canada and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and freezing rain warnings in advance of the major event. Waterloo North Hydro (WNH) normal after hours on call staff were readily available. This is comprised of: - One (1) Line Supervisor - Two (2) Powerline Maintainers (PLM?s) - One (1) Protection and Control Technician On Friday April 13, 2018, before the freezing rain storm began, WNH invoked emergency preparedness discussions. Arrangements were made to have these resources available: - Two (2) Corporate Communications Representatives - One extra (1) Line Supervisor on stand by - Four (4) extra PLM?s on stand by - Three extra System Operator?s available - Four (4) Damage Assessors (Engineering Technologists) - One (1) Engineering Supervisor - Four (4) Customer Service Representatives to handle phone calls - One (1) Customer Service Manager - One (1) Stores Manager including the availability of emergency storm inventory In addition, all PLM?s are on a call out list. Additional PLM staff were called out and utilized on April 15, 2018. WNH Operations employees are on call or on standby as part of their employment. Expectations to respond and work long days if required are known. Non-Operations staff were not utilized during this Major Event Day. Training was provided for Call Handling and Outage Case management through the implementation and ongoing development of WNH Outage Management System. Training was also provided to staff for providing updates on our website and social media (Twitter and Facebook) as well as fielding customer inquiries on social media (Twitter and Facebook) This event has exceeded the IEEE 1366-2012 2.5? threshold for Major Event Days (TMED). WNH 2018 TMED = 0.0695 SAIDI/day. This MED = 0.1845 SAIDI/day Three hours. No. No. WNH customer outage map displayed number of customers out of power, the geographical area of the outage, the cause, and the customers remaining out of power. The outage involved two large supply feeders which were off for about 3.5 hours in the overnight hours. WNH realizes that ice storms are not avoidable. WNH continues to invest in capital rebuild and distribution automation. WNH owned infrastructure held up well in this ice and wind event. Just one WNH feeder was affected. WNH investment in distribution automation has offered 199% savings in SAIDI during this major event day. WNH continues to practice its preparedness and restoration tactics. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2018 16-May-2018 04-May-2018 00:00 AM The Weather Network, Environment Canada and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and wind warnings in advance of the major event. Waterloo North Hydro (WNH) normal after hours on call staff were readily available. This is comprised of: - One (1) Line Supervisor - Two (2) Power Line Maintainers (PLM?s) - One (1) Protection and Control Technician. On Friday May 4, 2018, before the wind storm began, WNH invoked emergency preparedness discussions. Arrangements were made to have these resources available: - Two (2) Corporate Communications Representatives - Power Line Maintainers to be available per Call Out List - One (1) extra System Operator for Day and Night shift for entire week end - One (1) Engineering Supervisor in case Damage Assessment was required - Six (6) Customer Service Representatives to handle phone calls - Two (2) Customer Service Managers rotating through Friday night and Saturday - One (1) Stores Representative including the availability of emergency storm inventory Note. All PLM's are on a call out list. Additional PLM staff and Line Supervisors were called out and utilized on May 4, May 5 and May 6, 2018, working up to 16 hour days. WNH Operations employees are on call or on standby as part of their employment. Expectations to respond and work long days if required are known. Training was provided for Call Handling and Outage Case management through the implementation and ongoing development of WNH Outage Management System. Training was also provided to staff for providing updates on our website and social media (Twitter and Facebook) as well as fielding customer inquiries on social media (Twitter and Facebook) This event has exceeded the IEEE 1366-2012 2.5? threshold for Major Event Days (TMED). WNH 2018 TMED = 0.0695 SAIDI/day. This MED = 1.0213 SAIDI/day It took 7.5 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. No. No, not at outset. WNH customer outage map displayed number of customers out of power, the geographical area of the outage, the cause, and the customers remaining out of power. The outage involved several supply feeders. The small pockets that remained out of power after the 12 hours had ETR?s issued when known. Updates on the outage were communicated to customers as known and at the minimum hourly. In addition information on how to report power issues, trees on lines, and safety messages were continually communicated via social media. WNH realizes that severe weather is not avoidable. WNH continues to invest in capital rebuild and distribution automation. WNH owned infrastructure held up well in this severe weather event. WNH investment in distribution automation has offered a 9% savings in SAIDI during this MED. WNH continues to practice its preparedness and restoration tactics. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2018 27-Jul-2018 19-Aug-2016 23:25 PM The Weather Network, Environment Canada and like authorities predicted lightning prior to the Major Event. No. This type of weather forecast, for lightning, even if severe, does not trigger the need for additional on-call staff. WNH Operations employees are on call or on stand by as part of their employment. Expectations to respond and work long days if required is known. Non Operations staff also on stand by were utilized for Call Intake and Damage Assessment and providing nourishment to crews and material delivery. Training was provided for Call Handling and Outage Case management through the implementation of WNH Outage Management System. August 19, 2016 is a major event as it exceeded the IEEE 1366 2.5? threshold. The event was unavoidable. However, the restoration effort did not take WNH out of its normal mode of operation as this was not a multiple day restoration. 1.5 hours. No. Yes, through WNH web site, Customer Public Outage Map. Continued awareness and continue advanced preparation of additional On Call resources. WNH continues to invest in Distribution Automation. This almost always extends a saving in interruption SAIDI. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2018 27-Jul-2018 25-Jul-2016 2:45 AM The Weather Network, Environment Canada and like authorities predicted lightning prior to the Major Event. No. This type of weather forecast, for lightning, even if severe, does not trigger the need for additional on-call staff. WNH Operations employees are on call or on stand by as part of their employment. Expectations to respond and work long days if required is known. Non Operations staff also on stand by were utilized for Call Intake and Damage Assessment and providing nourishment to crews and material delivery. Training was provided for Call Handling and Outage Case management through the implementation of WNH Outage Management System. July 25, 2016 is a major event as it exceeded the IEEE 1366 2.5? threshold. The event was unavoidable. However, the restoration effort did not take WNH out of its normal mode of operation as this was not a multiple day restoration. 1.5 hours. No. Yes, through WNH web site, Customer Public Outage Map. Continued awareness and continue advanced preparation of additional On Call resources. WNH continues to invest in Distribution Automation. This almost always extends a saving in interruption SAIDI. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2020 01-Sep-2020 14-Aug-2020 09:06 AM No A Motor Vehicle Collison (MVC) occurred on August 14, 2020 on Union Street East near Moore Avenue in Waterloo, Ontario. The driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle which collided with a hydro pole causing it to sever. The accident ended in a fatality, no electrical contact occurred. As a result of the MVC, the secondary conductors came in contact with neighbouring tree branches, which ignited a small fire. Subsequently, the collision caused a power outage to surrounding areas while Waterloo North Hydro Inc. (WNH) made the scene safe by dropping multiple feeders and ensured the area would remain safe until emergency personnel completed their duties. Waterloo Regional Police Services closed the road in order to make the scene safe and to perform an investigation. A Motor Vehicle Collison (MVC) occurred on August 14, 2020 on Union Street East near Moore Avenue in Waterloo, Ontario. The driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle which collided with a hydro pole causing it to sever. The accident ended in a fatality, no electrical contact occurred. As a result of the MVC, the secondary conductors came in contact with neighbouring tree branches, which ignited a small fire. Subsequently, the collision caused a power outage to surrounding areas while Waterloo North Hydro Inc. (WNH) made the scene safe by dropping multiple feeders and ensured the area would remain safe until emergency personnel completed their duties. Waterloo Regional Police Services closed the road in order to make the scene safe and to perform an investigation. WNH’s customer outage map displayed the number of customers initially out of power, the geographical area of the outage, cause, and the customers remaining out of power. WNH provided updates on ETR through its social media channels (Twitter and Facebook). The first ETR update was communicated at 11:27 a.m and a second ETR was communicated at 1:45 p.m. This update was for the small number of customers that remained without power. This was the last update on ETR that was provided. The ETR was also shared with the public through an alert banner on the corporate website (www.wnhydro.com). The banner was updated with the ETR at 11:25 a.m. and later removed when only a small portion of customers remained without power. If new information was available, updates were provided at least once per hour. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4785 8 No No Others No WNH has implement a number of grid modernization technologies and will continue to do so to increase system reliability and operational efficiencies. An example is Survalent’s Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) software application which combines SCADA, OMS, and automated switching devices to re-route power in the event of a fault. This enables power to be efficiently restored to as many customers as possible via an automatic process. These technologies provide automatic self-healing on the portions of the system unaffected by the fault, ultimately improving restoration times. WNH’s staff is trained to be on alert for emergencies and major events. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2021 23-Dec-2021 11-Dec-2021 16:00 Yes The Weather Network, Environment Canada, and similar authorities issued special weather statements and wind warnings just hours before the Major Event. • One (1) Line Supervisor • Two (2) Power Line Maintainers (PLM’s). • One (1) Protection and Control Technician. • One (1) System Operator. Environment Canada issued wind warnings for essentially all of the province’s southern regions, gusts between 90 and 120 kilometres per hour through the afternoon and evening, causing outages throughout our territory. There were 7,039 Customer Interruptions for 489,101 Customer Minutes of Interruption. WNH restored 90% of interrupted customers within 2.25 hours. Yes, WNH’s customer outage map displayed the number of customers initially out of power, the geographical area of the outage, cause, and the customers remaining out of power. Once available, WNH also included ETRs on the outage map. WNH provided updates on restoration efforts through its social media channels (Facebook and Twitter). ETRs were not yet known when WNH published its first outage messages at 3:29 p.m. on December 11. Further messages followed at 4:40 p.m. alerting customers that ETRs were not yet known, but crews were working to restore power. A further update was provided at 6:09 p.m. and two additional updates followed before the end of the day on December 11. The fact that crews were working to restore power was also shared with the public through an alert banner on the corporate website (www.wnhydro.com). The banner was updated twice on December 11 and later removed when only a small portion of customers remained without power. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 7039 12 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes WNH has implement a number of grid modernization technologies and will continue to do so to increase system reliability and operational efficiencies. An example is Survalent’s Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) software application which combines SCADA, OMS, and automated switching devices to re-route power in the event of a fault. This enables power to be efficiently restored to as many customers as possible via an automatic process. These technologies provide automatic self-healing on the portions of the system unaffected by the fault, ultimately improving restoration times. WNH’s staff is trained to be on alert for emergencies and major events. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2022 25-May-2022 14-May-2022 18:24 PM No Waterloo North Hydro (WNH) has set up an automated email to be generated as soon as The Weather Network or Environment Canada issues weather alerts, warnings, or watches affecting any part of its service territory. If an alert is issued, WNH will begin posting outage warnings and safety alerts through social media and prepare staff for the possibility of an outage occurring. In this case, there were no weather warnings issued, so the utility had no prior warning that inclement weather or other factors could cause a major outage. N/A Customers affected - 3,384 Total Customers - 58,837 Percentage - 5.75% Yes, WNH’s customer outage map displayed the number of customers initially out of power, the geographical area of the outage, the cause, and the customers remaining out of power. Once available, WNH also included ETRs on the outage map. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3384 6 No No No further action is required at this time No WNH has implemented several grid modernization technologies and will continue to do so to increase system reliability and operational efficiencies. An example is Survalent’s Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) software application which combines SCADA, OMS, and automated switching devices to re-route power in the event of a fault. This enables power to be efficiently restored to as many customers as possible via an automatic process. These technologies provide automatic self-healing on the portions of the system unaffected by the fault, ultimately improving restoration times. WNH’s staff is trained to be on alert for emergencies and major events. The utility also regularly shares outage safety tips, information on where to find outage information and emergency preparedness information with customers through its website and social media accounts. This helps to educate customers about outages and restoration efforts before any major event occurs. Enova Power Corp. Waterloo North Hydro Inc. 2022 03-Jun-2022 21-May-2022 11:07 AM Yes Waterloo North Hydro (WNH) has set up an automated email to be generated as soon as The Weather Network or Environment Canada issues weather alerts, warnings, or watches affecting any part of its service territory. On May 21, 2022, WNH received a severe thunderstorm watch alert for parts of its service territory at approximately 12:10 p.m. The warning was not issued early enough for WNH to plan for additional resources to be made available. The storm rolled through Southern Ontario in the afternoon of Saturday May 21, 2022, bringing heavy rain, 132 km/h winds and hail in some areas. There were 8,925 Customer Interruptions for 1,507,297 Customer Minutes of Interruption. This event is classified as a Major Event using the IEEE 1366 standard. Yes, WNH’s customer outage map displayed the number of customers initially out of power, the geographical area of the outages, the cause, and the customers remaining out of power. Once available, WNH also included ETRs on the outage map. As the outage progressed and restoration efforts continued, WNH provided updates to customers on restoration efforts. In addition to ongoing safety messaging, the utility sent approximately 8 social media messages over a nine-hour period reminding customers that restoration efforts were underway and encouraging customers to check the online outage map for estimated ETRs. The social media messages also contained an image of the current outage map, allowing customers to easily see the impacted areas. An alert banner was also placed on the WNH website containing information on the number of customers impacted and where customers could go to find restoration updates. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8925 15 Yes No No further action is required at this time No No Yes WNH has implemented several grid modernization technologies and will continue to do so to increase system reliability and operational efficiencies. An example is Survalent’s Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) software application which combines SCADA, OMS, and automated switching devices to re-route power in the event of a fault. This enables power to be efficiently restored to as many customers as possible via an automatic process. These technologies provide automatic self-healing on the portions of the system unaffected by the fault, ultimately improving restoration times. WNH’s staff is trained to be on alert for emergencies and major events. The utility also regularly shares outage safety tips, information on where to find outage information and emergency preparedness information with customers through its website and social media accounts. This helps to educate customers about outages and restoration efforts before any major event occurs. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2018 15-Jun-2018 14-Apr-2018 10:45 AM The initial weather forecast from media outlets in the days leading up to the Major Event were somewhat conflicting, but generally indicated that a heavy rain storm was possible for the weekend of April 14-15, 2018. On Friday, April 13, at 6:50 am, Environment Canada issued a weather statement for Southwestern Ontario, indicating that several rounds of rain and occasional thunderstorms were likely for April 14-15. It was further indicated that temperatures might dip below the freezing mark late on April 14, with the threat of freezing rain. Subsequently, at 7:01 am on April 14, 2018, Environment Canada issued a rainfall warning for Chatham-Kent, indicating that the rain would change to freezing rain late in the afternoon. Entegrus serves 17 communities in Southwestern Ontario. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill and St. Thomas in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates three service centres, located in Chatham, Strathroy and St. Thomas. This structure enhances (through the availability of back up resources) response times to system needs during storms. Staff from all three operational centres were put on alert on the morning of Saturday, April 14 after the Environment Canada rainfall warning. Ultimately, staff from all three centres assisted with the restoration efforts later that day. In addition, Entegrus engaged in discussion on the morning of April 14 with neighbouring utilities regarding mutual assistance, although ultimately this was not required by Entegrus. Entegrus provides continuous training to staff on the various levels of response required for a Major Event. Entegrus has an established Emergency Preparedness Plan (?EPP?) providing details on how employees are called in and how staffing levels are balanced to cover rest time. The EPP is reviewed annually with employees. Entegrus has significant experience in providing mutual aid support to other areas experiencing severe storm damage. In recent years, Entegrus staff have assisted with restoration efforts in other parts of Ontario, as well as New York, New Jersey and Florida. This experience is invaluable when responding to Major Events. The April 14, 2018 ice storm was considered a Major Event due to the number of customers experiencing a concurrent outage of greater than 15 minutes. Entegrus serves approximately 58,000 customers. At the peak of the Major Event in the afternoon of April 14, 2018, there were 12,597 customers without electricity, representing approximately 22% of Entegrus customers. It took 6.8 hours to restore power to 90% of the customers who were interrupted. No. Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, including the outage map. Updates were also posted on Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also included safety information, as well as reminders to report downed power lines. The Entegrus website also contains an embedded Twitter feed to allow for customers who do not follow social media to receive updates. Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event to review the successes and the areas of improvement. This will result in enhancements to continued staff training, including updates to the EPP to more fully describe requirements for St. Thomas. Further, Entegrus continues to upgrade its distribution system, which will also help with future resiliency. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2022 14-Jun-2022 01-Jun-2022 1:31 PM Yes Environment Canada issued a Severe Thunderstorm Watch for certain locations within Southwestern Ontario approximately 1 hour before the first outage, which occurred in Chatham at 1:31pm on June 1. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates two operational centres, one in the Entegrus southwest region (located in Chatham) and another in the Entegrus northeast region (located in St. Thomas). As described in question #1 above, Entegrus had approximately 1 hour of prior warning before the storm. The event occurred during regular business hours, and as such Entegrus had a full operations staff complement at the time of the storm. Restoration efforts continued after-hours throughout the evening of June 1 into the early morning hours of June 2. The storm resulted in numerous broken poles, downed lines, and a downed three-phase transformer. The communities of Chatham and Wallaceburg experienced the largest amount of wind damage. Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, including the outage map. Updates were also posted on Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also included safety information, as well as reminders to report downed power lines. The Entegrus website also contains an embedded Twitter feed to allow for customers who do not follow social media to receive updates. Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 62500 24 Yes No System upgrades No No No Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event, which reinforced the benefits of recent and ongoing Distribution System Plan investments, which assist in mitigating additional storm outages that may have otherwise been experienced. These recent and ongoing investments have included: • Advance inventory purchases to mitigate pandemic-related supply risk; • Incremental focus on targeted replacement of at-risk poles; and, • Additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the frequency and duration of outages Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2023 21-Apr-2023 22-Feb-2023 6:15 PM Yes Yes. Environment Canada issued a Winter Storm Watch for certain locations within Southwestern Ontario (including Chatham-Kent) one day before the first outage. On February 21, 2023, at 6:09 pm, Environment Canada replaced the Winter Storm Watch with a Freezing Rain Warning. Subsequently, on February 22, 2023, at 4:15 am, Environment Canada issued a Freezing Rain Warning for Chatham-Kent indicating that “extensive utility outages are possible due to the combination of ice accretion and moderate winds”. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates two operational centres, one in the Entegrus southwest region (located in Chatham) and another in the Entegrus northeast region (located in St. Thomas). As described in question #1 above, Entegrus had prior warning about the storm. The event occurred after business hours, and as such Entegrus had on-call staff ready to respond and other staff on standby. Entegrus contacted vegetation contractors and had them on standby prior to the storm. Entegrus also participated in multiple conversations with its mutual aid group ONMAG prior to the storm. Restoration efforts continued after-hours throughout the evening of February 22 into the afternoon of February 24, 2023. The main contributing cause of the Major Event was “Adverse Weather – Freezing Rain”. The storm resulted in numerous tree limbs falling and making contact with infrastructure. This resulted in broken poles, downed lines, and faults. Yes. Entegrus maintains third party mutual assistance agreements for restoration efforts, including membership in the Ontario Mutual Assistance Program (“OnMAG”). Entegrus contacted Bluewater Power and London Hydro for restoration assistance. Bluewater Power and London Hydro were contacted on the morning of February 23, and crews from both arrived the afternoon of February 23. Yes, Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, including the outage map. Updates were also posted on Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also included safety information, as well as reminders to report downed power lines. The Entegrus website contains an embedded Twitter feed to allow for customers who do not follow social media to receive updates. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 13395 21 Yes Yes Others No Yes Yes Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event, which reinforced the benefits of recent and ongoing Distribution System Plan investments in mitigating additional storm outages that may have otherwise been experienced. These recent and ongoing investments have included: • Advance inventory purchases to mitigate pandemic-related supply risk; • Continual investment in vegetation management in all communities; and, • Additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the frequency and duration of outages. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2023 26-Apr-2023 27-Feb-2023 4:09 PM Yes On February 26, 2023, at 12:06 am, Environment Canada issued a Special Weather Statement for certain locations within Southwestern Ontario (including Chatham-Kent) for February 27, 2023. On February 27, 2023, at 5:43 am, Environment Canada replaced the Winter Storm Watch with a Freezing Rain Warning. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates two operational centres, one in the Entegrus southwest region (located in Chatham) and another in the Entegrus northeast region (located in St. Thomas). As described in question #1 above, Entegrus had prior warning about the storm. The event occurred after business hours, and as such Entegrus had on-call staff ready to respond and other staff on standby. Restoration efforts continued after-hours throughout the evening of February 27th. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were “Adverse Weather – Freezing Rain” and “Adverse Weather – Wind”. The storm resulted in tree limbs falling and making contact with infrastructure. This resulted in damage to Entegrus infrastructure. Entegrus serves approximately 63,000 customers. During the Major Event on the evening of February 27, 2023, there were 4,560 customers interrupted (unrelated to Loss of Supply), representing approximately 7% of Entegrus customers. See #7 below for additional details regarding Loss of Supply from this storm. Yes, Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, including the outage map. Updates were also posted on Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also contained safety information, including how to prepare for an outage. The Entegrus website contains an embedded Twitter feed to allow for customers who do not follow social media to receive updates. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4560 7 Yes No Others No Yes Yes Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event, which reinforced the benefits of recent and ongoing Distribution System Plan investments in mitigating additional storm outages that may have otherwise been experienced. These recent and ongoing investments have included: • Advance inventory purchases to mitigate pandemic-related supply risk; • Continual investment in vegetation management in all communities; and, • Additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the magnitude, frequency and duration of outages. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2023 10-Oct-2023 26-Jul-2023 4:30 PM Yes Yes. On July 26, 2023, at 1:14 pm, Environment Canada issued a Severe Thunderstorm Watch for certain locations within Southwestern Ontario (including Chatham-Kent) for July 26, 2023. On July 26, 2023 at 4:00 pm, Environment Canada replaced the Severe Thunderstorm Watch with a Severe Thunderstorm Warning. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates two operational centres, one in the Entegrus southwest region (located in Chatham) and another in the Entegrus northeast region (located in St. Thomas). As described in question #1 above, Entegrus had prior warning about the storm. The event occurred after business hours, and as such Entegrus had on-call staff ready to respond and other staff on standby. Restoration efforts continued after-hours throughout the evening of July 27th. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were “Tree Contact from Adverse Weather” and “Lightning”. The storm resulted in tree limbs falling and making contact with infrastructure as well as lightning strikes which further damaged Entegrus’ infrastructure. Yes, Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, including the outage map. Updates were also posted on Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also contained safety information, including how to prepare for an outage. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2262 4 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event, which reinforced the benefits of recent and ongoing Distribution System Plan investments in mitigating additional storm outages that may have otherwise been experienced. These recent and ongoing investments have included: • Advance inventory purchases to mitigate pandemic-related supply risk; • Continual investment in vegetation management in all communities; and, • Additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the magnitude, frequency and duration of outages. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2023 20-Oct-2023 24-Aug-2023 11:00 PM Yes Yes. On August 22, 2023, at 1:03 pm, Environment Canada issued a multi-day Severe Thunderstorm Warning for certain locations within Southwestern Ontario (including Chatham-Kent) for August 23 - August 24, 2023. On August 24, 2023 at 10:59 pm, Environment Canada replaced the Severe Thunderstorm Warning with a Tornado Warning. The boundaries of the EPI service territory stretch from Wheatley in the southwest to Parkhill in the northeast. The boundaries are non-contiguous, and the distance across the Entegrus service territory is approximately two hours travel time by vehicle. Accordingly, Entegrus operates two operational centres, one in the Entegrus southwest region (located in Chatham) and another in the Entegrus northeast region (located in St. Thomas). As described in question #1 above, Entegrus had prior warning about the storm. The event occurred after business hours, and as such Entegrus had on-call staff ready to respond and other staff on standby. Restoration efforts continued after-hours throughout the afternoon of August 28, 2023. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were “Tree Contact from Adverse Weather” and “Equipment Breakage from Adverse Weather”. The storm resulted in tree limbs falling and making contact with infrastructure as well as equipment breakage. Yes. Entegrus maintains third party mutual assistance agreements for restoration efforts, including membership in the Ontario Mutual Assistance Program (“OnMAG”). Entegrus contacted Bluewater Power for restoration assistance. Bluewater arrived the morning of August 25, 2023 and stayed until late Saturday, August 26, 2023 to assist with restoration efforts. Entegrus operational staff restoration efforts continued until August 28 at 3:57 pm. Yes, Entegrus provided continual updates on outage and restoration efforts at each specific community level, as there were multiple concurrent outages throughout the Entegrus service territory. The updates were shown on the Entegrus website, specifically the outage map page. Updates were also posted on social media channels, Twitter and Facebook. All posts included information on investigation efforts, causes and ETRs (where possible). The updates also contained safety information, including how to prepare for an outage. The Entegrus website contains an embedded Facebook feed to allow for customers who do not follow social media to receive updates. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 20755 33 Yes Yes No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event, which reinforced the benefits of recent and ongoing Distribution System Plan investments in mitigating additional storm outages that may have otherwise been experienced. These recent and ongoing investments have included: • Advance inventory purchases to mitigate pandemic-related supply risk; • Continual investment in vegetation management in all communities; and, • Additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the magnitude, frequency and duration of outages. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. Entegrus Powerlines Inc. 2024 12-Nov-2024 11-Sep-2024 1:13 AM No Entegrus had no prior warning about the Major Event. On September 11, 2024, at 1:13 am, a motor vehicle hit and broke a Hydro One pole which was joint use with Entegrus 27M10 circuit. The accident caused a pole fire and locked out the 27M10 feeder. The event occurred after business hours, and as such Entegrus had on-call staff ready to respond and other staff on standby. Restoration efforts continued after hours throughout the early morning hours of September 11, 2024. The main contributing causes of the Major Event was “Foreign Interference”. The motor vehicle accident resulted in a vehicle hitting and breaking a Hydro One pole which was joint use with Entegrus’ 27M10 circuit. The accident caused a pole fire and locked out the 27M10 feeder. There was no warning of the Major Event, and no information was issued during the event as the crew was focused on outage restoration and experienced some technology issues. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 5390 9 No No Process improvements No Entegrus conducted a debriefing after the conclusion of the Major Event. Future planned St. Thomas Distribution System Plan investments include additional system sectionalization, utilizing automated and remotely operable switches, including reclosers and sensory equipment, in order to reduce the magnitude, frequency and duration of outages. Although this Major Event was unavoidable, Entegrus is investigating ways to provide additional communications technical support after hours. Festival Hydro Inc. Festival Hydro Inc. 2017 28-Nov-2017 15-Oct-2017 01:39 PM No N/A Festival Hydro completes an annual review and round table discussion on its emergency preparedness plan and updates the plan on an annual basis. Extreme rain and wind storm with wind gusts greater than 100km/h caused tree limbs and uprooted trees to fall on overhead power lines. Using the IEEE Standard 1366 method, the event exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold with 796,376 customer minutes. 3 hours and 28 minutes No Yes. 1. ETR?s were published on the website ?Outages? section 2. ETR?s were communicated via the Festival Hydro Twitter and Facebook feeds. Discussions were held with staff after the event to review outage communications during the event and to evaluate the restoration process effectiveness. A new process to share outage information during events has been adopted. Festival Hydro Inc. Festival Hydro Inc. 2018 08-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 11:31 AM Yes. Festival was watching weather reports regarding a likely Ice Storm and received notifications via the local Emergency Response Group that adverse weather was expected. Yes. Festival Hydro notified available staff to be on standby as adverse weather was likely. Festival Hydro completes an annual review and round table discussion on its emergency preparedness plan and updates the plan on an annual basis. Freezing rain and wind storm with strong winds caused tree limbs and uprooted trees to fall on overhead power lines. Using the IEEE Standard 1366 method, the event exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold with 1,606,909 customer minutes. 27 hours and 22 minutes No Yes. 1. ETR?s were published on the website ?Outages? section 2. ETR?s were communicated via the Festival Hydro Twitter and Facebook feeds. 3. Social media links were made to the Hydro One Storm Centre Hydro One is preparing a feeder conversion to the supply in Dashwood that has improved historical reliability performance. Festival Hydro will continue to offer support to Hydro One in similar situations. Festival Hydro Inc. Festival Hydro Inc. 2018 08-Jun-2018 24-Apr-2018 5:34 AM No N/A Festival Hydro completes an annual review and round table discussion on its emergency preparedness plan and updates the plan on an annual basis. A fault was detected at Hydro One's Stratford TS that caused an outage on the transmission level affecting all customers in Stratford. Using the IEEE Standard 1366 method, the event exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold with 1,243,170 customer minutes. 1 hour and 51 minutes No Acknowledgement of the event on Twitter and Facebook were issued at 6:02am. No ETR's were provided. At 6:55am customers were provided with a link to the Hydro One outages map for updated ETR's through Facebook, Twitter, and via the Festival Hydro "Outages" webpage. Festival Hydro will continue to offer support to Hydro One in similar situations. Festival Hydro Inc. Festival Hydro Inc. 2018 25-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 2:43 pm Yes. Festival was watching local weather reports regarding high winds. The storm began during normal working hours and all available staff were on duty. Festival Hydro completes an annual review and round table discussion on its emergency preparedness plan and updates the plan on an annual basis. Strong winds caused tree limbs to fall on overhead power lines. Using the IEEE Standard 1366 method, the event exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold with 982,975 customer minutes. 4 hours and 41 minutes No Yes. 1. ETR?s were published on the website ?Outages? section 2. ETR?s were communicated via the Festival Hydro Twitter and Facebook feeds. Festival Hydro is reviewing technology solutions for outage communications. Festival Hydro Inc. Festival Hydro Inc. 2024 16-Jul-2024 27-May-2024 06:35 AM No The B23D was isolated to complete planned Transmission Line work, a fault then occurred at the Hydro One Owned Stratford TS that tripped the B22D transmission line, and left Stratford TS, and all connected customers, without power until the B23D could be recalled and placed into service. Using the IEEE Standard 1366 method, the event exceeded the Major Event Day Threshold with 975,738 customer minutes. Acknowledgement of the event on Social Media were issued at 6:58am. No ETR’s were provided as timing of when the circuit would be restored was not yet known. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 15254 67.6 Yes No Others No Festival Hydro cannot control transmission line outages, but will continue to ensure adequate on call staff are trained and available to respond quickly to widespread outages when they occur. GrandBridge Energy Inc. Brantford Power Inc. 2021 14-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 2:19 PM Yes Brantford Power monitors weather alerts issued for the Brantford area by Environment Canada. On the day prior to the event, it was determined that there may be adverse weather the following date. The afternoon of the event a weather (wind) warning was issued form Environment Canada. BPI senior leadership began early preparations on Saturday afternoon and continued to escalate the preparations as the situation became more clear. Preliminary arrangements were made the prior day with senior-level operations staff to monitor the event, though additional staff were not put on formal "standby". The day of the event, arrangements were made with additional staff in the Customer Care area early after the start of the event. On-call staff were available during the event, and further staff were only called in after the event had begun. On the afternoon of Sunday November 15th, 2020, high winds were experienced throughout Southern Ontario, lasting into the evening. Winds of over 100 km/h were measured throughout the region. The nearby areas of St. Catharines and Port Colborne reported record high wind speeds of 141 km/h and 131 km/h, respectively. In Brantford, the storm brought down trees and tree limbs and scattered other debris throughout the city. Alerts of BPI outages began at 2:19 PM and shortly after this time a primary pole broke off in the wind. On-call staff were first to respond in the field, however just over an hour into the event response, further Operations crews were called in for support. Brantford Power had made arrangements with its after-hours third party call answering service to increase staffing if possible and to provide data on incoming calls to assist with power restoration and identifying outage causes. Further staff from the Customer Care area were also brought into the emergency centre to assist with the response, including documenting (scribing), coordinating with the third-party after hours call centre, reviewing service orders to ensure all issues identified via phone were closed, assisting with coordination of response to particular addresses. BPI's Tree Trimming contractor was also on-site and coordinated with Brantford Power to assist with removing debris and clearing power lines. Working from home, the SCADA and DG department assisted with monitoring the OMS Lite system which can indicate which areas are experiencing outages, how many customers are impacted at any given time, and whether power has been restored. Unfortunately this OMS Lite system experienced some issues during the outage, requiring trouble shooting and extra efforts to ascertain all of these statistics. The Manager of Communications worked with the response team to provide frequent updates via Twitter and updating BPI's website, as well as responding to direct online and media inquiries. Frequent checks with the response team were necessary to provide up to date statistics on the number and location of outages and the progress of the outage response. By 8:15 PM, the wind had subsided, all outages had been restored, and Brantford Power did not anticipate any further new outages. The website was available throughout the outage and visits increased significantly from 109 the prior Sunday to 4,332, for almost a 4,000% increase. During an ongoing adverse weather event, it can be difficult to ascertain this statistic. Not all outages begin at the same time and new outages can occur after outage restoration is successful in the same or different areas of the utility's service territory. In some outages, the interruption begins at the same time for all customers, and customer groups are restored sequentially, and if those circumstances it is straight forward to determine when 90% of customers have had power restored. For this outage, the 90% restoration occurred between 4 and 5 hours, however many customers had their power interrupted for a much shorter time (and most customers did not experience an outage at all). Brantford Power issued frequent updates on Twitter, its website and in response to customer telephone calls. Communications included the number of affected customers, the areas currently experiencing outages, safety information and requests for customers on how to prioritize their calls (i.e.: in what circumstances a call to the utility is necessary). Statements were also issued to the local media. Brantford Power did not issue any estimated times of restoration Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 16719 41 No No Others No No No o Continue to monitor weather apps and Environment Canada alerts; o Continue to prepare and coordinate internally ahead of a potential severe weather event including notifying key staff of a potential requirement to respond (lines, communications, customer care); o Continue to prioritize timely customer communications during an extended outage event; o Continue to coordinate with third party after-hours call centre ahead of an expected weather event (to ensure Call Centre is prepared for increased call volumes; o Extend Incident Management System (IMS) training - senior operations staff will receive enhanced training; o Ensure formal scribe training is provided to pre-designated scribes and backups; o Furthering the business case for the implementation of a full Outage Management System. This project will enhance the information available to customers and streamline outage response communication, coordination and reporting; o Furthering the business case for the implementation of a 24/7 outsourced control room which will optimize communication and coordination during an outage response, allowing line crew supervisors to focus on outage restoration; o Working with the after-hours third party call answering service to create automated and self-serve ability for LDC staff. GrandBridge Energy Inc. Energy Plus Inc. 2018 29-May-2018 15-Apr-2018 2:40 AM ES Major Event Day: April 15, 2018 Severe Weather due to Freezing Rain Yes, the Weather Network, Environment Canada, and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and freezing rain warning in advance of the major event. Yes, in preparation for severe weather conditions causing multiple outages, on April 13, 2018, Energy+?s Emergency Plan Coordinator issued an email to senior leaders asking for confirmation of availability of staff and back up staff in advance of the major event. Energy+ ensured the following complement of staff and contractors were available: -On call crew and two back up crews consisting a total of eight (8) line-persons for Cambridge area -On call crew and two back up crews consisting a total of eight (8) line-persons for Brant area -Two (2) forestry contractor crews for Cambridge and Brant areas -Four (4) system control operators were on duty and present during the weekend -Two (2) senior management members were present during the weekend and five (5) other management staff members were on standby -Two (2) Communications Team members were on duty and working remotely throughout the weekend monitoring social media, liaising with local media, discussing status updates with system control operators -Fifteen (15) customer care representatives were on standby Energy+ has an emergency preparedness plan which specifies duties and responsibilities of team members. Energy+ did not need to invoke the plan as the magnitude of the outages did not meet the parameters defined in the plan to be quantified as an emergency. Energy+ operations staff are on call or on standby as part of their regular duties, and therefore are trained to respond to outages including major event days. Energy+ Communication Team is trained on updating website, social media platforms, liaising with local media and directing customers as necessary. April 15, 2018 exceeded the IEEE 1366-2012 standard and the definitions within to determine if the specific day was deemed to be a major event day. Energy+ also performed a qualitative analysis based on OEB's questions to determine if the event can be considered a major event. Please refer to Major Event Report Attached - Section "During the Major Event" Question #1 for a computation of the calculated value. It took 10 hours and 42 minutes to restore power to 90% of customers impacted by the Major Event. Energy+ determined assistance through the third party mutual assistance agreement was not required. Yes, the estimated times of restoration (ETR) were issued throughout the Major Event through Energy+ Outage Management System. Energy+ holds a debrief meeting after each Major Event with key members involved to understand items that went well and things that could be improved in the future. Overall, Energy+ determined that the response during the Major Event on April 15, 2018 went extremely well as staff were adequately trained and the process ran smoothly. GrandBridge Energy Inc. Energy Plus Inc. 2018 03-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 13:25 The Weather Network, Environment Canada, and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and strong wind warning in advance of the major event. Environment Canada issued wind warnings across the province, with some areas getting lashed with gusts measuring up to 110 kilometers per hour. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/hamilton-weather-may-4-1.4648017 There was no requirement to have extra employees on duty or standby as the event took place during regular business hours and, as a result, Energy+ had a full employee complement available. Energy+ has an emergency preparedness plan which specifies duties and responsibilities of team members. Energy+ did not need to invoke the plan as the magnitude of the outages did not meet the parameters defined in the plan to be quantified as an emergency. Energy+ operations staff are on call, or on standby as part of their regular duties, and therefore are trained to respond to outages including major event days. Energy+ communication staff are trained on updating website, social media platforms, liaising with local media and directing customers as necessary, during major event situations. May 04, 2018 exceeded the IEEE 1366-2012 standard and the definitions within to determine if the specific day was deemed to be a major event day. Energy+ also performed a qualitative analysis based on the OEB's questions to determine if the event can be considered a major event. The IEEE 1366-2012 Standard provides a statistical method of studying reliability events. A Major Event Day is a day which the daily system SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) exceeds a threshold value, designated as T-med. The SAIDI index is used as the basis of this definition since it leads to consistent results regardless of the utility size, because SAIDI is a good indicator of operational and design stress. Data used for SAIDI is based on five (5) sequential years and includes days that had an interruption, so a SAIDI/Day value can be used to calculate T-med. Energy+ T-med value as calculated in accordance with the IEEE 1366-2012 standard is shown in Table 1.0 in attached PDF. The T-med value of 9.64 indicates that anything beyond this figure would be deemed to be a Major Event. Table 2.0 in attached PDF shows the Daily SAIDI values calculated for May 4th and May 5th respectively. The calculated value for May 04, 2018 is 48.38 and is greater than the T-med value calculated. Therefore, this specific day was deemed to be a Major Event. It took 10 hours and 58 minutes to restore power to 90% of customers impacted by the Major Event. Energy+ determined assistance through the third party mutual assistance agreement was not required. Energy+ utilized third party contractors to support restoration efforts. Yes, the estimated times of restoration (ETR) were issued throughout the Major Event through Energy+ Outage Management System. Energy+ holds a debrief meeting after each Major Event with key members involved to understand items that went well and things that could be improved in the future. Overall, Energy+ determined that the response during the Major Event on May 04, 2018 went extremely well, as staff were adequately trained and the process ran smoothly. GrandBridge Energy Inc. Energy Plus Inc. 2021 08-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 10:15 AM Yes The Weather Network, Environment Canada, and similar authorities had issued special weather statements and strong wind warning in advance of the major event. Environment Canada issued wind warnings across the province, with some areas seeing gusts measuring up to 110 kilometers per hour. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/wind-freezing-rain-warning-nov-20-1.5802770 Energy+ Inc. ensured appropriate staffing levels were in place to address the expected outages that would occur as a result of the heavy wind conditions. Adverse Weather-Wind (Cause Code 6) was the main contributing Cause for this Major Event. It took 6 hours and 57 minutes to restore power to 90% of customers impacted by the Major Event. When known, the estimated times of restoration (ETRs) were issued throughout the Major Event through Energy+’s Outage Management System (OMS). The OMS includes a public-facing Outage Map on the Energy+ website which remained accessible throughout the Major Event. Energy+ also sent notifications and status updates through its social media channels, specifically Facebook (11) and Twitter (11). The metrics on social media and website results for November 15-16, 2020 are attached in Appendix A. The first ETR was issued immediately during the start of the first outage on November 15, 2020 at 10:15 EST through the Outage Management System. There were a total of 10 outages during the Major Event Day. For each outage, Energy+ updated the OMS system when the outage was first identified and provided updates depending on the scale of the outage. Overall, there were a total of 27 updates made to the OMS system during the Major Event. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 10317 15 Yes No Process improvements No Yes No Energy+ holds a debrief meeting after each Major Event with key members involved to understand items that went well and things that could be improved in the future. Energy+ determined that the response during the Major Event on Sunday November 15, 2020 went extremely well, as staff were adequately trained and the process ran smoothly. Energy+ also determined that it is important to have access to third party contractors that are available to supplement the restoration efforts. Contacting third party contractors early on in this Major Event, assisted Energy+ in ensuring adequate resources for power restoration efforts. Energy+ will follow-up with enhancements to their current process of opening the call centre and redirecting calls from the dedicated toll-free outage line during major events. Energy+ learned customers rely on the online outage map to see “at a glance” the scope of the outage in their neighbourhood, by viewing a shaded polygon outlining the outage. The outage map also provides a summary of the streets that are currently without power. Energy+ learned that their inventory levels met their needs to assist with timely restoration efforts. Energy+ learned that while they are operating with multiple temporary sites for Operations and the System Control Room and many staff are working remotely due to COVID, the team was able to act swiftly and efficiently to restore power to customers based on the priorities established. GrandBridge Energy Inc. GrandBridge Energy Inc. 2022 18-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:09 PM Yes On Saturday, May 21, 2022, a GrandBridge Energy (GBE) Control Room Operator and Operations Supervisor On-Call were monitoring the inclement weather tracking east from Sarnia and Windsor toward GBE’s service territory. GBE received a severe thunderstorm alert from Environment Canada at approximately 12:00 EDT. Environment Canada Weather Forecast on Saturday, May 21, 2022: At 09:43 EDT, Environment Canada issued weather statements for Sarnia and Windsor, which was upgraded for Sarnia to a severe thunderstorm warning at 10:25 EDT. Severe thunderstorm watches for the London area followed at 10:41 EDT, upgraded to a severe thunderstorm warning at 11:08 EDT. The alert mentioned possible strong wind gusts up to 100 km/h, along with nickel-sized hail. Severe thunderstorm watches were issued for points eastward of London at 11:19 EDT. These were later upgraded to severe thunderstorm warnings. Additionally, after the derecho impacted London, Environment Canada issued an emergency alert for regions in Ontario and Quebec along the path of the storm, with alerts going out over cellphones, television, and radio. The Environment Canada forecast did not provide sufficient time for the distributor to place additional employees on duty or on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. However, as part the GBE’s normal practice, the resourcing for the long weekend included an extra Operations crew on-call for the Cambridge and North Dumfries areas with an extra Operations crew on-call for the Brant County area. The main contributing cause of the Major Event was Tree Contacts (Cause Code 3). GBE experienced 20 major outages of which 12 of them were tree contacts. Of the 12 tree contact outages, 1 of them resulted in lines down only and 2 of them resulted in lines down with broken poles. When known, the estimated times of restoration (ETRs) were issued throughout the Major Event through GBE’s public-facing Outage Map for the Cambridge, North Dumfries, and Brant County areas. The Outage Map on the GBE website remained accessible throughout the Major Event. The updates were posted on the GBE (former Energy+) home page via a highly visible Alert Banner. The updates on Brantford areas were regularly communicated via the legacy Branford Power website and legacy Twitter account. The Brantford service area has not been incorporated in the GBE’s public-facing Outage Map post-merger on May 2, 2022. GBE also sent notifications and status updates through its social media channels, specifically Facebook (19) and Twitter (27). The metrics on social media and website results for May 21-23, 2022, are attached in Appendix A. The first ETR was issued immediately during the start of the first outage on May 21, 2022, at 12:09 EDT through the public facing Outage Map. There were a total of 20 outages during the Major Event Day. For each outage in the Cambridge, North Dumfries, and Brant County areas, GBE updated the Outage Map system when the outage was first identified and provided updates depending on the scale of the outage. For each outage in the Brantford area the legacy website was updated with outage notification, location and updates on the restoration were shared. In total, GBE released 47 updates to the public-facing Outage Map, shown in Appendix B and 10 updates made to the legacy Brantford Power Inc. website as the result of the Major Event on May 21, 2022. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 51816 47 Yes No System upgrades No No No • Incorporate Brantford’s distribution area into GBE’s public-facing Outage Map to provide Brantford customers with instant access to outage status information. • Continue deploying grid modernization technology (i.e. automated reclosers) to increase GBE’s operational effectiveness during the Major Events. GrandBridge Energy Inc. GrandBridge Energy Inc. 2023 16-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 7:44 AM Yes On December 20, 2022, Environment Climate Change Canada (ECCC) issued a Weather Briefing forecasting inclement weather on December 23-25, 2022. The storm was forecasted to affect all of southern Ontario and large portion of northern Ontario beginning Thursday, December 22 through to at least Saturday, December 24. The briefing included threats of significant snowfall, strong winds, blowing snow, rain as well as icing and cold temperatures. At the time of the briefing, there was a fair amount of uncertainty regarding specific timing and snow/rain/wind intensities. Regardless of these uncertainties, high impacts were expected to occur. GBE initiated emergency response preparation and advanced resource planning during the week of December 19th, 2022. On Thursday, December 22, GBE finalized the arrangements that ensured extra employees were available to respond from December 23 to 25, 2022. The main contributing cause of the Major Event was Adverse Weather (Cause Code 6). GBE experienced three (3) outages in North Dumfries and one (1) outage in Brantford, of which the largest outage was due to adverse weather with galloping lines in the town of Ayr. It took 7 hours and 30 minutes to restore power to 90% of customers impacted by the Major Event. When known, the Estimated Times of Restoration (ETRs) were issued throughout the Major Event through GBE’s public-facing Outage Map for the Cambridge, North Dumfries, and Brant County areas. The Outage Map on the GBE website remained accessible throughout the Major Event. The updates were posted on the GBE (former Energy+) home page via a highly visible Alert Banner. The updates on the Brantford outages were regularly communicated via the legacy Branford Power website. The Brantford service area has not yet been incorporated in the GBE’s public-facing Outage Map following the merger of Brantford Power and Energy+ on May 2, 2022. GBE also sent notifications and status updates on all outages through its social media channels, predominantly through Facebook (22) and Twitter (18). Two videos were posted to the GBE YouTube channel. The metrics on social media and website results for December 23, 2022, are attached in Appendix A. For each outage in the Cambridge, North Dumfries, and Brant County areas, GBE updated the Outage Map system when the outage was first identified and provided updates depending on the scale of the outage. For each outage in the Brantford area, the legacy website was updated with an outage notification including the location and updates on the restoration. In total, GBE released 19 updates to the public-facing Outage Map, shown in Appendix B and four (4) updates made to the legacy Brantford Power Inc. website as the result of the Major Event on December 23, 2022. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 22315 20 Yes No System upgrades No Yes Yes • Incorporate Brantford’s distribution area into GBE’s public-facing Outage Map to provide Brantford customers with instant access to outage status information. • Continue deploying grid modernization technology (i.e. automated reclosers, fault indicators, etc.) to increase GBE’s operational effectiveness during the Major Events. GrandBridge Energy Inc. GrandBridge Energy Inc. 2024 15-Oct-2024 17-Aug-2024 9:46 AM Yes The tornado warning was received approximately 15 minutes before the Major Event occurred. The Environment Climate Change Canada (ECCC) issued a warning for several areas of Ontario, including Waterloo Region at 10:45 a.m. The severe weather warning alerted the public about severe thunderstorms capable of producing tornado winds. The Environment Canada forecast did not provide sufficient time for the distributor to place additional employees on duty or on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. The main contributing cause of the Major Event was Adverse Weather – Tree Contact Weather (Cause Code 6.1). A tornado was confirmed as touching down on Greenfield Road and Northumberland in the community of Ayr. When crews arrived on site, they found a large number of downed trees and debris on many sections of the distribution lines in the area. It took 3 hours and 33 minutes to restore power to 90% of customers impacted by the Major Event. When known, the Estimated Times of Restoration (ETRs) were issued throughout the Major Event through GBE’s public-facing Outage Map for the Cambridge, North Dumfries, Brantford, and Brant County areas. The Outage Map on the GBE website remained accessible throughout the Major Event. GBE also sent notifications and status updates on all outages through its social media channels, predominantly through Facebook (7 posts) and Twitter (5 posts). The metrics on social media and website results for August 17, 2024, are attached in Appendix A. In total, GBE released 5 updates to the public-facing Outage Map, shown in Appendix B as the result of the Major Event on August 17, 2024. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2883 2.5 No No Others No No Yes GBE is proactive in mitigating the risk of emergency by applying the appropriate distribution system designs, equipment specifications, deploying grid modernization technology, planned system maintenance, staff training and utility operating practices. The GBE's Emergency Plan enables GBE staff to effectively assess and respond to any given emergency. Future actions arising from the Major Event: Continue deploying grid modernization technology (i.e. automated reclosers, fault indicators, etc.) to increase GBE’s operational effectiveness during the Major Events. Greater Sudbury Hydro Inc. Greater Sudbury Hydro Inc. 2018 13-Sep-2018 09-Jul-2018 16:56 PM A severe thunderstorm hit Sudbury on July 9th, 2018 at approximately 16:56. GSHI did not have any significant prior warning that the storm would be to the intensity level that was experienced. According to Environment Canada, the storm created a "downburst" which sometimes results from severe thunderstorms and produces straight-line wind, forcing the wind outward in all directions and results in incredible wind damage. Environment Canada issued a severe thunderstorm watch for Greater Sudbury at approximately 16:05 and upgraded it to a warning at 16:45, approximately 10 minutes before the storm hit. As Greater Sudbury did not have any warning prior to the end of the regular work day for operations crew, no extra employees were on duty or standby. However Greater Sudbury has a crew on-call 24/7 and has the ability to call in more crews if the need prevails. Staff had not been given formal training for response to a major event prior to the event. Plans are in the works to provide formal training in the coming months. The OEB defines a "Major Event" as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable". The adverse weather event experienced by the customers within GSHI's distribution territory was consistent with the OEB's definition of "Major Event". The storm knocked out power to nearly 8% of the customer base for a total of nearly 3.5 million customer minutes spread over the parts of four calendar days (July 9th thru July 12th, 2018). For comparison, GSHI's year-long Scorecard target for SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) is 1.18 - SAIDI for this adverse weather event alone was 1.23. It took 43.65 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. In this instance GSHI received assistance from the following distributors: -PUC Distribution Inc. -Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd -North Bay Hydro Distribution Ltd GSHI also utilized assistance from the following private contractors: -Tommy Carruthers Service -Pickard Construction -McNamara Powerline Construction -Arbor Works For the most part, GSHI did not issue time-specific ETR's. GSHI provided general information where it was available such as "Will take some time..." "..will be without power overnight" "Not likely to have power restored overnight...Hope to have everyone powered by the weekend." The channels used were: Media releases (Radio/TV), Twitter, Facebook, Media Interviews, website and IVR. A debriefing meeting was held on August 1st, 2018 to discuss what went well, what could have gone better and what could be improved on in the future. As a result of the meeting, some procedures are being rewritten and GSHI's Emergency Situation Manual is being reviewed for dealing with similar situations in the future. It was also decided that scenario type training will be conducted in the near future to better prepare staff for any future events. In addition, GSHI is piloting a project to improve its outage notifications, workforce tracking and mobile deployment. This pilot includes control room process improvements using the Organizations' location and operational intelligence platform. The system is being designed to federate and share data with our partners and the public during major events. Data critical for streamlining communication of outages will be available for integration to partner systems (for example City of Greater Sudbury WebEOC) using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). Hydro 2000 Inc. Hydro 2000 Inc. 2022 30-May-2022 21-May-2022 04:45 PM No The Derecho storm of Saturday May 21st passed through our area at approximately 16:45 pm The Derecho storm of Saturday May 21st that affected most of southern Ontario passed through our area at approximately 16:45. Yes we kept updating our Facebook page and Website with information available on Hydro One Storm Centre Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 1508 100 Yes Do not have third party mutual assistance agreements with other utilities Additional staff training No In the event of Derecho storm, clean-up and safety was priority before restoring power. Staff training will be about communication and client empowerment on feeling understood. Hydro 2000 Inc. Hydro 2000 Inc. 2024 08-Apr-2024 03-Apr-2024 09:30 PM No Following high wind and rain storm, loss supply from Supplier. Following high wind and rain storm, loss supply from Supplier. As an embedded distributor, we are dependent on Hydro One reliability. We upgraded our Facebook page as information became available. Our Estimated Time of Restoration was pretty much exact except for one part of town where Hydro One was out one phase. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 1300 100 Yes Do not have third party mutual assistance agreements with other utilities No further action is required at this time No Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 10-Jan-2017 09:35 PM On Monday, January 9th, at 8:03 am, a Transmission & Distribution “Significant Event Notification System” (SENS) was issued to advise of potential weather of heavy snow and strong winds, which could reach 70-80km/h for an afternoon period on January 10th. An update to the SENS was sent out on January 10th at 4:12pm, advising that strong winds with gusts of up to 90km/h were still expected. On Tuesday January 10th, arrangements were made to have extra employees in the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) on January 10th, 11th and 12th, for both day and night shifts. Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centres throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 195,000 (or about 14%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 12:09 pm on January 12th, the Muskoka M1 was restored, energizing 9,906 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 60 hours and 9 minutes from the onset of the event. Yes, Niagara Peninsula Energy assisted via our third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes. ETR notifications were issued to the public through updates via Significant Event Notification System, Proactive Automated ETR notification and social media channels. ETRs were also issued through an auto-dialer, on the Company’s Storm Centre Outage website map, phone application and media outlets. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) will start in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro One has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 08-Mar-2017 2:00 PM On March 7th at 1:43 pm, a Transmission & Distribution “Significant Event Notification System” (SENS) was issued to advise of high winds weather, starting on the morning of March 8th throughout the Province. On Tuesday, March 7th, extra employees were called into the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) to assist with the expected high winds. Extra employees were also called in to assist during the time period of the major event. Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centres throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 143,000 (or about 10.4%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 12:57 pm on March 9th, the Margach DS was restored, energizing 2,693 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 36 hours and 57 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes, through our Media Notifications. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) will start in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro One has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 07-Apr-2017 1:18 AM Weather warnings were started on April 5th to advise the possible of strong winds and heavy wet snow across the majority of the Province. Extra staff was called in to assist, starting on Wednesday, April 6th, at the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) and continued to call in extra staff to assist during the major event. Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centres throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 156,000 (or about 11%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 4:48 pm on April 9th, the Coldwater DS was restored, energizing 1,191 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 64 hours and 48 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes, through our Media Notifications. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) will start in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro One has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 27-Apr-2017 7:12 AM Weather warnings were started on April 25th to advise of possible strong winds, thunderstorms and freezing rain across the majority of the Province. No extra employees were called into the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) prior to this event. Hydro One’s Storm team (crews and support staff) was formed, in addition to the participation of the Company’s Provincial Lines and Distribution Operations Management Centre. This Storm team provided annual field training to prepare for Major Events. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 138,000 (or about 10%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 10:04 am on April 29th, the Clarabelle TS M7 was restored, energizing 6,963 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 58 hours and 4 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes. ETR notifications were issued to the public through updates via Significant Event Notification System, Proactive Automated ETR notification and social media channels. ETRs were also issued through an auto-dialer, on the Company’s Storm Centre Outage website map, phone application and media outlets. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) will start in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro one has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 18-May-2017 9:00 PM On May 18th at approximately 3:45 pm, Environment Canada issued severe thunderstorm watches with high winds for majority of Southern Ontario. A Transmission & Distribution Significant Event Notification System (SENS) was sent out at 3:59 pm on May 18th, advising of potential high winds throughout south-central Ontario. Yes, on May 18th extra staff was added in the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) during the period of the major event. Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 142,000 (or about 10.3%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 10:11 pm on May 19th, the Baysville DS F1 was restored, energizing 857 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 46 hours and 11 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes. ETR notifications were issued to the public through updates via Significant Event Notification System, Proactive Automated ETR notification and social media channels. ETRs were also issued through an auto-dialer, on the Company’s Storm Centre Outage website map, phone application and media outlets. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) will start in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro one has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Apr-2018 15-Oct-2017 2:38 PM On October 14th, 2017, warnings were issued with regarding to a cold front approaching, which would bring potential thunderstorms and high winds. At 2:21 pm, a Transmission & Distribution Significant Event Notification System (SENS) was issued, advising of potential thunderstorms and high winds across South/Central Ontario. Yes. Field staff was kept apprised of the approaching high wind event. Field crews were placed on alert, and canvassing of crew availability was also completed. Additional Dispatcher staff was also called into the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC). Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 141,500 (or about 10.2%) of Hydro One’s customers. At 11:40 am on Oct 16th, recloser 1901 on the Flynns Corners DS F3 was restored, energizing 410 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 35 hours and 40 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes. ETR notifications were issued to the public through updates via Significant Event Notification System, Proactive Automated ETR notification and social media channels. ETRs were also issued through an auto-dialer, on the Company’s Storm Centre Outage website map, phone application and media outlets. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) started in October. This web-based application will be used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro one has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 21-Aug-2018 04-Apr-2018 10:43 AM Yes, prior warning was given by the weather provider of possible Thunder Storms with heavy rain 20?30 mm and wind gusts to 70-80 km/h in the Southwestern Ontario and the Niagara areas. A Significant Event Notification System (SENS) was subsequently sent out by the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) on Tuesday April 3rd, advising of a pending significant weather. DOMC developed a Storm Restoration Contingency Staffing plan on Wednesday April 4th and Thursday April 5th. Additional staff was added to assist for all shifts. Yes, the response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 236,000 customers, or about 17 per cent. At 12:46 PM on April 5th, the Greely DS F3 feeder was restored, energizing 436 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 36 hours and 46 minutes from the onset of the event. No. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR through the following channels: ?Auto Dialer Notification? tool, ?Outage Website? map, App and ?Outage Alerts? for those customers who had signed up for the notification. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) had begun in October 2017. This web-based application was used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro One has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 21-Aug-2018 14-Apr-2018 01:39 PM Yes, a Significant Event Notification System (SENS) was sent out by the Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) on Friday April 13rd, indicating a potential significant freezing rain. Yes, DOMC had arranged to have extra dispatchers as well as managers on shift for the duration of the storm, from April 14th to April 18th, to assist with the restoration efforts. All Distribution line workers attended and completed the annual ?Mock Storm Emergency Response? training. The procedure of the training was implemented and posted at the Distribution Forward Command Centre. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 467,000 customers (or about 34%) of Hydro One?s customers. At 8:37 AM on April 17th, a line switch on the Ingersoll TS M50 feeder was restored, energizing 214 customers. This restoration was the 90% threshold, after 80 hours and 37 minutes from the onset of the event. Yes, 5 LDCs assisted in this restoration effort. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR through the following channels: ?Media Notification?, ?Outage Website? map, App and ?Outage Alerts? for those customers who had signed up for the notification. A pilot project (TWC Outage Prediction) had begun in October 2017. This web-based application was used to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system. Hydro One has also implemented a banner on the external Outage Map to provide customers with a high level overview of the major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 30-Aug-2018 04-May-2018 2:30 AM Yes, prior warning was issued by weather provider of possible strong thunderstorms in Southern, Central and Eastern Ontario with widespread gusts of 80 – 90kph and marginal conditions of tornado activity especially along the Georgian Bay. Additional staff was scheduled by Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) in preparation of the potential high incident event. Yes, specific response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plan for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 620,000 customers or about 45 per cent of Hydro One’s total customer base. At 8:25 PM on May 7th, 558,509 customers had been restored, which represented the 90% threshold, after 76 hours and 10 minutes from the onset of the event. Yes, there were Twenty LCD’s assisted via third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR through the following channels: “Auto Dialer Notification” tool, “Outage Website” map, App and “Outage Alerts” for those customers who had signed up for the notification. TWC Outage Prediction pilot program that was initiated in October 2017 has tested successful. Hydro One has decided to purchase this tool and is now customizing features to enhance our demographic. This web-based application provides ability to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system, which provides the necessary information to enact a more proactive approach to align crews and resources to areas expected to be impacted by storms. Hydro One has continued to broadcast customer facing banner messaging on the external Outage Map to provide customers with high level overview of a major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 24-Oct-2018 30-Jun-2018 08:49 AM Yes, prior warning was issued by weather provider of possible strong thunderstorms in Southern, Central and Eastern Ontario with widespread gusts of 80 to 90 kph and marginal conditions of tornado activity especially along the Georgian Bay. Additional staff was scheduled by Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) in preparation for this potential "High Incident"event. Yes, specific response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plan for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 163,000 customers, or about 12 per cent. At 6:46PM on July 2nd, after 66 hours and 46 minutes from the onset of the event, the recloser M1RC1 on the Chesterville TS M1 feeder was restored, energizing 4,031 customers, bringing a total number of customers restored up to approximate 147,000, which represented the 90% threshold. Yes, there were seven LCD's and one contractor who assisted via third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR updates through the following channels: Auto Dialer Notification tool, Outage Website map, App and Outage Alerts for those customers who had signed up for the notification. TWC Outage Prediction pilot program that was initiated in October 2017 has tested successful. Hydro One has decided to purchase this tool and is now customizing features to enhance our demographic. This web-based application provides ability to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system, which contains the necessary information to align crews and resources to the expected impacted areas of a storm. Hydro One has continued to broadcast customer facing banner messaging on the external Outage Map to provide customers with high level overview of a major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2018 26-Nov-2018 21-Sep-2018 01:04 PM Yes, prior warning was issued by weather provider of possible strong thunderstorms in the Southern, Central and Eastern Ontario with widespread gusts of 80 ? 90kph and marginal conditions of tornado activity especially along the Georgian Bay. Additional staff was scheduled by Distribution Operations Management Centre (DOMC) in preparation for this potential ?High Incident? event. Yes, specific response plan for a Major Event is reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plan for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 507,000 customers, or about 37 percent. At 12:25PM on September 25th, after 108 hours and 25 minutes from the onset of the event, the feeder recloser on the Tillsonburg TS M2 feeder was restored, energizing 1,918 customers, bringing a total number of customers restored up to approximately 456,650, which represented the 90% threshold. Yes, there were thirteen LCD?s and three contractors who assisted via third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR updates through the following channels: ?Auto Dialer Notification? tool, ?Outage Website? map, App and ?Outage Alerts? for those customers who had signed up for the notification. TWC Outage Prediction pilot program that was initiated in October 2017 has tested successful. Hydro One has decided to purchase this tool and is now customizing features to enhance our demographic. This web-based application provides ability to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system, which contains the necessary information to align crews and resources to the expected impacted areas of a storm. Hydro One has continued to broadcast customer facing banner messaging on the external Outage Map to provide customers with high level overview of a major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Conference calls with key operations groups will continue to be held in advance to prepare for resources and equipment. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2019 17-Apr-2019 24-Feb-2019 01:07 PM Yes. We began monitoring the weather event on February 21st through our weather service provider, Environment Canada and other weather forecasters. The IBM Outage Prediction Tool suggested more than 1,200 weather impacted incidents within the 72 hour period and continued to climb to a peak of just under 1,900 on February 24th. Additional staff was scheduled by the Distribution Operations Management Centre ("DOMC") in preparation for this potential "High Incident" event. Yes, specific response plans for a Major Event are reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 190,000 customers, or about 14 percent. At 11:35 AM on February 25th, a total of 35 hours and 35 minutes after the onset of the event, a switch on the Thunder Beach DS F1 feeder was restored, energizing 570 customers. This restoration brought the total number of customers restored up to 171,243, which represented the 90% threshold. Yes, One LDC (Niagara Peninsula Energy) provided mutual assistance during the storm. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR updates through the following channels: "Auto Dialer Notification" tool, "Outage Website" map, App and "Outage Alerts" for those customers who had signed up for the notification. TWC Outage Prediction pilot program that was initiated in October 2017 has tested successful. Hydro One has decided to purchase this tool and is now customizing to enhance the demographic features. This web-based application provides the ability to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system, which contains the necessary information to align crews and resources to the expected impacted areas of a storm. Hydro One has continued to broadcast customer facing banner messaging on the external Outage Map website to provide customers with a high level overview of a major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Conference calls with key operations groups will continue to be held in advance to prepare for resources and equipment. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2019 20-Dec-2019 01-Nov-2019 01:46 AM Yes. We began monitoring the weather event on Monday October 28th through our weather service provider, Environment Canada and other weather forecasters. The outage prediction tool as of 3pm on Tuesday October 29th was predicting 714 weather impact outages for the province. Additional staff was scheduled by the Distribution System Control in preparation for this event and conference calls was also setup to discuss proactive activities in key operational areas on Wednesday October 30th and Thursday October 31st. Yes, in preparation for the event, all related materials were reviewed by the management staff prior to the storm. Specific response plans for a Major Event are reviewed once a year with the Distribution dispatchers. The work instruction for storm management is posted on the DOMC internal website for quick reference during storm events. In addition, a Storm Team visits various operation centers throughout the year to go over response plans for major events, simulate past major events to gain experience and implement best practices. Hydro One categorizes a Major Event as one that impacts 10 per cent or more of its customers. This event impacted approximately 233,000 customers, or about 17 percent. At 10:45 AM on November 3rd, after 58 hours and 45 minutes from the onset of the event, a switch on the Ivy Lea DS F3 feeder was restored energizing 5 customers. This restoration brought the total number of customers restored up to 209,126, which was about the 90% threshold. Yes, Alectra, PUC, Ottawa River Power and Lakefront Utilities provided mutual assistance during the storm. Yes, Hydro One provided ETR updates through the following channels: ?Auto Dialer Notification? tool, ?Outage Website? map, App and ?Outage Alerts? for those customers who had signed up for the notification. Hydro One has purchased the outage prediction tool and is now customizing to enhance the demographic features. This web-based application provides the ability to forecast weather and predict potential impact on the distribution system, which contains the necessary information to align crews and resources to the expected impacted areas of a storm. Hydro One has continued to broadcast customer facing banner messaging on the external Outage Map website to provide customers with a high level overview of a major event that is taking place and the up-to-date information. Conference calls with key operations groups will continue to be held in advance to prepare for resources and equipment. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2020 26-Aug-2020 10-Jun-2020 11:13PM Yes Use of IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring. N/A N/A June 10, 2020 commencing at 11:13PM to June 12, 2020 ending at 11:13PM K-Line, Peterborough Utilities, Orillia Power, Niagara Peninsula Energy, Entegrus and Blue Water Power The Weather Banner was updated on the Hydro One Outage Map to inform customers of imminent weather. Once Damage was assessed by the damage assessors, the incident was updated with the actual Estimated Time to Restoration (ETR). This can be viewed by all customers on our Hydro One Outage Map – there is also an auto notification via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system included. Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 216000 15 No Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes Hydro One continues to proactively prepare for each Major Event by conducting briefings throughout the event and lessons learned sessions to specifically improve damage assessment, ETR accuracy and customer satisfaction. At the same time, a major processes improvement initiative is also taken place to streamline each of the execution steps through the use of the latest technology (WM Enterprise Systems). Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2021 11-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 01:18 PM Yes Use of IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring. Scheduled extra crews to be on call. The main contributing causes of the Major Event are tree contact and equipment failure during the wind storm. It took 66 hours and 33 minutes from the onset of the Major Event. - Festival Hydro; - Tilsonburg Hydro; - Entegrus; - Bluewater; - Essex Power; - Orangeville Power; - ERTH Power; - Rrenfew; - Newmarket Tay; - North Bay Hydro; - ENWIN Power; - Westario; - North Power Utility; - Centre of Wellington; - London Hydro; - Lakefront The Weather Banner was updated on the Hydro One Outage Map to inform customers of the imminent weather. Once damage was assessed by the damage assessors, the incident was updated with the actual Estimated Time to Restoration (ETR). This can be viewed by all customers on our Hydro One Outage Map. There is also an auto notification via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system included. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 572000 41 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes Hydro One continues to proactively prepare for each Major Event by conducting briefings throughout the event and lessons learned sessions to specifically improve damage assessment, ETR accuracy and customer satisfaction. At the same time, a major processes improvement initiative is also taken place to streamline each of the execution steps through the use of the latest technology Weather Monitoring Enterprise Systems. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2021 11-Nov-2021 12-Sep-2021 06:10 PM Yes From the use of IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring. During the pre-planning event, extra staff was arranged in advance of the storm. These included: Lines, Damage Assessors and Field Business Centre staff. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were tree contact and equipment failure during the wind storm. It took 84 hours and 45 minutes from the onset of the Major Event. The Weather Banner was updated and added to the Hydro One Outage Map to inform customers of imminent weather. Once damage had been assessed by the damage assessors, the incident was updated with an Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). This ETR could be viewed by all customers on our Hydro One Outage Map, and also available on our auto notification via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 147200 10 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes Hydro One is proactively prepared for each Major Event by conducting lessons learned sessions to improve Damage Assessment, ETR accuracy and Customer Satisfaction. Major process improvements such as trainings, feeder prioritization, pre-planning preparation, staff planning, roles and accountabilities are also taken place to streamline each of the execution steps through use of the latest technology Weather Monitoring Enterprise Systems. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2022 31-Jan-2022 11-Dec-2021 11:51 AM Yes Hydro One was aware of this low-pressure system and was monitoring its impacts through the weather monitoring system when it began in the southern United States on December 10th. During the pre-storm call on the morning of December 10th, extra staff were arranged in advance of the storm. These included: Lines, Damage Assessors and Field Business Centre staff. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were tree contacts and equipment failures during the windstorm. It took 149 hours and 12 minutes from the onset of the Major Event to restore 90% of the approximately 761,100 customers who were interrupted by this storm. CONTRACTORS AND LDC’S THAT ASSISTED Alectra K-Line Construction Black & Mac Lakeland Power Devries Power and Utility London Hydro Dundas Powerlines Niagara Peninsula Energy Durham High Voltage Oakville Hydro Elexicon Orangeville hydro Entergus Ottawa River Power Enwin Power North Epcor PowerTel ERTH Sproule Powerline Construction Hannon Electric Sudbury Hydro Highline Utility Solutions T & T Line Construction Holland Power Services Tillsonburg Hydro Hydro Ottawa Valard The Weather Banner was updated and added to the Hydro One Outage Map to inform customers of imminent weather. Once damage had been assessed by the damage assessors, the incident was updated with an Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). This ETR could be viewed by all customers on our Hydro One Outage Map, also available on our auto notification via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 761100 52 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes Hydro One is proactively prepared for each Major Event by conducting a debrief to identify lessons learned, including issues and recommendations to improve Damage Assessment, ETR accuracy and Customer Satisfaction. Major process improvements such as training, feeder prioritization, pre-planning preparation, staff planning for roles and accountabilities are also taking place to streamline each of the execution steps through use of the technology Weather Monitoring Enterprise Systems. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2022 10-Jun-2022 15-Apr-2022 03:45 PM Yes The Significant Event Notification System (SENS) forecasted the spring snowstorm and blizzard weather conditions that began on Monday April 11th, 2022. During the pre-planning events, extra staffing was arranged at the Operation Centers to prepare all emergency response positions ahead of the storm. The main contributing causes of this Major Event were tree contact and equipment failure during the windstorm. It took 61 hours and 7 minutes from the onset of the Major Event. Burlington Hydro; Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd Durham High Voltage; North Bay Hydro EPCOR; Sproule Powerline Construction Ltd ERTH Power; Valard Construction K-Line Construction Ltd During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed by the crews, each incident ticket was updated accordingly to include cause code and Estimate Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors assessed the damage and provided updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 213000 14 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes A storm debrief meeting was scheduled and held on May 9th, 2022 for both process improvements and additional staff training. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2022 15-Aug-2022 17-Jun-2022 01:24 PM Yes From the use of the IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring system. Extra staff were arranged in advance of the storm. These included: Lines, Damage Assessors and Field Business Centre staff. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were equipment failures and tree contacts. Alectra Dundas Power Erie Thames During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed, each incident ticket was updated accordingly to include cause code and Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors were used to assess the damage and provide updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 252000 17 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes A storm debrief meeting is scheduled in August to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2022 16-Aug-2022 21-May-2022 03:07 PM No The IBM Prediction Software and Weather Monitoring tool did not produce warning about a storm of this size. As such, no early warning was issued, with the exception of a warning from Environment Canada shortly before the storm impacted the system. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were equipment failures and tree contacts. Aecon/Ainsworth Bird Electric Bluewater Power Black & Macdonald Devries Electric Inc. Dundas Power Line Durham High Voltage ERTH Power EPCOR Utilities Inc. Enwin Utilities EPTCON Forbes Contracting Festival Hydro Fortis Ontario Group of Companies Holland Power Services Hyline Utility Iconic Power Systems Inc. K&M Contracting Inc. K-Line Maintenance K –Line New Brunswick K Reid Inc. & Construction ltd. Lakeland Power Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. North Bay Hydro Distribution Ltd. Renfrew Hydro Inc. Spark Electric Spark Electric (US Contractor) Sudbury Hydro T&T Line Construction Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. Tri-Line Electric Ltd During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed, each incident ticket was updated to include cause code and Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors were used to assess the damage and provide updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 890100 60 Yes Yes Process improvements No A storm debrief meeting was scheduled and held on June 13th, 2022 to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2023 06-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 9:55 AM Yes The IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring tool indicated the potential for a significant event. N/A The main contributing causes of the Major Event were tree contacts and equipment failures. It took 111 hours and 14 minutes from the onset of the Major Event to restore 90% of the impacted customers. Cormorant Utility Service/Power Tel Dundas Power Line Durham High Voltage EPCOR Utilities Holland Power Services Iconic Power Systems K-Line North Bay Hydro Sault Ste. Marie PUC Sudbury PUC Sproule Powerline Construction T&T Power Valard During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed, each incident ticket was updated to include cause code and Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors were used to assess the damage and provide updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 525000 35 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes A storm debrief meeting took place on January 6th, 2023, to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2023 06-Feb-2023 15-Dec-2022 10:33 AM Yes The IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring tool indicated the potential for a significant event. N/A The main contributing causes of the Major Event were tree contacts and equipment failures. It took 82 hours and 34 minutes from the onset of the Major Event to restore 90% of the impacted customers. Durham High Voltage K-Line Ainsworth Iconic Lakefront Utilities North Bay Hydro Entegrus ERTH EPCOR Devries Power and Utility Sproule Powerline Construction Holland Power T&T Line Construction Vickers Power Line Kingston Utilities During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed, each incident ticket was updated to include cause code and Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors were used to assess the damage and provide updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Others No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 232000 16 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes A storm debrief meeting took place on January 6th, 2023 to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2023 16-May-2023 22-Feb-2023 3:02 AM Yes The IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring tool indicated the potential for a significant event. Ahead of the February 22nd weather system, Dx System Control developed a staffing readiness plan for Control Room resources over the February 22nd to 24th period. Discussions were held with Dx Lines (Southern region) on a preparedness strategy. Southern region held three calls in advance of the event, which included forestry, transmission lines, support staff, damage assessors and logistics representatives. The plan was to increase additional crews on call for Wednesday evening and Thursday night in Southern region to respond to any events in those projected impact areas. No internal crew movement was required. n/a It took 86 hours to restore 90% of the 99,000 customers impacted. Ainsworth Bluewater Power EPCOR ERTH Power EPCOR Utilities Hannon Electric Highline Holland Iconic K-Line K Line – Barrie K Line – Hamilton Lakeland Power London Hydro Milton Hydro Valard During this event, restoration priority was provided to the crews. Once damage was assessed, each incident ticket was updated to include cause code and Estimated Time Restoration (ETR). For those incidents where crews were not available, Damage Assessors were used to assess the damage and provide updates. All ETR updates could be viewed by our customers on the Hydro One Outage Map and were also available on our automatic notification system via the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 46000 7 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes The emergency management program in collaboration with many lines of business at the company continuously work toward improving preparedness and mitigation techniques to improve response. Additional training on emergency-response roles and functions is being developed and applied by both the emergency management team, design services and distribution lines. In addition, new tools are being deployed to support storm response and restoration. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2023 06-Jun-2023 05-Apr-2023 2:30 AM Yes The IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring tool indicated the potential for a significant event. Preparations and mobilization began ahead of the weather system on April 4th. Distribution Lines resources were allocated within the Northwest zone, and sixty resources from the south were dispatched to an area bordering the Central and Northeast zones. Damage assessors, forestry crews, and field business centre staff were briefed and readied for mobilization as the storm unfolded. Helicopter and Fleet staff and equipment were on standby, with contractors notified of potential support requirements. N/A It took 70 hours and 16 minutes from the onset of the Major Event to restore 90% of the 394,000 customers impacted. Local Distribution Company (LDC) Lakefront Utilities Lakeland Power Epcor Kingston PUC North Bat Hydro Bluewater Power Oakville Hydro Toronto Hydro Alectra Estimated Time Restoration (ETRs) were shared with customers who were registered for proactive notifications. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 359000 27 Yes Yes Others No Yes Yes Hydro One will continue to reinforce emergency management and response roles, processes, and procedures, to prepare our staff to fill emergency response roles across the company. Following the storm, a lessons learned exercise was held, with post incident actions identified, and relevant actions collected and assigned for action. Training will continue to fill functions required to support local, regional and provincial emergency response command centers. Further, Hydro One plans to engage customers through a Major Event Outage Survey to identify strengths and to develop areas of improvements. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2024 03-Jun-2024 02-Apr-2024 01:12 AM Yes An awareness call was held and employees put on alert. Weather predictions were widespread, and hardest hit areas were monitored to determine crew mobilization Severe wind and heavy rain hit the province, with numerous areas experiencing wind gusts ranging from 80 to 100 km/h. The regions most affected included West, West Central, Manitoulin Island, Georgian Bay, Central, and the Greater Toronto Area. This windstorm had a significant impact, affecting approximately 325,000 customers (about 22% of the total) from April 2nd to April 4th. According to the IEEE 1366 methodology, these days qualified as a Major Event Day. This is the second Major Event in 2024. Kingston Utilities Epcor Renfrew Hydro Elexicon We have in excess of 600,000 customers enrolled in outage information communication through text messages that receive ETR communications. Hydro One’s Outage Map and Outage Map app is automatically updated during the event with status and ETR. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 325000 22 Yes Yes No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2024 07-Jun-2024 12-Apr-2024 12:23 AM Yes Emergency Operations Centre (Distribution) (EOC-D) calls were set up on April 12 and periodically throughout the event. In the initial April 12 EOC-D morning call, in addition to full staff availability in supporting LOBs, confirmed availability of Dx Lines crews on-call, 300 contractors available. Heavy Rain and Severe wind swept through Southern, Central and Northeast Regions. Northeastern Ontario experienced gusts between 80 to 90 km/h, and Southern Ontario saw gusts between 80 to 95 km/h. There was sustained wind in the Lakeshore area of Lake Huron and Georgian Bay areas with gusts between 90 to 110 km/h. This windstorm impacted a total of approximately 96,000 customers (about 6.5% of the total) on April 12th. The day of April 12th qualified as the Major Event Day based on IEEE 1366 methodology. Approximately 6.5% of Hydro One’s customer based was interrupted during the event. It took 34 hours and 55 minutes from the onset of the Major Event to restore 90% of customers We have in excess of 600,000 customers enrolled in outage information communication through text messages that receive ETR communications. Hydro One’s Outage Map and Outage Map app is automatically updated during the event with status and ETR. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 96000 6.5 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. 2024 12-Aug-2024 13-Jun-2024 12:45 AM Yes The IBM Predication Software and Weather Monitoring tool indicated the potential for a significant event. A SENS of information was issued for potential severe weather over days Wednesday, June 12th and Thursday, June 13th specifically. The weather system was monitored and proactively prepared for, since early afternoon Wednesday. A severe thunderstorm passed through the province with high wind (wind gusts up to 110km/h) and tornados, combined with localized heavy rainfall and very frequent lightning. It hit the grid and brought significant impact. This thunderstorm impacted a total of ~142,000 (9.5%) customers for June 13, and restoration extended into June 15 impacting an additional ~30,000 (2.0%) customers. The day of June 13 qualified as the Major Event Day based on IEEE 1366 methodology. It took 41 hours and 26 minutes from the onset of the Major Event. We have in excess of 600,000 customers enrolled in outage information communication through SMS - ETRs are provided to these customers. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 142000 9.5 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes N/A Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. - 1937680 Ontario Inc. (Peterborough Distribution) 2017 28-Nov-2017 15-Oct-2017 04:11 PM Yes. There were weather advisories that were in place in advance of the storm that warned of high winds and intense storm cells due to a cold front moving across the province. However, the potential impact of the storm was difficult to quantify when compared to a hurricane, tornado, or major ice storm. No extra employees were called on standby ahead of the storm. There was no clear indication that this storm would cause as much significant damage as it did. We perform periodic test scenarios for major outages in our control centre to enhance our state of readiness. This event should be considered to be a Major Event since it was caused by an intense windstorm with gusts up to 90 km/h. The trees that were brought down onto our lines during this event caused extensive damage to our assets, took significantly longer than usual to repair, and affected a substantial number of customers. 69% of our customers were unaffected by this storm 74% of customers were restored within 2 hours and 49 minutes 79% were restored within 3 hours and 28 minutes 83% were restored within 3:42 93% were restored within 4:24 No The outage information was communicated to the public through social media and press releases. The estimated time of restoration was communicated as updates were available. Continual communication was provided on the status of the outage. PDI has implemented a fault location, isolation, and restoration on our 27.6 kV distribution system. It is currently in test mode since full staff training is scheduled for later this year. This system triggered a switching order which would have automatically restored power to some customers during the event. This system will be brought into automatic mode once the staff training is completed. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. - 1937680 Ontario Inc. (Peterborough Distribution) 2018 08-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 03:00 PM Yes. There were weather advisories that were in place in advance of the storm that warned of high winds and intense storm cells due to a cold front moving across the province. However, the potential impact of the storm was difficult to quantify when compared to a hurricane, tornado, or major ice storm. No extra employees were called on standby ahead of the storm. There was no clear indication that this storm would cause as much significant damage as it did. We perform periodic test scenarios for major outages in our control centre to enhance our state of readiness. This event was considered a Major Event since it was caused by an intense windstorm with gusts over 100 km/h. The trees that were brought down onto our lines during this event caused extensive damage to our assets, took significantly longer than usual to repair, and affected a substantial number of customers. 90% of our customers were restored within three hours of the first major event No The outage information was communicated to the public through social media and press releases. The estimated time of restoration was communicated as updates were available. Continual communication was provided on the status of the outage. PDI has implemented a fault location, isolation, and restoration on our 27.6 kV distribution system. This system triggered an automatic switching order, which was stopped due to an abnormal system configuration prior to the event. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. - 1937680 Ontario Inc. (Peterborough Distribution) 2019 25-Nov-2019 31-Oct-2019 11:36 PM Yes. There were weather advisories that were in place in advance of the storm that warned of high winds and intense storm cells due to a cold front moving across the province. However, the potential impact of the storm was not expected to be as significant as a hurricane, tornado, or major ice storm. No extra employees were called on standby ahead of the storm. There was no clear indication that this storm would cause significant damage. We perform periodic test scenarios for major outages in our control centre to enhance our state of readiness. This event was a Major Event because of the intense windstorm with gusts up to 84 km/h that brought down several trees onto our lines. The repairs from this event took longer than usual to repair and affected a substantial number of customers. Multiple short duration outages occurred during this event. During the largest event that accounted for 17% of our customers, power was restored within 0.98 hours. No, additional assistance was not required. We communicated the outage information to the public through social media and press releases. The estimated time of restoration was communicated, as updates were available. Continual communication was provided on the status of the outage. PDI has implemented a fault location, isolation, and restoration on our 27.6 kV distribution system. We have an annual program to add more faulted circuit indicators in order to help locate faults and restore power quicker. Our tree-trimming program has a three-year cycle, which has helped to reduce the amount of tree contacts during these types of storms. Hydro One Networks Inc. Hydro One Networks Inc. - 1937680 Ontario Inc. (Peterborough Distribution) 2021 11-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 04:10 PM Yes There were weather advisories that were in place in advance of the storm that warned of high winds and intense storm cells due to a cold front moving across the province. However, the potential impact of the storm was difficult to quantify when compared to a hurricane, tornado, or major ice storm. No extra employees were called on standby ahead of the storm. There was no clear indication that this storm would cause significant damage. This event was considered a Major Event since it was caused by an intense windstorm with gusts over 80 km/h. The trees that were brought down onto our lines during this event caused extensive damage to our assets, took significantly longer than usual to repair, and affected a substantial number of customers. The outage information was communicated to the public through social media and press releases. The estimated time of restoration was communicated as updates were available. Continual communication was provided on the status of the outage. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5200 14 Yes No Process improvements No No No PD has implemented a fault location, isolation, and restoration on our 27.6 kV distribution system to reduce the impact of unplanned outages. Hydro One Remote Communities Inc. Hydro One Remote Communities Inc. 2019 25-Nov-2019 20-Sep-2019 15:00 Yes. Environment Canada and other weather forecasters provided a weather warning throughout the region. No additional staff were scheduled in advance of the storm. In the past, storms most often miss Remotes? communities since they are small and isolated. Yes, specific response plans for a Major Event are reviewed once a year with the on-call and trades staff. In addition, the Remotes Outage Committee meets monthly to review outages, responses and operational improvements in a continuous effort to gain experience and implement best practices. Remotes categorizes a Major Event under IEEE (Section 3.5) with a threshold value of 2.1 SAIDI minutes/day. These unusual wind storms on September 20th and 21st impacted a significant number of our customers, resulting in a 3.4 SAIDI minutes/day that exceeded our threshold value. Power was restored to all customers at 18:30 hours on September 21st, resulting in an interruption lasting 27.5 hours. No. Most of the damage was to the Transmission and Distribution system in the Red Lake region to the south of the community. This resulted in an outage due to loss of supply for which Remotes had no direct control in resolving and accurate ETR estimation by Remotes was difficult. General communication was done with the Deputy Chief and council members of the community. Actions and timelines were provided regularly to the council as well as to those customers who contacted the Call Centre. Remotes also provided outage updates to Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) in case further community emergency response was required. Remotes plans to explore its operational processes as well as mutual assistance agreements with Watay Power. Issuance of press releases, press conferences and social media notifications during these types of events will be more fully explored. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2017 20-Nov-2017 27-Sep-2017 03:08 PM Weather forecasts indicated that active weather was probable at 3:00 p.m. the afternoon of September 27, 2017. For the event, thunderstorms and heavy rain were expected as a cold front passed through. This occurred after several days of unseasonably warm temperatures. The forecast did not include any indication that we would receive damaging winds. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were notified early in the day of the approaching weather. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The SAIDI value of September 27, 2017 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. It took approximately 24 hours from the activation of our Electrical Emergency Response Plan to restore 90% of affected customers. No, not according to any formal Mutual Assistance Agreement. We did, however, use third-party contractors for forestry and lines work. Yes, Hydro Ottawa issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) through the outage map on our website (hydroottawa.com) and through our Twitter and Facebook accounts. A debrief of the event was held with all stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2018 06-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 05:08 PM Weather forecasts initially indicated that the storm would hit sometime over the weekend, possibly as early as Friday April 13th. The forecast was for a period of significant feezing rain and gusty winds followed by a warm front. We expected that the warming would prevent the ice from building up. The storm system stalled over southern Ontario for the weekend before finally moving into the Ottawa area Sunday evening. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were briefed before the weekend about the approaching weather. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The SAIDI value of April 16, 2018 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. It took approximately 36 hours from the activation of our Electrical Emergency Response Plan to restore 90% of affected customers. No, not according to any formal Mutual Assistance Agreement. We did, however, use third-party contractors for forestry and lines work. Yes, Hydro Ottawa issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) through the outage map on our website (hydroottawa.com) and through our Twitter and Facebook accounts. A debrief of the event was held with all stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation, and outage communication. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2018 26-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 07:24 PM Weather forecasts indicated that active weather was probable for the evening of May 4th. Wind gusts exceeding 90kmph were forecast. System Operations personnel reviewed weather radar from several sources late in the afternoon, and at that time the weather system appeared to be tracking south of the Ottawa area. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were notified early in the day of the approaching weather. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The SAIDI value of May 4, 2018 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. It took approximately 12 hours from the activation of our Electrical Emergency Response Plan to restore 90% of affected customers. No, not according to any formal Mutual Assistance Agreement. We did, however, use third-party contractors for forestry and lines work. Hydro Ottawa personnel were requested to assist Hydro One in the Ottawa area for the day on Monday May 7, 2018. Yes, Hydro Ottawa issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) through the outage map on our website (hydroottawa.com) and through our Twitter and Facebook accounts. A debrief of the event was held with all stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2018 19-Nov-2018 21-Sep-2018 12:24 PM Weather forecasts indicated that active weather was probable for the afternoon and evening of September 21st. Wind gusts exceeding 80 km/h were forecast. System Operations personnel reviewed weather radar from several sources early in the day, and at that time the weather system appeared to be tracking toward the Ottawa area. During the event there were two tornadoes (class EF-2 and EF-3) and winds up to approximately 260 km/h. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were notified early in the day of the approaching weather. On-Call trades personnel were sent home at approximately 12:00 p.m. to rest for evening/overnight restoration work. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The daily SAIDI value of 1221 on September 21, 2018 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold of 5.5, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. The total number of customer hours interupted was 6808300. It took approximately 55 hours from the activation of our Electrical Emergency Response Plan to restore 90% of affected customers. Alectra Utilities provided Lines personnel under the Hydro One Mutual Assistance Agreement with Ontario Local Distribution Companies (LDC's) . Hydro Ottawa also used third-party contractors for Forestry and Lines work. Given the scope of devastation, Hydro Ottawa did not issue estimated times of restoration (ETR) through our outage map at hydroottawa.com until the third day. Through our website, Twitter, Facebook and the media we did provide continuous regular updates to customers and stakeholders as of September 21 (6:00 p.m.). A debrief of the event was held with all stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2019 10-Jun-2019 15-Apr-2019 00:56 There were three basic causes for the outages on April 15th. There were outages attributed to Lightning that was forecast. The distribution transformer outages due to Flooding were anticipated due to heavy rain forecast and spring melt runoff. The Nepean TS outage was unexpected Loss of Supply. During a planned Hydro One maintenance outage on the Nepean T3, the companion T4 transformer tripped from relay protection due to an internal fault. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were notified of potential flooding at the Weekly On-Call meeting. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The daily SAIDI value of 6.14 on April 15, 2019 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold of 5.3, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. The total number of customer hours interrupted was 34,425. The Nepean TS outage was restored in 2 hours, 41 minutes. No third party assistance was necessary. ETR's were provided on the HOL website Outage Map, Power Outage Line and by email Outage Alerts. ETRs were published on social media, and through responding to requests from local radio stations seeking additional information. No debrief of the event was held with stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2019 04-Sep-2019 05-Jul-2019 11:56 AM There were several factors that caused this day to become a MED some of which were expected, some not. The heat and storm activity were forecast, but not expected to be impactive. The unexpected derating at Fallowfield by Hydro One in addition with planned work that was underway, constrained available alternative supplies to restore customers following the storm activity. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. All Operations groups were notified of potential weather related activity. The decision was made early in the day to keep all on-call field personnel, four additional PLT's, and control room personnel at the end of their workday. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The daily SAIDI value of 12.11 on July 5th , 2019 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold of 5.3, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. The total number of customer hours interrupted was 68,268. The outages were unrelated and restored independently of each other. The longest duration was the Limebank relay misoperation outage which lasted 6 hours, 35 minutes. No third party assistance was necessary. ETR's were provided on the HOL website Outage Map, Power Outage Line and by email Outage Alerts. ETRs were published on social media. The on-call Management personnel conducted a debrief meeting to review the major outages, repairs made and corrective measures required. The Fallowfield derating has been corrected by Hydro One as their error.The Limebank T3 B protection settings have been updated. Remaining work in the area, has been reviewed and steps taken to confirm required backup sources are available for restoration. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2019 17-Dec-2019 01-Nov-2019 12:10 AM Winds were forecasted however the severity of the winds exceeded what was expected. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel. Hydro Ottawa has an established Electrical Emergency Response Plan and Organization. Formal training is completed annually according to Market Rules, and a weekly preparation meeting is held to refresh on-call management personnel. This event was considered to be a Major Event Day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The daily SAIDI value of 5.97 on November 1st , 2019 exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold of 5.3, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366, based on the daily SAIDI values for the past five years. The total number of customer hours interrupted was 33,805. The major damage from the wind started at 9am and 90% were restored at 3pm. One outside contractor was secured to assist with power restoration activities. ETR's were provided on the HOL website Outage Map, Power Outage Line and by email Outage Alerts. ETRs were published on social media. No debrief of the event was held with stakeholders. There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2020 25-Jun-2020 07-Mar-2020 02:23 AM No There was no prior warning to this Major Event occurring. An overhead transition on a pole (pothead) failed and caused a fault condition. A fire occurred at Lincoln Heights TD station as a result of the circuit breaker failing to fully interrupt the fault condition. To restore all customers supplied by Lincoln Heights TD station, the station fire had to be suppressed, the situation needed to be made safe, new circuit ties had to be completed, and equipment was re-tested prior to energization. ETR's for the outages were issued by our Outage Management System, Power Outage Line and by email Outage Alerts. Regular updates were provided throughout the day into the following day on our website and through social media posts. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 11686 3 Yes No Others Yes There will be continued focus on on-call and emergency response preparation. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2020 10-Dec-2020 18-Oct-2020 02:00 AM Yes A dedicated switching crew was arranged to keep the outage time as minimal as possible. The outage which caused the Major Event was due to a planned Loss of Supply from Hydro One which affected 3 Hydro Ottawa stations. Hydro Ottawa had prior warning to this event. There was also an outage due to defective equipment on the same day. Initial customer notifications were issued four days prior to the event, and a reminder was also issued the day prior. Notifications were also sent to impacted Community associations and BIAs, as well as respective City Councillors five days prior to the event. The notifications provided each stakeholder, including impacted customers, with contact information to reach us should they have questions or concerns about this event. Because this was a planned outage, the time of restoration was issued in the initial customer notifications, on the website and through social media - as well as Hydro One communications. Crew updates were issued during the event on Hydro Ottawa's Twitter account. A total of 3 updates were issued : 2:30 a.m. (outage notice), 2:45 a.m. (crew arrived), 8:45 a.m. (power restored). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9186 3 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes No Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2021 10-Aug-2021 14-Jun-2021 04:25 PM No Storms were forecasted however the severity of the lightning exceeded what was expected. The main contributor of the major event was lightning. On June 14, Environment Canada issued a severe thunderstorm warning for parts of eastern Ontario, including the Ottawa region. Three lightning related outages were reported, including a Loss of Supply from the provincial transmission system resulting in a loss of load to an entire substation (1,749 customer hours). Another instance of lightning caused a feeder to trip (3,917 customer hours). Lastly, a lightning strike caused arcing within a switchgear at a Hydro Ottawa-owned substation, resulting in the loss of the entire station (29,409 customer hours). These three outages account for over 99% of the interruptions experienced by customers during the Major Event Day. Yes, estimated time of restoration for the initial outages were issued by Hydro Ottawa’s Outage Management System, Power Outage Line and by email outage alerts beginning at 4:26pm on June 14th. Regular updates were provided throughout the evening. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 17441 5 Yes No Process improvements No Asset Planning is taking a review of the 4kV Stations to ensure backup and offload capability is available. The System Office Grid Automation group is reviewing estimated time of restoration expectations and philosophy. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2022 20-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 3:36 PM No No. Winds were forecasted however the severity of the winds exceeded what was expected. Environment Canada issued an alert for a Severe Thunderstorm Watch at 2:12 pm on May 21, 2022. Hydro Ottawa started experiencing outages between 3:45 - 4:00 pm thereafter. Derechos are challenging to predict. On days when derechos form, it is often uncertain whether any storms will form at all. But if they do, the chance exists for explosive development of intense winds*. Derechos are among the most destructive weather events that Canada can experience. While the wind intensity cannot equal a strong to violent tornado, the expanse of area affected in orders of magnitude is greater, often resulting in greater overall impact than tornado event**. *www.theweathernetwork.com/ca/news/article/what-is-a-derecho **www.theweathernetwork.com/ca/news/article/nearly-half-of-canadas-population-hit-by-derecho-why-it-was-harmful The primary cause of interruption for the Major Event was due to a Derecho, a widespread, long-lived wind storm that is associated with a band of rapidly moving showers or thunderstorms. This event was considered to be a Major Event day based on the IEEE Standard 1366 method. The daily SAIDI value of 2308.27 on May 21, 2022 exceeded the daily threshold of 5.05, as determined by IEEE Standard 1366. The total number of customer hours interrupted on May 21, 2022 was 35,491. There were areas damaged from the storm that experienced outages on the days after the storm, which are also part of the Major Event. The total outage hours for the full storm period was 13,367,385. 180,946 customers were interrupted on the day of the major event plus an additional 11,528 customers were impacted on the days after the storm due to damage from the storm. This represented 54% of Hydro Ottawa's total customer base. The major damage from the wind started May 21st at 3:36 p.m. and 90% were restored by May 28th at 6:00 p.m. Four high voltage lines contractors, four neighbouring utilities, three forestry contractors, three civil contractors and one communications contractor for a total of 450 workers were utilized for assistance with storm recovery. Please see further details below regarding how Hydro Ottawa provided restoration estimates information. Due to the number of individual and complex overlapping outages throughout the service territory our outage map was unable to reflect the real time situation after the storm. This included not fully reflecting the extent of the 24/7 progress made by our team, nor estimated times of restoration (ETRs) due to the unprecedented damage, construction and cleanup required. As a result, the outage map was temporarily removed from our website in an effort to prevent frustration and confusion, or create false hope as the situation remained fluid. From the very first day, to ensure customers were still informed of the impact of the storm and to prepare for extended outages based in their area and the restoration priority process Hydro Ottawa issued public statements through multiple mediums that the storm recovery would be a multi-day restoration effort. On Monday, May 30th with the bulk of the electricity grid fully operational, Hydro Ottawa relaunched its online outage map, tailored for customers who still remained without power. These new ETRs were defined by the day on which power would be restored to specific areas instead of times. We were also able to provide ward-specific information to respective city councilors at the same time. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 180946 54 Yes Yes Others No Others. A company wide debrief is being conducted due to the magnitude of the event that took place May 21, 2022. Findings will be actioned and Hydro Ottawa has and will continue to look at lessons learned as a result of the major event. A derecho is defined as a widespread, long-lived, straight-line wind storm that is associated with a fast-moving group of severe thunderstorms known as a mesoscale convective system. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2022 12-Aug-2022 18-Jun-2022 12:13 PM No No, Hydro Ottawa had no prior warning that the Major Event would occur as it occurred due to a loss of supply event. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel available. On June 18th at 12:13pm a cable fault occurred on the Hydro One C7BM 115kV transmission supply resulting in a loss of supply to six Hydro Ottawa substations which led to 27000 Hydro Ottawa customer outages. It took 2 hours and 40 minutes to restore 90% of the customers related to the major outage. The major outage started at 12:13 pm on June 18th, 2022 and 90% were restored at 2:53 pm of the same day. Yes, estimated times of restorations for the major outage were issued by Hydro Ottawa’s Outage Management System, Power Outage Line and email Outage Alerts beginning at 12:47 pm June 18th. The first social media post was published on Twitter at 12:39 pm. Regular updates were provided. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 27405 8 Yes No No further action is required at this time No No There is an ongoing focus on on-call and emergency response preparations with the goal of continuous improvement. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2023 10-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 1:01 AM Yes Environment Canada issued a Special Weather Statement on December 19th, 2022 at approximately 16:00, a Winter Storm Watch on December 21, 2022 at approximately 15:00 and a Winter Storm Warning on December 22nd, 2022 at approximately 15:00. Once Environment Canada issued the Winter Warning Watch, all Hydro Ottawa Operations employees were contacted for availability. All available Line staff and underground staff were instructed to report into their work location on December 23rd, 2022 at 6:00. All On-Call staff were instructed to report in on December 22nd, 2022 at 18:00 in preparation for the event as well as the Incident Command Centre was stood up at the same time. On December 23rd at 1:01AM Hydro One S7M circuit and Cambrian's T1 transfer tripped which resulting in a loss of supply to four Hydro Ottawa substations which led to 31,897 Hydro Ottawa customer outages. Yes, estimated times of restoration were provided on the Hydro Ottawa website Outage Map, Power Outage Line and by email Outage Alerts prior to it going into Storm Mode. Estimated times of restoration were also provided through responding to requests from media, shareholder and social media. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 67710 19 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes A debrief is being conducted and findings will be actioned to ensure Hydro Ottawa continues to be prepared for such events Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2023 11-May-2023 05-Apr-2023 10:54 AM Yes Environment Canada issued a Special Weather Statement on April 4th, 2023 stating prolonged freezing rain leading to 10 to 15 millimeters of ice accretion was forecasted. Hydro Ottawa had all of its employees on standby and on-site during the onset of the event. In addition, Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel working overnight. On April 5th at 7:26 PM, Hydro One M31A transfer tripped. Which resulted in a loss of supply to two Hydro Ottawa substations leading to 25,303 Hydro Ottawa customer outages. 163,448 customers were interrupted during the Major Event, representing 45% of Hydro Ottawa’s total customer base. Burlington Hydro, London Hydro, ERTH Power Once available, estimated times of restoration were provided through proactive communications via website, news releases, press conference, updates to the shareholder, email to customers and social media outlets. ETRs were also provided while responding to requests for information from the following audiences: customer enquiries, media, shareholder. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 163448 45 Yes Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes Hydro Ottawa will conduct a debrief to discuss lessons learned from the Major Event. Process improvements from those lessons learned will be implemented for future major events. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2023 24-Aug-2023 26-Jun-2023 3:40 PM Yes Thunderstorms were forecasted; however, the severity of the lightning exceeded what was expected. Hydro Ottawa had all of its employees on standby and on-site during the onset of the event. In addition, Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel working overnight. On June 26, 2023 there was a thunderstorm and lightning event that caused some significant outages: 1) 48M2 breaker auto re-closed at the Hawthorne TS station. The Blue phase switch was open with pitting due to lightning. 7241 customers were interrupted. 2) TB06 breaker failure due to a lightning strike which tripped the Y bus at the Russell TS station. 2363 customers were impacted. 3) UX02 and UX05 breakers tripped at the Gladstone station due to fallen trees from the thunderstorm event. 1266 customers were affected. Yes, ETRs were provided on social media (Twitter/X) and through the Outage Map Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 15413 96 Yes No Process improvements No Yes No Hydro Ottawa is undertaking a full review/update of its Electricity Emergency Response Plan. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2023 27-Sep-2023 28-Jul-2023 1:22 PM Yes Thunderstorms were forecasted, however the severity of the storm exceeded what was expected. In the challenging scenario of a labour disruption, Hydro Ottawa took specific measures to ensure staff readiness and on-call staff and contractors were on stand-by. On July 28, 2023, there was a hailstorm event that caused some significant outages: i) A circuit breaker tripped at the Lincoln Heights TD substation due to fallen trees on overhead primary conductor infrastructure. 2,261 customers were affected. ii) A circuit breaker tripped at the Lincoln Heights TD substation as extreme winds knocked down a tree branch onto an overhead primary conductor segment. 1763 customers were interrupted. iii) Downed primary conductor segments at multiple locations on a circuit tied to the Woodroffe TW substation. 1535 customers were impacted. 92.3% of the interrupted customers (34,906) were restored by 4:15 AM on 29th July, 2023. Yes, ETRs were provided on social media (Twitter/X) and through the Outage Map. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 37821 10.4063 Yes No Others No Yes Yes Review of emergency response processes during the labour disruption. Hydro Ottawa Limited Hydro Ottawa Limited 2024 26-Apr-2024 28-Feb-2024 2:52 PM Yes Yes. Winds were forecasted the day prior, and in response, Hydro Ottawa executed its Major Incident Preparedness Process. Hydro Ottawa had a full complement of on-shift personnel, and a full on-call roster of field technicians and management personnel on-site ready to respond prior to the forecasted weather. On February 28th, 2024, there were multiple outages in Hydro Ottawa's system impacting 21,911 customers due to extreme wind conditions. The majority of them occurred in the afternoon and into the night as high winds hit Hydro Ottawa’s service territory. There were two large outages impacting 18,437 customers: - At 9:21 pm the extreme wind event caused a major interruption by tripping the breaker A9M3 at South March TS station and interrupting 10,409 customers fed from distribution stations Beaverbrook MS, Janet King DS, Richmond North DS and Munster DS. - At 10:27 pm the Hydro One A8M 115kV transmission supply tripped resulting in a loss of supply to Hydro Ottawa substations Uplands MS and Merivale MS which led to 8,028 Hydro Ottawa customer outages. There were smaller outages in the afternoon interrupting 3,443 customers (16% of total customers impacted by the weather event). Starting at 9:21 pm, there were two large interruptions impacting 18,437 customers (85% of total customers impacted by the weather event). It took 12 hours and 18 minutes since the event started to restore 90% of the customers impacted by the weather event; however, it took five hours and 39 minutes since the time the large interruptions occurred to restore 90% of the customers interrupted. Estimated Time of Restauration (ETRs) were provided on the HOL website Outage Map, sent via SMS/text message or email alert to impacted customers, and published on social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 21911 6 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes There is an ongoing focus on on-call and emergency response preparations with the goal of continuous improvement. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2017 31-Jul-2017 27-Jul-2016 No N/A Yes the training for staff on the response for a Major Event is the same as all trouble calls and customer power interruptions. We have crews available during working business hours and one person on call available after business hours to respond to identify interruption cause and remove cause and any hazard to then reestablish supply of power to customer. If the work requires additional staff the one person on call will request additional staff assist. This event was a Major Event because of Tree Contact 2 hours and 25 minutes to restore 90% of customers No The estimated time for restoration was communicated through InnPower Corporation Outage Management System and Twitter. Ongoing staff emergency response, process improvements, as well as continual system upgrades of aging assets is being done. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2017 31-Jul-2017 17-Oct-2016 No N/A Yes the training for staff on the response for a Major Event is the same as all trouble calls and customer power interruptions. We have crew available during working business hours and one person on call available after business hours to respond to identify interruption cause and remove cause and any hazard to then reestablish supply of power to customer. If the work requires additional staff the one person on call will request additional staff assist. This Event was a Major Event because of Adverse Weather 3 hours and 28 minutes to restore 90% of customers No The estimated time for restoration was communicated through InnPower Corporation Outage Management System and Twitter Ongoing Staff emergency response, process improvements, as well as continual system upgrades of aging assets is being done InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2017 31-Jul-2017 18-Oct-2016 No N/A Yes, the training for staff on the response for a Major Event is the same as all trouble calls and customer power interruptions. We have crews available during working business hours and one person on call available after business hours to respond to identify interruption cause and remove cause and any hazard to then reestablish supply of power to customer. If the work requires additional staff the one person on call will request additional staff assist. This Event was a Major Event because of Adverse Weather 2 Hours and 23 minutes to restore 90% of customers No The estimated time for restoration was communicated through InnPower Corporation Outage Management System and Twitter Ongoing Staff Emergency response, process improvements, as well as continual system upgrades of aging assets is being done. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2017 31-Jul-2017 21-Nov-2016 No N/A Yes, the training for staff on the response for a Major Event is the same as all trouble calls and customer power interruptions. We have crews available during working business hours and one person on call available after business hours to respond to identify interruption cause and remove cause and any hazard to then reestablish supply of power to customer. If the work requires additional staff the one person on call will request additional staff assist. This Event was a Major Event because of Adverse Weather 1 hour and 48 minutes to restore 90% of customers No The estimated time for the restoration was communicated through InnPower Corporation Outage Management System and Twitter Ongoing staff emergency response, process improvements, as well as continual system upgrades of aging assets is being done. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2018 12-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 16:09:PM InnPower Corporation ("IPC") actively monitors short and long term weather patterns to identify weather related risks. The distributor was aware of this risk being a major event. IPC did arrange to have extra customer service representatives on duty to handle the anticipated increase in call volume, engineering technologists on standby to help with line patrols and contracted and on-call line crews on standby to respond to emergencies and repairs. IPC is actively working on developing its emergency response and business continuity plans. Staff have basic training in dealing with Major Events and typically take direction from senior management or persons appointed by senior management. On determination of a major event, senior management or designates set up a utility command post in its control room, where all decisions are directions are carried out. Staff are called in as necessary based on the severity of the event and additional staff are called to be on standby should the incident escalate. Available staff are then dispatched to handle phone calls, update communications to customers, patrol lines in order to triage emergencies and high risk outages and respond to emergencies and repair outages. As the situation continues to unfold, standby staff may be called in to assist teams. We also kept the Innisfil Town staff and Council updated throughout the event. This event was considered by IPC to be a Major Event as it deviated significantly from the normal system reliability pattern experienced by the distributor. The event created a significant and impactful outage to a large number of customers. It took approximately 28 hours to restore 90% of interrupted customers. No Yes, ETRs were issued via InnPower public outage map, Twitter, Facebook, phone calls, emails and a media release on CTV news. Multiple steps are being taken to mitigate the impact of future Major Events such as this one. First, staff training, emergency management and business continuity processes are being developed and put in place based on Emergency Management Ontario practices. Second, our vegetation management program is being revisited to ensure that cycles are assigned on a priority and risk basis such that tree contacts are minimized. Third, our system planning is being revisited to ensure that we have adequate tie points between feeders and capabilities to redistribute load. Finally, our SCADA\control systems are being developed to create an automated self-healing network through deployment of fault indicators and smart switches. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2020 05-Jun-2020 26-May-2020 5:51:00 PM Yes InnPower was aware that there was active weather coming, as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees on call for emergencies. As the intensity of the storm increased over Barrie, InnPower strengthened these forces by calling additional staff in to remain on standby as required. One of InnPower's main 44,000 V supplies from Hydro One started indicating over 2000 amperes on the red and white phases and this feeder was removed from service. After patrolling in lightning and near whiteout conditions due to the rain and close to a foot of localized flooding, crews located a downed 44,000 V line on the 6th line. It was reported that lightning had struck the pole, carried the current through the line and broke the wire off the insulator causing one phase to fall into another. Crews started making repairs here while other team members continued to assess other outages and respond to customer inquiries. Over the course of the night a pad mount transformer had also failed needing to be replaced and a feeder serving Salem, McKay, Veterns, 4th line etc. was found locked out. At around 2:30am, the same 44,000 V supply from Hydro One locked out yet again. The team quickly came up with a plan to divide and conquer by patrolling in sections and troubleshooting by looking at fault currents and impedances. It was estimated that the fault was to be 10-15 km from the demarcation point from Hydro One around the Cookstown area. The team was able to identify a faulted arrestor in the Cookstown area and quickly worked to isolate the section of line and ensure the site was left safe. All power restored at 3:46am. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included a picture of the damaged pole on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations as updated. InnPower received a lot of public and private feedback from customers reporting the areas they are in. This assisted with troubleshooting efforts. At approx. 10:50pm crews started restoring power, a message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Hydro One supply feeder tripped again at approx. 2:30am 27MAY20. Crews were immediately dispatched. InnPower again received messages through answering service and social media. A post was put up on Twitter and Facebook at advising of the outage and real-time information as dispatched through the operating supervisor. Power was restored at approximately 3:46am and a message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office or message through social media. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9344 49 No No System upgrades No Yes Yes More lightning arrestors in areas of high lightning vulnerabilities (data as mapped and analyzed from GIS system). InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 11-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 1:38:00 PM Yes InnPower monitors the weather and system conditions according to weather forecast in order to appropriately allocate resources ahead of time. InnPower always has at least two line employees on call for emergencies. As the intensity of the storm increased, InnPower strengthened these forces by calling additional staff in to remain on standby, as required. One of InnPower's main 44,000 V supply (9M1/ Alliston TS) from Hydro One locked out because of tree contact, which caused an outage for 3,220 customers. Immediately after the storm started, this feeder was backed up from another 44kV feeder through InnPower's service territory. Subsequently, multiple outages occurred because of high winds and storm conditions on the distribution side, which required patrolling in lightning and heavy rain conditions. Crews located a downed distribution line on the 25th side road, 10th line, 9th line (in total we had 37 locations reported outages). It was reported that a tree had struck the pole, carried the current through the line and broke the wire off the insulator, causing one phase to fall into another. Crews started making repairs here while other team members continued to assess other outages and respond to customer inquiries. Over the course of the night, most of the power to customers was restored and crews worked continuously for two days (in shifts) to restore 100% of customers. In total, we had restored 7,487 customers in less than 5 hours, which was 77% of total number of interrupted customers. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with the Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report and as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the areas effected. Social media and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included a picture of the damaged pole on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations, as updated. InnPower received a lot of public and private feedback from customers reporting the areas effected, which assisted with troubleshooting efforts. At approx. 10:50pm crews started restoring power and a message was put out on social media advising if any customers were still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9823 51 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes More vegetation control and tree trimming based on substandard feeder behavior in areas where there is a high possibility of tree contact (data as mapped and analyzed from SCADA/GIS system). InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 18-May-2021 28-Apr-2021 11:01 AM Yes InnPower was aware that there was active weather coming as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees on call for emergencies. InnPower had full staff April 28, 2021 On the morning of April 28, a large outage occurred in the South-West of Innpower’s System. The outage was determined to be cause by heavy rains that caused a recently formed osprey nest to fall on top of the 44kV circuit. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media and Customer Service were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included a picture of the nest and downed power lines on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations as updated. At approx. 12:28pm crews restored power, a message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4694 24 No No System upgrades No Yes No Infrastructure Services will be looking at different ways to best mitigate animal species from building nests without negatively impacting the species. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 18-May-2021 30-Apr-2021 15:22 PM Yes InnPower was aware that there was active weather coming as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees on call for emergencies. InnPower had full staff during the event. Wind intensity picked up around 15:00 on April 30th causing a large tree to fall on the distribution lines which caused a huge surge on our distribution system as well as our supply from Hydro One. Crews quickly responded and isolated the section of line and restored most customers around 17:30. There was also significant repairs on Corner Ave due to a downed tree, a broken pole on the 9th Line and other trees on the lines throughout the system. External crews were brought in to assist with restoration efforts. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included pictures of tree damage on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations as updated. InnPower received a lot of public and private feedback from customers reporting the areas they are in. The outage started at approximately 15:22 and resulted in 11,921 customers experiencing an outage. We restored 6077 customers in less than 15 minutes and then restored 3877 customers in 2 hours. The rest of our 1967 customers were restored in less than 4 hours. After that our crews responded to single outages in a timely manner with the last customer restored at noon on May 1st. A message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 11921 60 No No Others No Yes Yes Vegetation management InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 03-Aug-2021 15-Jul-2021 14:38:20PM No Environment Canada issued an emergency alert minutes after the tornado had already occurred. Adverse Weather - Tornado At 14:38, InnPower lost a major supply feeder from Barrie servicing 2,193 customers, due to an EF2 tornado At 14:55, Environment Canada issued a Tornado warning for Barrie and Innisfil By 16:48, InnPower had sectionalized and restored power to 1,088, leaving 1,105 customers without power By 18:08, 1,031 customers had been restored, leaving 74 customers without power (69 restored by 19:32 and 5 restored by 01:54). The main area damaged was Mapleview Drive between Yonge Street and 25th Sideroad, where many homes were damaged and a new 44/27.6 kV pole line put up by InnPower was taken down. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter 15:03 & Facebook at 14:52) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report, as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media, Customer Service and the answering service (after-hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included pictures of storm damage on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations, as updated. A message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2193 11 Yes No No further action is required at this time No InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 09-Dec-2021 02-Dec-2021 08:00 AM Yes InnPower was aware that there was active weather coming, as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees on call for emergencies. InnPower had full staff during the event. On December 2nd at 08:00, wind intensity picked up causing a large tree to fall on the distribution line, leaving 482 customers without power. Crews quickly responded, cut and removed the tree from the lines and restored power by 09:59. The wind continued throughout the day into the evening, causing two more significant outages. An outage occurred at 14:08 due to the 44kv tap being blown off the amp connection. 1957 customers were without power until the crews were safely able to install a jumber and restore power at 17:23. Full repairs were completed the following day. The third outage affecting 130 customers occurred at 19:25 due to another tree being twisted in the three phase circuit. The crew isolated the area and restored 126 customers by reclosing the blue phase by 22:55 . The remaining 4 customers were restored at 00:45 on December 3rd. To complete the tree removal, an additional 5 customers had an outage from 22:20 to 00:45. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) at the first report as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included pictures of tree damage on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations, as updated. A message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2574 12 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes No InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2021 22-Dec-2021 11-Dec-2021 14:45:18PM Yes InnPower was aware that there was extreme weather coming, as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees, one supervisor and one customer service management support on call for emergencies. Additional staff, as well as third party contractors were called in as more outages occurred. Major outages occurred throughout our area on December 11, 2021 at 14:45 due to high winds causing extensive tree contacts and three broken poles. We cleaned up and restored power as fast as possible by calling in additional resources to support restoration efforts. Orangeville Hydro Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with the Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media, Customers Service and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included pictures of damage on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations, as updated. A message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 4612 23 No Yes Others No Yes Yes InnPower is keep improving its reliability through the vegetation management program and also adding smart devices in the field for better and faster restoration. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2022 18-Jul-2022 16-Jun-2022 12:30:34PM Yes InnPower was aware that there was extreme weather coming as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees, one supervisor and one customer service management support on call for emergencies. Additional staff were called in as more outages occurred Major outages occurred throughout our area on Thursday, June 16th afternoon continuing until the morning of Saturday, June 18th. High winds caused extensive tree contacts and the repair of a 44kv insulator. InnPower cleaned up and restored power as fast as possible by calling in additional resources to support restoration efforts. Messages were put out on Social Media (Twitter & Facebook) tagged with Town of Innisfil (to reach more customers) as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the area affected. Social media, Customers Service and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included pictures of damage on the social media posts and estimated time of restorations as updated. A message was put out on social media advising if any customers are still without power to call our office (which goes directly to answering service) or message through social media. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 14244 70 Yes No Others No Yes Yes InnPower is improving its reliability through vegetation management programs and also adding smart devices in the field for better and faster restoration. InnPower Corporation InnPower Corporation 2024 20-Jun-2024 13-Jun-2024 8:14 PM Yes InnPower was aware that there was extreme weather coming as its system control group continually monitors the weather and system conditions. InnPower always has at least two line employees, one supervisor and one customer service management support on call for emergencies. Additional staff were called in as more outages occurred Our service area was impacted by a thunderstorm on the evening of Thursday, June 13. While four crews were already addressing a broken pole from an MVA early that evening, a second operation team and an engineering tech joined to accelerate the assessment and repair of storm damages. The storm caused three of the four HONI feeders supplying our area to lockout around 8:14 PM, affecting 15,799 customers. Power was restored to 15,292 customers on Barrie M3 and Alliston M1 within 10 minutes. However, restoration of Alliston M4, affecting 507 customers, took longer until HONI cleared the line by 3:35 AM the next day. Although, we could restore power to 111 of those 507 customers earlier at 1:15 AM. Restoration efforts continued throughout the night with six crews working until 6:00 AM the next day. After a short break, a fresh team from IPC Operations and a team from third party contractor resumed the process. This seamless handover ensured continuous restoration efforts throughout the night with subsequent crews taking over around 4:00PM until late evening. During this response, crew restored power to 570 customers (in addition to those affected directly by loss of supply), replaced two storm-damaged poles, conducted 20 inspections, removed 12 trees/branches from power lines, and issued 6 supporting guarantees. Notably, five of six these guarantees were reconnected by the end of the day or the following day, minimizing customer inconvenience. All customer inquiries were successfully addressed by our crews. Messages were put out on Facebook as information came in from the field. The outage map was updated showing the areas affected. Social media, Customers Service and answering service (after hours dispatch) were updated to assist with customer inquiries. InnPower included estimated time of restorations as updated. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 16563 71 Yes No Others No Yes No InnPower is improving its reliability through vegetation management programs and also adding smart devices in the field for better and faster restoration. Kingston Hydro Corporation Kingston Hydro Corporation 2019 19-Dec-2019 01-Nov-2019 01:41 a.m. Yes. No. Once restoration efforts began, we moved employees out of their regular positions into positions that would aid in the effort. Yes. Some training was position specific, such as crisis communications procedures, while other training is more general, such as relating to emergency management and the more formal incident management system (IMS). The calculated System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)/Day (mins) for the day exceeds the annual TMED threshold. The calculated annual TMED threshold using five year data (2014 to 2018) is 0.2808, while the calculated SAIDI for the day is 1.29. 48 hours. No. Yes, through our website, outage map and Twitter and Facebook accounts. The information was picked up and distributed by local news media. Example https://utilitieskingston.com/News/Article/Update-on-power-restoration-traffic-signalsNov-2 We debriefed with staff to find improvements and updated our crisis communications framework. Kingston Hydro Corporation Kingston Hydro Corporation 2023 16-Feb-2023 24-Dec-2022 00:55 AM Yes Called employees as required. The main cause of the Major Event is the Adverse Environment, specifically a winter storm. A powerful winter storm swept across eastern Ontario in the days leading up to Christmas. The high winds and heavy snow caused a total of 11,874 customer-hours of interruptions in Kingston Hydro service territory on December 24th, 2022. Yes, we issued safety messaging, reassurances, outage areas, estimated times of restoration, contact information, power outage precautions, and messages of thanks through our website, outage map and Twitter and Facebook accounts. The information was picked up and distributed by local news media. Example website article demonstrating the issued estimated times of restoration: https://utilitieskingston.com/News/Article/Crews-respond-to-power-outage-in-Central-Kingston-6-PM Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5128 18.4 No No Process improvements No No Yes Debriefed with staff looking for improvements. We discussed sharing the spread sheet real time that the Operations Centre uses to keep track of locations with field crews so they can see and enter comments with their iPads. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 21-Sep-2017 18-May-2017 No. N/A No. This event is considered a Major Event as it meets all criteria specified in the OEB File EB-2015-0182 and RRR Section 2.1.4.2. 4.28 hrs. No. Yes via Twitter and Facebook. LPDL reviewed the existing mutual assistance agreements to ensure that they were current and relevant. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 21-Sep-2017 07-Jul-2017 No. N/A No. This event is considered a Major Event as it meets all criteria specified in the OEB File EB-2015-0182 and RRR Section 2.1.4.2. 20.22 hrs No. Yes via Twitter and Facebook. LPDL reviewed the existing mutual assistance agreements to ensure that they were current and relevant. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2018 21-Nov-2018 21-Sep-2018 1:12 pm No N/A No This event is considered a Major Event as it meets all criteria specified in the OEB File EB-2015-0182 and RRR Section 2.1.4.2. 18.63 hrs. No Yes via Twitter and Facebook. LPDL reviewed the existing mutual assistance agreements to ensure that they were current and relevant. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2020 17-Jul-2020 10-Jun-2020 7:37 pm No Environment Canada declared this a level 1 tornado. Level 1 Tornado Orillia Power Distribution, Orangeville Hydro and Wasaga Distribution. Posted outage and updated restoration times via Lakeland Power's Twitter and Facebook accounts and on the outage map on Lakeland Power's website. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 6499 47 Yes Yes Others No Lakeland Power is meeting with Hydro One this summer to review and assess how we can together improve the reliability in our service area. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2021 17-Nov-2021 22-Sep-2021 2:33 am No Loss of Supply Posted outage and updated restoration times via Lakeland Power's Twitter and Facebook accounts and on the outage map on Lakeland Power's website. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3415 24 Yes No Others No Lakeland Power is meeting with Hydro One in December 2021 to review and assess how we can together improve the reliability in our service area. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2022 21-Nov-2022 20-Oct-2022 5:10 am No Huge snow storm Posted outage and updated restoration times via Lakeland Power's Twitter and Facebook accounts and on the outage map on Lakeland Power's website. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 10902 76 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. Lakeland Power Distribution Ltd. 2023 13-Jan-2023 23-Dec-2022 10:50 pm Yes Lakeland participated in storm preparation calls with OnMAG (Ontario Mutual Assistance Group). These were situational calls to discuss how LDC's in the province were preparing for this province wide storm. Employes, contractors and tree trimming contractors. Province wide snowstorm - loss of supply/adverse weather The amount of snowfall in a such a short period of time made most roads in our area impassable for an extended period of time which impeded our efforts in assessing damage, reaching lines that were down and customers that were out. Lakeland posted outage and updated restoration times via Lakeland Power Twitter, Facebook and Instagram accounts and on the outage map on Lakeland Power's website. Lakeland also provided updates on weather conditions, weather warnings and winter preparedness tips via the above three social media platforms. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9779 68 Yes No Others No Yes Yes Lakeland is a member of OnMAG and participate in quarterly meetings to discuss future storm assistance. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2017 03-Apr-2017 08-Mar-2017 Yes, London hydro was aware of the weather forecast. In addition, Environment Canada issued a high wind warning for Southwestern Ontario. The Major Event started during normal working hours. London Hydro had all employees available to assist during the event and put contractors on alert. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in Major Event response. The last training session was held on December 13, 2016. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock tabletop exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). This event was related to extreme winds. Based on the definition of a Major Event in the ?Electricity Distribution System Reliability: Major Events, Reporting on Major Events and Customer Specific Measures? report issued by the OEB, this event was beyond the control of London Hydro. As well, based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event since the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values recorded exceeded the MED threshold values. It took 11 hours to restore more than 90% of the customers who were interrupted. London Hydro did not invoke the third party mutual assistance agreement; however, London Hydro used third party contractors through private agreements. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR messages through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the Outage Map on our website, which is updated every 5 minute with the most recent information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan which is complemented by the execution of a mock tabletop exercise annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro?s electrical distribution system. In addition, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where improvement is needed. Considering the root cause of the outages in this Major Event was trees falling on the distribution lines, London Hydro has meetings planned with the City?s Forestry Department to educate them on the risks posed by trees and to aid in better planning and planting by the City. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2017 24-Aug-2017 24-Jun-2017 No. This event was caused by a vehicle accident. Not applicable. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on December 13th, 2016. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock tabletop exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). Based on the definition of a Major Event in the ?Electricity Distribution System Reliability: Major Events, Reporting on Major Events and Customer Specific Measures? report issued by the OEB, this event was beyond the control of London Hydro. As well, based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event since the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values recorded exceeded the MED threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 1 hour 52 minutes to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. London Hydro utilized the assistance of a third party private contractor through an existing agreement. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR messages through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text Messages. London Hydro also issued ETR messages through an Outage Map on our website, which is updated every minute with the most recent information London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan that is complemented by the execution of a mock tabletop exercise annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro's electrical distribution system. In addition, London Hydro performs post-event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where improvement is needed. Considering the root cause of the event was a traffic accident, a review of major intersection is being undertaken to determine if there are any mitigating measure that can efficiently be designed into the distribution system to mitigate the impact of similar events in the future. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2017 10-Oct-2017 10-Aug-2017 No. This event was caused by a Loss of Supply. Not applicable. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on December 13th, 2016. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock tabletop exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). Based on the definition of a Major Event in the ?Electricity Distribution System Reliability: Major Events, Reporting on Major Events and Customer Specific Measures? report issued by the OEB, this event was beyond the control of London Hydro. As well, based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event since the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values recorded exceeded the MED threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 1 hour to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. London Hydro did not invoke a third party mutual assistance agreement; however, London Hydro used third party contractors through private agreements. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR messages through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the Outage Map on our website, which is updated every minute with the most recent information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan that is complemented by the execution of a mock tabletop exercise annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro?s electrical distribution system. In addition, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where improvement is needed. Considering the root cause of the event was a traffic accident, a review of major intersection has been undertaken to determine if there are any mitigating measure that can reasonably be designed into the system to mitigate the impact of similar events in the future. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2018 12-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 02:09 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a freezing rain and high wind warning for southwestern Ontario London Hydro had employees available on standby to assist during the event. London Hydro also contacted several private contract resources (overhead linemen and arborists) and requested that they be available if needed. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on December 5th, 2017. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values exceeded the daily SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 17 hours to restore more than 90% of the customers who were interrupted since 12:00am on April 15th. However, the most significant outage occurred at 2:09pm and contributed 97% of customer interruptions on April 15th. These customers were restored in just over 3 hours. London Hydro did not require assistance through its third party mutual assistance agreement; however, London Hydro did use third party contractors through the private contractor?s agreement. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockup is performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro?s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where we need to improve. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2018 27-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 04:20 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a high wind warning for southwestern Ontario. The Major Event happened during normal working hours. London Hydro had all employees available to assist during the event. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on December 5th, 2017. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values exceeded the daily SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 20 hours to restore more than 90% of the customers who were interrupted since 12:00am on May 4th. However, the Major Event outage occurred at 4:20pm and contributed 51% of customer interruptions on May 4th. These customers were restored in just over 4 hours. London Hydro did not require assistance through its third party mutual assistance agreement; however, London Hydro did use third party contractors through the private contractor's agreement. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockups are performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro's electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas for improvement. Also, in 2017 London Hydro conducted a review of its tree trimming practices. This review resulted in additional tree trimming efforts during the 4th quarter of 2017 and first quarter of 2018. The additional trimming during this time helped to decrease the number of limbs down on power lines during the storm. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2018 05-Sep-2018 05-Jul-2018 2:23 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued a severe weather warning for southwestern Ontario. The Major Event happened during normal working hours. London Hydro had all employees available to assist during the event. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on December 5th, 2017. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise (i.e. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values exceeded the daily SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 2 hours and 23 minutes to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. The remaining 10% of customers interrupted were restored in 3 hours and 17 minutes. London Hydro did not require assistance through its third party mutual assistance agreement. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on London Hydro?s website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockup is performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro?s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where we need to improve. Also, in 2017 London Hydro conducted a review of its tree trimming practices. This review resulted in additional tree trimming efforts during the 4th quarter of 2017 and first quarter of 2018. The additional trimming during this time helped to decrease the number of limbs down on power lines during the storm. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2019 10-May-2019 13-Mar-2019 08:12 AM No. There was no prior warning. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that is involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on November 29, 2018. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise. Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values exceeded the daily SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values. The SAIDI and SAIFI threshold values were set based on the daily SAIDI and SAIFI values for the past 5 years. It took 63 minutes to restore over 90% of the customers who were interrupted. London Hydro did not require assistance through its third party mutual assistance agreement. While our public outage map updated, no tweets, emails, texts or phone calls were placed to notify customers. An ETR was not defined internally as the interruption cause was due to the loss of supply. London Hydro discussed the event with Hydro One and after determination of the root cause; Hydro One has been performing maintenance and also changed protection settings at the station to prevent future events of similar nature. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2019 19-Sep-2019 20-Jul-2019 08:02 PM Yes, Environment Canada issued high wind and thunderstorm warnings for Southwestern Ontario. London Hydro alerted the on call staff and contractor support. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on November 29, 2018. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise (ie. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). The weather events of July 20, 2019 were accordant with the definition of Major Event Day as per OEB's Electricity Reporting and Keeping Requirements, section 2.1.4.2. Severe thunderstorms, accompanied by high winds and lightning passed London Hydro's distribution area since July 19, 2019 through July 20 and July 21, 2019. Some of the Environment Canada alerts for July 20, 2019 include: - 19:17h "A line of strong to severe thunderstorms has formed over Michigan and is forecast to move southeastward across Southwestern Ontario this evening. Very strong wind gusts to 100 km/h will be possible with this line of storms, as well locally heavy rainfall accumulations. Intense lightning is likely with any thunderstorm that develops." - 23:40h "A line of strong to severe thunderstorms has moved into southwestern Ontario and is expected to race eastward this evening. Very strong wind gusts to 100 km/h will be possible with this line of storms, as well as locally heavy rainfall accumulations." Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI values exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold value. The current SAIDI threshold is 0.09 and this MED (July 20, 2019) had a SAIDI of 0.22. The SAIDI threshold value was set based on the daily SAIDI values for the past 5 years. It took 5.6 hours to restore over 90% of the customers who were interrupted (13,096). London Hydro used an overhead contractor crew during the restoration work. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockup is performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro’s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where we need to improve. Also, in 2017 London Hydro conducted a review of its tree trimming practices. Subsequently, this review resulted in additional tree trimming efforts and resources being deployed. The additional trimming during this time helped to decrease the number of limbs down on power lines during the storm. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2019 19-Sep-2019 21-Jul-2019 02:21 AM Yes, Environment Canada issued high wind and thunderstorm warnings for Southwestern Ontario. London Hydro alerted the on call staff and contractor support. London Hydro provides annual training to all supervisory staff that are involved in major event response on their roles and responsibilities. The last training session was held on November 29, 2018. This session included training on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the team along with the execution of a mock table top exercise (ie. an ice storm scenario was used in the training session). The weather events of July 21, 2019 were accordant with the definition of Major Event Day as per OEB's Electricity Reporting and Keeping Requirements, section 2.1.4.2. Severe thunderstorms, accompanied by high winds and lightning passed London Hydro's distribution area since July 19, 2019 through July 20 and July 21, 2019. Some of the Environment Canada alerts for July 21, 2019 include: - July 20, 2019 @ 23:40h "A line of strong to severe thunderstorms has moved into southwestern Ontario and is expected to race eastward this evening. Very strong wind gusts to 100 km/h will be possible with this line of storms, as well as locally heavy rainfall accumulations." - July 21, 2019 @ 02:35h "Thunderstorms crossing the region may produce damaging winds, torrential downpours and frequent lightning this evening." Based on the IEEE Standard 1366 (2.5 Beta method) this event was considered to be a Major Event Day where the daily SAIDI values exceeded the daily SAIDI threshold value. The current SAIDI threshold is 0.09 and this MED (July 21, 2019) had a SAIDI of 0.12. The SAIDI threshold value was set based on the daily SAIDI values for the past 5 years. It took 5 hours to restore over 90% of the customers who were interrupted. London Hydro used an overhead contractor crew during the restoration work. Yes, London Hydro issued ETR through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockup is performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro’s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas where we need to improve. Also, in 2017 London Hydro conducted a review of its tree trimming practices. Subsequently, this review resulted in additional tree trimming efforts and resources being deployed. The additional trimming during this time helped to decrease the number of limbs down on power lines during the storm. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2021 29-Oct-2021 12-Sep-2021 10:11 PM Yes Environment Canada issued a severe thunderstorm warning for Southwestern Ontario. London Hydro did have extra London Hydro employees on duty during the storm. London Hydro did bring in additional contractors to assist in restoration activities during the storm. Severe thunderstorms, accompanied by high winds and lightning, passed through London Hydro's distribution area on September 12, 2021 at around 10pm. The resulting high wind from the storm knocked down several trees throughout the region that damaged various hydro poles and power lines. The major event started at 10:11pm on September 12th, and over 90% of customers were restored by 3:52am on September 13th. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8004 4.9 No No Others No Yes No London Hydro will be looking to complete a risk analysis based on field inspections of trees that have adequate clearances from the lines, but could have severe impacts to reliability if the entire tree or large portions of it were to come down. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2022 15-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 11:30 AM No Environment Canada issued typical weather warnings of thunderstorms and windy weather, but it did not call for such major event causing tornado-like winds that were seen. Severe thunderstorms, accompanied by high winds, heavy rain and hail, passed through London Hydro's distribution area on May 21, 2022 at around 11:30am. The resulting high wind from the storm knocked down several trees throughout the region that damaged various hydro poles and power lines. The major event started at 11:30am on May 21st, and over 90% of customers were restored by 7:15pm on May 21st. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 57034 34.6 No No Others No London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockups are performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro’s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas for improvement. Additionally, London Hydro plans to have a discussion with the City of London regarding tree planting practices and upkeep of older trees to help minimize the impact from large trees coming down during wind storms and causing severe power outages. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2023 25-Jul-2023 02-Jun-2023 10:40 AM No N/A On Friday, June 2nd at 10:40am a truck struck and broke a hydro pole that was installed far away from the curb, behind a sidewalk, exceeding minimum clearance requirements. This caused an outage to 12,613 customers across two main feeders as this pole location was a tie point between both feeders. Furthermore, the customer count on the impacted feeders was higher than normal as the system was abnormally configured due to a construction process occurring on another feeder. Due to the varying unclear reports received of the incident, London Hydro crews had to get eyes on the scene to understand the exact damage and nature of the work required. Additionally, there was a critical customer adjacent to the accident location, a hospital, which had both of its power supplies affected due to this outage. Recognizing the complexity of the situation, London Hydro needed to determine a holistic plan and procedure that would allow for the safe restoration of power to all in a timely manner. The major event started at 10:40am on June 2nd, and over 90% of customers were restored by 12:41pm on June 2nd. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 12613 8 No No Others No London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas for improvement. For the critical customer adjacent to this accident location, we are evaluating various options to improve reliability, including the provision of an alternative supply that minimizes the risk of a common mode failure/incident interrupting power to the entire hospital. Although the circumstances of this specific outage were abnormal, we will use this ‘foreign interference – vehicle accident’ scenario at a tie point between two feeders as an input to assess other similar locations as part of an ongoing critical intersection study that London Hydro is conducting. This ‘foreign interference – vehicle accident’ could have potentially been prevented by undergrounding circuits near the intersection, however vehicle accidents can occur anywhere throughout the city and undergrounding all intersections is not a reasonable solution. London Hydro must tactfully determine the appropriate and cost effective reliability improvement measures (which may include the installation of overhead sectionalizing switches, automated devices, or undergrounding the circuits) for various intersections considering the design of the system in that area and the potential impact of a similar accident. For this specific location, a combination of sectionalizing switches and other protective device installations are being evaluated. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2023 13-Sep-2023 20-Jul-2023 05:08 PM Yes Environment Canada issued a severe thunderstorm warning for the London area. London Hydro did have extra London Hydro employees on duty during the storm. London Hydro did bring in additional contractors to assist in restoration activities during the storm. Severe thunderstorms, accompanied by high winds and heavy rain, passed through London Hydro's distribution area on July 20, 2023 at around 5:08pm. The resulting high wind from the storm knocked down several trees throughout the region that damaged various hydro poles and power lines. The major event started at 5:08pm on July 20th, and over 90% of customers were restored by 1:15am on July 21st. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 14616 9 No No Others No Yes No London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockups are performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro’s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas for improvement. London Hydro is actively conducting a risk analysis to identify trees that have adequate clearances from the lines, but could have severe impacts to reliability if the entire tree or large portions of it were to come down. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2024 03-Jan-2024 10-Nov-2023 03:37 AM No N/A On Friday, November 10 at 3:37am a vehicle struck and broke a hydro pole that was installed far away from the curb, behind a sidewalk, exceeding minimum clearance requirements. This caused an outage to 8,450 customers across two main feeders as this pole location carried two feeders. Furthermore, the customer count on the impacted feeders was higher than normal as the system was abnormally configured due to a construction process occurring on another feeder. Using automated devices, 82% of the customers were restored within half an hour after reports were received of the accident. Due to the location of the incident, temporary switches were required to be installed on both feeders to safely isolate the accident location, and restore power to the remaining groups of customers. The major event started at 3:37am on November 10th, and over 90% of customers were restored by 10:25am on November 10th. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 8450 5.1 No No Others No For the specific accident location, bollards have been installed to protect the pole and mitigate any future outages at this location. Additionally, sectionalizing switches were left installed at this pole location to provide switching capabilities to aid in the restoration of any future outages in the area. Furthermore, we will be looking to enhance our design guidelines of these specific feeder configurations to allow for sectionalizing switches to be installed at initial construction. Existing feeders that fit this profile will be targeted and evaluated for proactive sectionalizing switch installation. This scenario will also be included in the ongoing critical intersection study that London Hydro is conducting. This ‘foreign interference – vehicle accident’ could have potentially been prevented by undergrounding circuits near the intersection, however vehicle accidents can occur anywhere throughout the city and undergrounding all intersections is not a reasonable solution. London Hydro must tactfully determine the appropriate and cost effective reliability improvement measures (which may include the installation of overhead sectionalizing switches, automated devices, or undergrounding the circuits) for various intersections considering the design of the system in that area and the potential impact of a similar accident. London Hydro Inc. London Hydro Inc. 2024 21-Aug-2024 25-Jun-2024 11:43 AM Yes Environment Canada issued a special weather statement for the London area but it did not call for such a major event causing tornado-like winds that were seen. The Major Event happened during normal working hours. London Hydro had all employees available to assist during the event. High winds accompanied by heavy rain, passed through London Hydro's distribution area on June 25, 2024 at around 11:43am. The resulting high wind from the storm knocked down trees throughout the region that damaged various hydro poles and power lines. OEB Cause Code; Adverse Weather - Tree Contact Weather / Loss of Supply The major event started at 11:43am on June 25th, and over 90% of customers were restored by 3:16pm on June 25th. London Hydro issued estimated times of restoration (ETR) for the various outage events through Twitter, IVR, Email, and Text. London Hydro also issued ETR through the outage map on our website, which gets updated every minute with the most updated information. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 47132 28.1 Yes No Others No Yes No London Hydro has an Emergency Procedures Plan; training and mockups are performed annually. The purpose of the Emergency Procedures Plan is to define the roles and responsibilities of London Hydro personnel in the event of extensive damage to London Hydro’s electrical distribution system. Also, London Hydro performs post event analysis following each Major Event in order to identify points of strength and areas for improvement. Additionally, London Hydro is actively conducting a survey to identify trees that have adequate clearances from the lines, but could have severe impacts to reliability if the entire tree or large portions of it were to come down. London Hydro will continue to catalog extensive failed tree scenarios to consider as a part of the aforementioned study. Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. 2019 09-Apr-2019 08-May-2018 03:11 PM Yes. A high wind weather advisory was in effect prior to the Major Event Occurring. The Major Event began during working hours. All available staff were on duty. Yes Employees have received on the job training. The event was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" . It was "beyond the control of the distributor as was: a) unforseeable b) unpredicable c) unpreventable or d) unavoidable It took 17.5 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. No Milton Hydro issued regular ETR's to the public using social media (Twitter) We have increased our Tree Trimming efforts in some of the affected areas. Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. 2022 21-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:10 PM Yes On Saturday, May 21, 2022, on-call operations, and management team were monitoring the weather travelling from east to Milton Hydro’s service territory. Severe thunderstorm alarm from Environment Canada was received at approximately 12.00pm EST. The Environment Canada forecast did not provide sufficient time for Milton Hydro to place additional employees on duty or on standby prior to the Major Event beginning. However, it is Milton Hydro’s common practice to have on-call personnel on standby on after-hours, weekends, and holidays. The Cause of Interruption for the Major Event was Cause Code 6, Adverse Weather. The event was consistent with the OEB definition of Cause of Interruption Code 6 “Adverse Weather” due to high winds. On May 21, 2022 at approximately 12.10pm, a storm classified as Derecho brought damaging winds up to 130km/hr across Milton, SW Ontario and Quebec. This caused fallen tree and limbs on wires, broken wires, downed wires, snapped poles, broken insulators and blown transformer/fuses across Milton Hydro’s service territory leading to prolonged power outages affecting 5,279 customers. Crews and office staff were called in for assistance, along with the contractors. Power was restored to 3,879 customers on day one, 1,150 customers on day two and the remaining on day three. Milton Hydro did issue estimated times of restoration through its website Outage Map (https://outages.miltonhydro.com/outages) and Social Media Accounts (Twitter & Facebook). Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 5279 12.3 No No Others No No No Milton Hydro conducted a review of its outage response for this outage and determined that the response was conducted in a safe, effective and controlled manner. Areas for improvement were identified for customer communication, grid modernization, damage assessment, mutual assistance and tree trimming. Actions were taken to improve internal and customer communication, expand mutual assistance and increase tree trimming activities. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Midland Power Utility Corporation 2017 16-Apr-2017 17-Aug-2017 Midland PUC was aware there were high wind warnings in the weather forecast on the day of the Major Event (August 17, 2016). The high winds began early in the day on August 17, 2016. All staff were available, if required. Midland PUC staff have been trained on response plans using other storms to hone our skills. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: A Major Event is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable. This wind storm was beyond the control of the distributor and is both unavoidable and unpreventable. 64 percent of the customers that experienced a sustained outage were restored in 3.75 hours. 26 percent of the customers that experienced a sustained outage were restored in 5.5 hours. No. Midland PUC did issue a general ETR statement to the public during the Major Event through social media which is linked to our website. As in the past, Midland PUC will continue to: - Debriefed staff to discuss lessons learned - Inspect existing and remove legacy 44KV line openers - Ensure our capital and maintenance programs are designed minimize the number of customers affected by a major event such as adverse weather Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Midland Power Utility Corporation 2017 21-Jun-2017 13-Jun-2016 No No Midland PUC staff have been trained on response plans using other storms to hone our skills. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: ?Major Event? is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable. This event was beyond the control of the distributor and is both unavoidable and unpreventable loss of supply. 100 percent of the customers that experienced a sustained outage were restored in 4.8 hours. No Midland PUC issued a general ETR statement to the public during the Major Event using our twitter account, this is also linked to our website. As in the past, Midland PUC will continue to: - Debriefed staff to discuss lessons learned - Improve communication with the supply authority - Ensure our capital and maintenance programs are designed minimize the number of customers affected by a major event such as adverse weather Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 10-May-2017 25-May-2016 No. Not applicable. Major Event procedures are available and reviewd annually. The event was considered a Major Event in accordance with OEB RRR definition i.e. unpredictable and beyond the control of the distributor and using fixed approach methodology i.e. met the ME criteria for 10% of total customers affected 100% of the customers were restored in 1.15 hours. No, (3rd party mutual assistance was not necessary for this one-hour duration Major Event outage). No ETR was issued because power was restored in 1 hour and 9 minutes. This car accident was an unpredictable event, outside of the distributor's control i.e. root cause was Foreign interference. No specific training or process improvements required to mitigate for this type of event. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 21-Jun-2017 22-Apr-2017 No Not applicable Major event procedures are available and reviewed annually. The event was considered a Major Event in accordance with OEB RRR definition i.e. unpredictable and beyond the control of the distributor and using fixed approach methodology i.e. criteria for 10% of total customers affected. 90% were restored in under 6 hours; (i.e. 58% or 4,702 interrupted customers were restored in 5 minutes, while 42% or 3,368 interrupted customers were restored in 5 hrs 59 mins). No. Yes, via twitter. The twitter outage notification (one-way communication out to the public) is also available on the distributor?s website during this event. i. Continued encouragement and reminders to customers to maintain their equipment; ii. Installation of more fault indicators on the overhead distribution system in an effort to reduce trouble-shooting time. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 10-Jul-2017 11-May-2017 No Not applicable Major event procedures are available and reviewed annually. The event was considered a Major Event in accordance with OEB RRR definition i.e. unpredictable and beyond the control of the distributor and using fixed approach methodology i.e. criteria for 10% of total customers affected. 100% were restored in under 1 hour; (i.e. 88% or 4,375 interrupted customers were restored within 24 minutes, while 2% or 594 of the interrupted customers were restored in 58 minutes). No Yes, via twitter. The twitter outage notification (one-way communication out to the public) is also available on the distributor?s website during this event. Continued participation in study groups investigating improved methodologies in mitigating power interruptions due to animal/wild-life as well as installation of more effective animal mitigation devices. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2017 01-Dec-2017 15-Oct-2017 Outage 1 ? No Not Applicable Major event procedures are available and reviewed annually. The event was considered a Major Event in accordance with OEB RRR definition i.e. unpredictable and beyond the control of the distributor and using fixed approach methodology i.e. criteria for 10% of total customers affected. 90% of customers had their power restored within 2 hours and 29 minutes; restoration time was dependent on Hydro One who needed to first replace their broken poles. No, third party assistance was not required. Using Twitter, customers were notified of the outage on October 15, 2017 at 2:22PM. The Twitter outage notification (one-way communication out to the public) was also available on the distributor?s website during this event. Discussion with Hydro One to understand any risks and/or measures to be implemented to mitigate a re-occurrence of the incident. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2018 28-May-2018 04-May-2018 17:07 PM No. Not applicable. Major event procedures are available and reviewed annually. The event was considered a Major Event in accordance with OEB RRR definition i.e. unpredictable and beyond the control of the distributor and using fixed approach methodology i.e. criteria for 10% of total customers affected. Hydro was restored to 90% of the customers within 1 to 1.5 hours. No. Mutual Assistance from a third party was not required. Outage notification was made available on the distributor?s website. Twitter customers were notified with Tweet updates of the Newmarket service area outages. ETR was unknown because ETR was dependent on Hydro One and their restoration regarding Loss of Supply. Already commenced discussion with Hydro One as to cause and action for future mitigation. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2020 25-Aug-2020 24-Jul-2020 12:03 PM No N/A N/A 100% were restored in 0.1 hours. Yes, an outage notification was made available on the distributor’s website. Due to the short duration of the event, the estimated outage duration was posted after power was restored to the area. Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 10617 24 No No No further action is required at this time No N/A Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2020 16-Sep-2020 04-Sep-2020 2:59 PM No N/A Transmitter reported high winds caused a tree contact on overhead feeder line supplying Newmarket-Tay Power service area. 100% were restored in 2.05 hours Yes, an outage notification with an estimated time of restoration was made available to the public on the distributor’s website and Twitter account. Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 7923 18 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Major Event was due to tree contact on transmitter owned equipment, therefore no further action is required by NT Power at this time. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2021 11-Jan-2021 15-Nov-2020 03:19 AM No On November 15, 2020, Newmarket-Tay Power’s service territories experienced high winds and heavy rain, causing two supply authority station feeder circuit breakers to lock-out. The first event occurred at 3:19 PM in the Town of Newmarket and was restored in 1.03 hours. Approximately an hour after the restoration of the first event, a second feeder lock-out occurred in the Township of Tay. The restoration time of this event was 1.67 hours. The total event duration was 4.02 hours. However, there was a 1.05-hour interval between the restoration of the first outage and the beginning of the second outage where no customers were interrupted. NT Power issued several public media notices on Twitter and its website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. Due to the nature of the outages, the ETR was not initially issued since the cause of the feeder circuit breaker lock-outs were unknown at the time. Also, the ETR was dependent on the supply authority and their restoration regarding Loss of Supply. Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 5828 13.2 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2021 13-Oct-2021 07-Sep-2021 6:44 PM No On September 7, 2021, Newmarket-Tay Power’s service territories experienced severe thunderstorms, causing one supply authority station feeder circuit breaker to lock-out in the Town of Newmarket. In addition, high winds and rain caused trees to fall on primary circuits across its Newmarket service area, which resulted in three distributor owned station feeder breakers to lock-out. 100% were restored in 2.73 hours. NT Power issued several public media notices on Twitter and its website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. Due to the nature of the outages, the ETR was not initially issued since the cause of the feeder circuit breaker lock-outs were unknown at the time. Also, the ETR was dependent on the supply authority and their restoration regarding Loss of Supply. Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 7012 16.7 Yes No Process improvements No Increased tree trimming in the areas affected by the outage. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2023 06-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 12:44 PM Yes A massive cross-country winter storm was forecasted. Environment Canada predicted winds up to 100 kilometers per hour in many parts of Ontario Additional staff and crew members were on standby preparing to respond to possible power outages that may occur during the major winter storm. On December 23, 2022, a major winter storm hit Ontario, bringing heavy snowfall and strong winds causing power outages across the province. A total of 11 outages occurred in all NT Power service areas during the Major Event. The first outage was on December 23, 2023, at 12:44 PM, and the last outage was on December 24, 2023, at 6:00 AM. All outages were restored by 10:31 AM on December 24, 2022. Eleven outages occurred during the Major Event, and each outage was restored at various stages. The longest power outage lasted for 4.51 hours and affected 57 customers. NT Power issued several public media notices on Twitter and its website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) Yes 8132 18.1 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Major Event was due to adverse weather conditions; therefore, no further action is required by NT Power at this time. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2024 29-May-2024 04-Apr-2024 2:06AM No A spring storm that hit Quebec and Ontario on April 4, 2024, knocked out power to tens of thousands of customers. By Thursday morning, heavy, wet snow dominated several regions, causing widespread power outages, airport delays, and road closures. In the early morning of April 4, 2024, several tree contacts and station recloser operations were experienced on the distribution system in Tay Township due to strong winds from a storm that hit Ontario and Quebec. At 2:06 AM, an outage was experienced at Port McNicoll station in Tay Township. Upon arrival, a feeder recloser was found to be on fire. Once the fire was extinguished, oil was found in the vicinity of the recloser and the station power transformers. Furthermore, upstream fuses were blown. Due to the extent of the damage and oil spill, it was unknown at the time if the transformer had become defective as a result from the sequence of events. The site was cleaned up, the recloser and fuses were replaced, and the transformer was successfully tested. The first attempt to energize the station occurred at 3:24PM but was not successful. Upon further inspection and patrols of the overhead lines, additional tree branches were found on one of the feeders due to ongoing strong winds. The branches were cleared, and the station was successfully energized at 6:13PM on April 4, 2024. Among the 3,568 customers, 1,805 customers experienced a short power interruption, approximately 13.3 hours into the outage event, in order accommodate switching and repair work for Port McNicoll station. The remaining 1,763 customers were restored when the Port McNicoll station was restored at 6:13PM, a process that took 15.93 hours. NT Power issued several public media notices and outage updates on X, Facebook, and its website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3568 7.9 No No No further action is required at this time No Major Event was due to adverse weather conditions, therefore no further action is required by NT Power at this time. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. Newmarket-Tay Power Distribution Ltd. 2024 11-Oct-2024 17-Aug-2024 04:43 PM Yes Before the day of the storm, the Weather Network issued a tornado watch for southern Ontario, which remained in effect through the afternoon of August 17 due to a severe storm threat. On August 17, a severe thunderstorm and rainfall warning was issued, as the weather system brought significant torrential rainfall and gusty winds. Operations team continually monitors the weather events and system conditions NT Power had a full complement of standby staff and extra staff who could be called out to respond to possible power outages. Contributing causes include: Loss of Supply Adverse Weather - Wind Lightning On August 17, 2024, a severe thunderstorm swept across the Greater Toronto Area, bringing record-breaking rainfall and lightning that led to widespread flooding and damage. As a result, a feeder circuit breaker at one of the supply authority stations in the Town of Newmarket locked out. 100% were restored in 1.72 hours. NT Power issued several public media notices and outage updates on X, Facebook, and its website relating to the outages and restoration of affected areas. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5048 11.2 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Yes No Major Event was due to adverse weather conditions; therefore, no further action is required by NT Power at this time. Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. 2022 02-Feb-2022 11-Dec-2021 12:18 PM Yes Environment and Climate Change Canada issued two special weather statements on December 10, 2021, for high winds and heavy rain. Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. (“NPEI”) always has staff on-call during the weekends. Due to the weather statements, NPEI arranged to have extra employees on standby for Saturday December 11th and Sunday December 12th. A severe wind storm impacted NPEI’s service territory on December 11, 2021, with wind gusts exceeding 100 km/h. The storm resulted in downed wires, fallen trees and flying debris, which caused significant outages. Yes, NPEI issued updates throughout the Major Event on social media, indicating that crews were onsite and providing estimated restoration time when available. Also, Customer Service staff were called in to answer telephone calls. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 15488 27 Yes No Process improvements No Yes Yes NPEI is reviewing the Major Event response to identify potential process improvements. One improvement to be implemented is: NPEI will document customer-owned equipment in its CIS system. This will allow more efficient communication with customers in cases where repairs are required to customer-owned equipment in order to restore power to the customer. Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. 2023 10-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 08:46 AM Yes Yes, a special weather statement was issued by Environment Canada on Monday December 19th for the remainder of the week into the weekend, advising of the potential for a winter storm. A Blizzard warning was then issued on December 22nd warning of flash freezing, sustained wind gusts of between 100 and 120 km/h combined with from 15 to 30 cm of snow. Yes, Niagara Peninsula Energy Inc. (“NPEI”) always has staff on-call during the evenings and weekends. Due to the weather statements, NPEI arranged to have extra employees on standby for December 23rd and December 24th. A severe wind storm impacted NPEI’s service territory on December 23rd, 2022, with wind gusts exceeding 115 km/h. The wind levels stayed in the range of between 60 & 70 km/h sustained with gusts approaching 115 km/h from approximately 09:00 on December 23rd until mid-day on Dec. 24th.The storm resulted in downed wires, fallen trees and flying debris, which caused significant outages. Yes, NPEI issued updates throughout the Major Event on social media, indicating that crews were onsite and providing estimated restoration time when available. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 7535 12.78 No No Process improvements No Yes Yes NPEI is reviewing the Major Event response to identify potential process improvements as well as reviewing the performance of our tree trimming program to identify areas of improvement. Niagara-on-the-Lake Hydro Inc. Niagara-on-the-Lake Hydro Inc. 2021 10-Nov-2021 09-Oct-2021 01:49 AM No This was an unanticipated loss of supply from the transmitter. In September, NOTL Hydro was informed by Hydro One that an outage would be required on the Q11S in October for maintenance work. The Q11S feeds the NOTL station. To avoid the transmission double billing, which would have cost our customers $80k, the NOTL station was taken offline for the month and all the load was put on our York station which is fed by the Hydro One Q12S. In the early morning of October 9, 2021, the Q12S went down creating an outage for the full Town. The decision was immediately made to transfer all the power to the NOTL station even though the $80k cost would now be incurred. If not for the OEB rules on transmission billing the Town would have been fed by both stations on October 9, 2021, so the outage would have only been half the Town and the restoration time would have been much quicker. No estimated times of restoration were issued during the outage. A tweet was issued at 2:12 AM advising that the whole Town was out of power due to a transmission outage but no ETA was known at that time. A further tweet was provided at 3:09 AM advising that power was back on. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9930 100 Yes No Others No The only reason this event created an outage for the full Town of NOTL was due to the Ontario Energy Board rules. Distributors such as NOTL Hydro are billed for transmission based on the peak loads at each of their delivery points instead of the overall usage of the local grid. NOTL Hydro has two delivery points. In September, NOTL Hydro was informed by Hydro One that an outage would be required on the Q11S in October for maintenance work. The Q11S feeds the NOTL station. To avoid the transmission double billing, which would have cost our customers $80k, the NOTL station was taken offline for the month and all the load was put on our York station which is fed by the Hydro One Q12S. In the early morning of October 9, 2021, the Q12S went down creating an outage for the full Town. The decision was immediately made to transfer all the power to the NOTL station even though the $80k cost would now be incurred. If not for the OEB rules on transmission billing the Town would have been fed by both stations on October 9, 2021, so the outage would have only been half the Town and the restoration time would have been much quicker. The OEB will be holding a hearing on this transmission double billing issue in 2022 and NOTL Hydro will be intervening and requesting a change to avoid situations like this. North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2017 15-May-2017 20-Aug-2016 NO No prior warning No specific training for Major event however Supervisor participates in Area Disaster Preparedness Meetings. Exceeded 10% threshold customers without power 2 No No Vegetation management, system upgrades and training are ongoing. Budgeted yearly. Potential issues are identified through monthly inspections. System upgrades are included in the 5 Year plan. North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2017 16-May-2017 18-Aug-2016 No No warning No Exceeded 10% threshold customer without power .5 hour No No Loss of Supply out of our control North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2017 26-Jul-2017 07-Jul-2017 No No prior warning No specific training for Major event however Supervisor participates in Area Disaster Preparedness Meetings Exceed 10% threshold customers without power .25 No No No steps North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2017 28-Nov-2017 24-Oct-2017 6 :40 am No N/A No 100% of customers off for 10 minutes 16% of customers off for 5 hours 3 Hours No No unknown North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2017 28-Nov-2017 10-Nov-2017 2:00 pm No N/A No 100% of Customers off for 10 minutes 16% of Customers off for 5 hours 3 hours No No Unknown North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2021 26-Mar-2021 11-Mar-2021 13:00 No none N/A On March 11, 2021 Espanola experienced a period of extreme winds in the afternoon. none N/A Adverse Weather-Wind No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) No 705 20.8 Yes No No further action is required at this time No none North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited Espanola Regional Hydro Distribution Corporation 2021 07-Sep-2021 11-Aug-2021 15:36PM No N/A On August 11, 2021, severe thunderstorms moved across all of Northern Ontario. These major thunderstorms caused major outages to Hydro One which in turn caused a Loss of Supply for ERHDC at approximately 15:46pm. It took about 10 minutes for 90% of customers to have their power restored. n/a Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) No 3375 100 Yes No No further action is required at this time No n/a North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited 2022 07-Nov-2022 20-Oct-2022 21:39 AM No Loss of Supply From Hydro One to Massey territory. Tree fell on Hydro One feeder. 16% is based on the Espanola territory. Short restoration time was expected. Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) No 543 16 Yes No No further action is required at this time No North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited North Bay Hydro Distribution Limited 2024 13-Nov-2024 18-Aug-2024 03:34 PM No A transmission issue on Hydro One’s line during severe weather and high winds caused a service outage across the entire service territory. The Hydro One-owned Espanola Transformer Station is supplied by the S2B 115kV circuit, which also serves other Hydro One Distribution Stations (DS) in the area. While Hydro One has not yet confirmed the cause, it is suspected that the outage may have resulted from a broken crossarm, given the unusually high winds that afternoon and evening. The outage began on August 18, 2024, at 15:34, with power restored to 2,808 customers in the Espanola region by 22:15 the same day. The remaining 520 customers had service restored by 03:00 on August 19, 2024. o 6.68 hours for 2808 customers & 11.43 hours for 520 customers During Event: Espanola Regional Hydro social media (Facebook) was updated regularly as new information was received. Customers were informed about the outage and that it was a Hydro One outage and were waiting on updates from them. Customers were informed that no ETA was given from Hydro One After Event: Customers were let known that the power had been restored. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 3328 12.1 Yes No No further action is required at this time No NBHDL has submitted a loss of supply report to Hydro One but has yet to receive a response. Given the circumstances, NBHDL has limited options to mitigate major events related to loss of supply, especially when the transmission circuit is affected. Any investments to enhance reliability would likely need to be addressed by Hydro One on their side of the demarcation point. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2018 28-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 3:52 p.m A powerful windstorm struck Southern and Central Ontario on May 4, 2018, knocking down trees and downing power lines. Early in the day, Environment Canada had issued a special weather statement for Oakville and surrounding areas warning that wind gusts of 70 to 80 km/h were likely across much of the region that afternoon and that there may be a few local power outages. Later that morning, Environment Canada upgraded the wind warning and advised that winds of 90 to 100 km/h could cause damage to buildings, such as to roof shingles and windows, and that high winds might toss loose objects or cause tree branches to break. The windstorm proved to be even more severe than expected with Environment Canada measuring wind gusts of 109 km/h at the Burlington monitoring station at the height of the storm. It is Oakville Hydro?s practice to have a crew of two on stand-by at all times. The first power outage occurred at 3:52 p.m. on May 4, 2018 and by 4:00 p.m., Oakville Hydro called in all available staff to assist with. By 6:00 p.m., Oakville Hydro had also engaged a third party power line contractor under to assist with power restoration and the Town of Oakville to assist with the clearing of trees and branches. Oakville Hydro?s Business Continuity Plan requires a regular review of Enterprise Critical Functions (ECF) in each department. Potential interruptions (storms, pandemics, access to facilities etc.) to these ECF?s are identified and mitigation plans developed to lessen the impacts. Each department is required to complete a unit test of their plan yearly. Oakville Hydro has an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in place that is continually updated and used as part of its Business Continuity Planning exercises. As part of its Business Continuity Planning, Oakville Hydro conducts a major mock disaster on an annual basis testing each area?s preparedness. Oakville Hydro is also actively engaged with Halton Region?s Emergency Management Committee. The Ontario Energy Board?s (OEB?s) Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements (RRR) define a major event as follows: An event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) unforeseeable; b) unpredictable; c) unpreventable; or d) unavoidable. The Electricity RRRs further define a major event as an event that disrupts normal business operations and occurs so infrequently that it would be uneconomical to take them into account when designing and operating the distribution system. Such events cause exceptional and/or extensive damage to assets, they take significantly longer than usual to repair, and they affect a substantial number of customers. Weather events such as this, which uprooted trees and resulted in the closure of the Burlington Skyway, are not common. In Oakville Hydro?s opinion, it would not only be uneconomical but close to impossible to plan for winds over 100 km/h, which can uproot large trees, when designing and operating the distribution system Oakville Hydro was able to restore power to more than 90% of the effected customers within three hours of the first interruption. By 6:50 p.m., less than 2,000 customers were without power and by 8:41 p.m., the number of interruptions had been reduced to 532 and by 2:23 p.m. on May 5, 2018, there were less than 100 customers without power. During this event, Oakville Hydro did not seek assistance from its LDC mutual aid partners, however it was able to receive assistance on May 4, 2018 through an Alliance Agreement in place with a large power line contracting firm. The agreement allows for ?Right of First Refusal? for storm and emergency assistance. In addition, the Town of Oakville forestry department, who conducts our regular line clearing program, was engaged them at the onset of the event. Oakville Hydro was able to provide assistance to our neighbouring communities on May 7, 2018. During the event, Oakville Hydro issued ETRs for specific areas on Twitter and on its online outage map. For example, the following message was issued on twitter: Crews have been dispatched within the Town of Oakville to an area bounded by Cornwall Rd, Lake Ontario, Maple Grove Rd and Allen St to restore power. ETR 10:00 p.m. Oakville Hydro conducted a full de-brief of the major event and its response capability. Through this process, Oakville Hydro identified some opportunities to enhance its overall capabilities. Oakville Hydro will continue to improve upon its Business Continuity Plans and test its preparedness for emergency events through its annual mock disaster planning. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2018 28-Jun-2018 25-Apr-2017 8:51 p.m. On April 25, 2017, the T37B circuit tripped due to animal contact with T4 Transformer at Hydro One?s Palermo Transformer Station. Due to the nature of the incident (animal contact), Oakville Hydro did not have any prior warning the major event would occur. Oakville Hydro operates its control center 24 hour per day, seven days per week. It is also Oakville Hydro?s practice to have a crew of two on stand-by at all times Oakville Hydro?s Business Continuity Plan requires a regular review of Enterprise Critical Functions (ECF) in each department. Potential interruptions (storms, pandemics, access to facilities etc.) to these ECF?s are identified and mitigation plans developed to lessen the impacts. Each department is required to complete a unit test of their plan yearly. Oakville Hydro has an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in place that is continually updated and used as part of its Business Continuity Planning exercises. As part of its Business Continuity Planning, Oakville Hydro conducts a major mock disaster on an annual basis testing each area?s preparedness. Oakville Hydro is also actively engaged with Halton Region?s Emergency Management Committee. The Ontario Energy Board?s (OEB?s) Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements (RRR) define a major event as follows: An event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) unforeseeable; b) unpredictable; c) unpreventable; or d) unavoidable. The Electricity RRRs further define a major event as an event that disrupts normal business operations and occurs so infrequently that it would be uneconomical to take them into account when designing and operating the distribution system. Such events cause exceptional and/or extensive damage to assets, they take significantly longer than usual to repair, and they affect a substantial number of customers. Animal contact events such as this are unpredictable and unpreventable. Oakville Hydro was able to restore power all customers within one hour of the first interruption through remote switching. During this event, Oakville Hydro did not seek assistance from its LDC mutual aid partners as it was able to restore power to its customers through remote switching from its control centre. Oakville Hydro issued an ETR on Twitter and on its online outage map. Oakville continues to evolve its distribution system through prudent asset management decisions based on replacing selected end-of-life equipment and communication infrastructure, with choices that align with its evolving grid modernization goals. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2020 25-May-2021 19-Jul-2020 12:40 PM Yes A special weather statement was issued from Environment Canada (risk of severe thunderstorms) for Oakville and surrounding areas. “Severe thunderstorms are possible today as a cold front approaches from the west”, read the statement. Additional skilled personnel on-call On Sunday July 19, 2020 the Town of Oakville sustained a severe, fast moving storm. The Town sustained over 400 lightning strikes, high winds, wind gusts and rain downpours. Oakville’s Forestry Department received 50 downed tree calls from residents. The extent of damage created safety alarms across the grid, limiting our ability to restore power to outages remotely. Crews needed to visit the site of each alarm to perform repairs and verify safe electrical operations. The public was provided updates and information via social media. Information included locations affected, estimated time of restoration, and confirmation once power had been restored. Social media information is provided below. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 6163 8 No No System upgrades No Yes Yes Continuous improvement to our inspection program to determine corrective action on assets that could be affected by inclement weather. In addition, focusing on automation for quicker response time for interruptions. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2022 08-Feb-2022 11-Dec-2021 14:00 PM Yes A wind warning was issued from Environment Canada for Oakville and surrounding areas, calling for strong winds throughout the afternoon and into the early evening. Winds could reach up to 90 km/h, according to the warning, which can be blamed on a cold front sweeping through southern Ontario. The warning noted that strong winds would continue throughout the day and until late evening. The warnings also advised that utility outages might occur along with damage to buildings, such as to roof shingles and windows, and that high winds might toss loose objects or cause tree branches to break. Additional skilled personnel were placed on-call, prior to the event. On December 11, 2021 the Town of Oakville sustained a severe, high wind weather event. The Town sustained 60 km/h winds, with gusts up to 90 km/h from the afternoon and into the night. The length of overhead wire patrol routes and lingering effects of the storm caused increased frequency and duration to outages. 5.98 hours (359 minutes) to restore over 90% of the customers Updates and information were provided via social media. Information included locations affected, estimated time of restoration, and confirmation once power had been restored. Interruption details were also available through the Oakville Hydro online outage map (oakvilleoutages.ca), which provided information on customers and areas impacted together with updates as customers were restored. Social media information is provided below Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 15035 19.8 No No Process improvements No Yes Yes Continuous improvement to our maintenance program through increased inspections, including trimming where necessary, of tree proximity to overhead lines along heavy tree canopy areas (south-east Oakville). Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2022 30-Jun-2022 21-May-2022 12:43 PM Yes An alert was issued the morning of May 21, 2022. The alert mentioned possible strong wind gusts up to 100 km/h (62 mph), along with nickel-sized hail. Most of southern Ontario south of the 401 was assigned a marginal risk of severe weather, which changed after noon as the storm progressed and intensified. Little advanced warning was provided to allow for additional planning On May 21, 2022 southern Ontario experienced a historic derecho and one of the most impactful thunderstorms in Canadian history, with winds up to 190 km/h (120 mph) as well as several tornadoes, caused widespread and extensive damage along a path that extended for 1,000 kilometres. The severe spring storm rolled through Oakville in the early afternoon on Saturday, causing widespread power outages and road closures due to fallen trees. Wind speeds reached sustained speeds of 120 km/hr. 1 hours, 42 minutes to restore over 90% of the customers Updates and information were provided via social media. Information included locations affected, estimated time of restoration, and confirmation once power had been restored. Interruption details are available through the Oakville Hydro online outage map (oakvilleoutages.ca), which provides information on customers and areas impacted together with updates as customers are restored. In this instance, Oakville Hydro’s outage map and phone system experienced technical difficulties that needed to be resolved. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 25697 34 Yes No Process improvements No No No Continuous improvement to the maintenance program through increased inspections, including trimming where necessary, of tree proximity to overhead lines along heavy tree canopy areas (south-east Oakville). Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. Oakville Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2023 09-Aug-2023 30-Jun-2023 12:15 PM No Although Oakville Hydro could not foresee or predict the impending event, announcements to the public were made following the event via social media channels (such as Twitter and our Outage Map). Employees are trained through Oakville Hydro’s Business Continuity Plan which requires a regular review of Enterprise Critical Functions (ECF) in each department. Potential interruptions (storms, pandemics, access to facilities etc.) to these ECF’s are identified and mitigation plans developed to lessen the impacts. Each department is required to complete a unit test of their plan yearly. Oakville Hydro also has an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in place that is continually updated and used as part of its Business Continuity Planning exercises. As part of its Business Continuity Planning, Oakville Hydro conducts a major mock disaster test on an annual basis testing each area’s preparedness. On June 30th, 2023 around 12:15pm, a crane came in contact with one of our power lines during construction activities. This led to a major power outage between Dundas Street West to Highway 403 and between Trafalgar Road and Bronte Road. Crews responded immediately to the outage, ensuring worker and public safety, and begun restoring power. The event was unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable, and unavoidable as it was “Beyond the control of the distributor”. 2 hours, 38 minutes to restore over 90% of the customers Updates and information were provided via social media. Information included locations affected, estimated time of restoration, and confirmation once power had been restored. Interruption details are available through the Oakville Hydro online outage map (oakvilleoutages.ca), which provides information on customers and areas impacted together with updates as customers are restored. Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 12318 16 No No No further action is required at this time No The actions of a third-party during construction activities are difficult to constantly supervise and impossible to predict when designing the system. The event has been thoroughly reviewed by Oakville Hydro’s Engineering & Planning teams and determined that the event was out of the distributor’s control as no amount of investment to install safeguards to protect against such interference could be made. Orangeville Hydro Limited Orangeville Hydro Limited 2017 15-May-2017 17-Jan-2017 No, Orangeville Hydro was aware that rain, freezing rain, and wind was within the short term weather forecast for January 17, 2017 however Orangeville Hydro did not have prior warning of the Loss of Supply Event that occurred due to Hydro One?s galloping conductors on the M25 Feeder. This event occurred during the work hours of Tuesday January 17th, 2017. Therefore, all available field and office staff were on duty. Orangeville Hydro?s staff are experienced with effects of freezing rain and windy conditions and the responses required to freezing rain events. Orangeville Hydro?s staff are experienced with effects of Loss of Supply events and the responses required to Loss of Supply events. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: ?Major Event? is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable. The OEB has also stated: ?Beyond the control of the distributor? means events that include, but are not limited to, force majeure events and Loss of Supply events. This Loss of Supply was beyond the control of the distributor and is both unpredictable and unavoidable for Orangeville Hydro. All of the 4,211 customers were restored at the same time. This took 0.58 hours (35 minutes). Orangeville Hydro did not receive assistance during the Major Event through a mutual assistance agreement. Hydro One and Orangeville Hydro worked together to locate the root cause of the issue and determine an acceptable restoration plan. Orangeville Hydro did not issue any ETR statements to the public during the Major Event. Orangeville Hydro has: - Debriefed staff to discuss lessoned learned - Reviewed & Updated Community Contact Lists for Streamlined Press Releases (Local Media, Municipal Staff, Municipal Council, County Emergency Management) - Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Orangeville Hydro Limited Orangeville Hydro Limited 2023 22-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 11:18 AM Yes Environment Canada warned of a significant winter storm set to hit much of Ontario. On-call staff and contractors were available. The main contributing causes of the Major Event were high sustained winds straining overhead infrastructure. There were two separate outages related to this major event. It took ~3 hours to restore power for the first large outage. It took ~4 hours for the second large outage. Ontario High Voltage Ltd. (a contractor) provided the assistance. Due to the blizzard conditions and road closures, other LDC’s were not available during the outage periods. Updates were provided through social media platforms (ie. Twitter and Facebook), incoming telephone calls, and the website. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5400 42 No Yes Process improvements No Yes Yes Additional staff training, process improvements, and system upgrades are examples of actions that are being taken. Storm debriefings occurred at following Board meetings, management discussions, and operational meetings. Specific material will no longer be installed in the field and a proactive replacement program is planned to reduce the risk of future issues during conditions that strain the overhead primary distribution equipment. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. 2018 22-Jun-2018 04-May-2018 05:33 PM Yes, the weather network issued high wind warnings. Yes, Manager of Metering and Operations issued an Emergency Preparedness SMS to management team at 3:00 pm. Lines distribution asked for extra crews to be available for standby. Verify standby generator available. Oshawa PUC Networks reviewed the Emergency Preparedness Plan on April 13th, 2018 and ran through a scenario regarding a large outage event similar to the ice storm in 2013. This event has been considered as a Major Event as this was outside of our control and exceeds the reasonable design and operational limits of the electric power system due to the abnormal high winds / microburst that caused 13 poles to snap and break resulting in the loss of our 2 ? 44KV feeders. Multiple high winds also caused trees to be uprooted and limbs to crash, debris in the air cause 2 additional 44 KV feeders to be removed from service. Total customers out of power is 20580. This event has also impacted other utilities in the area. 3.33 hours No, it was determined that assistance was not required. Yes, through our Outage Management System (OMS), social media (Twitter/Facebook). E-mail to news media providers and Municipality/Region. Continuous system upgrades and storm hardening through engineering design and construction using current standards. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. 2021 13-Jul-2021 26-May-2021 22:09 No N/A N/A Hydro One Thornton transformer station is supplied by two 230 kV circuits, T24C & T26C respectively. On May 26, 2021, the T26C 230 kV circuit was out of service for planned insulator replacement work. At 22:09, Hydro One's T24C 230 kV circuit was automatically removed from service, initiated from a customer equipment protection trip. This resulted in a complete loss of supply to Thornton transformer station and two Oshawa Power municipal stations (MS5 & MS11). Precisely, 10,554 customers were affected by this power outage. All of Hydro One's high voltage transformer customers were contacted by the Ontario Grid Control Centre and requested to isolate from the grid. Once all customers confirmed they were isolated from the grid, T24C was energized (with no load) from Clarington transformer station at 23:16. Load restoration commenced in stages: Thornton transformer station energized at 23:28, Oshawa G.M. station at 23:31 and Whitby station at 23:36. In addition, at 23:36, other customer loads were in the process of being restored. N/A During Event: * Oshawa Power Social Media (Twitter and Facebook) was updated regularly as new information was received. * After hours answering service was contacted to ensure they were prepared for a surge in calls and had the necessary information to relay to customers. * IVR message for the phone system was updated to let customers know that there was a widespread outage and crews were working on restoration. After Event: * Twitter event was created summarizing all the tweets sent out. * Throughout the evening, Oshawa Power messages were posted to Facebook. * Summary of the event was posted on the Oshawa Power website and sent to local media and picked up by both Oshawa Express and Oshawa This Week newspapers and Durhamregion.com. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 10554 17.6 Yes No Process improvements No No No I. Oshawa Power will request incident investigation reports from Hydro One following all major loss of supply outages to ensure remedial actions are taken to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. II. Oshawa Power has requested Hydro One to ensure testing of customer protection equipment connected to applicable 230kV circuits, prior to isolation of a companion circuit. III. Oshawa Power control room will track and manage risk of abnormal Hydro One circuit conditions it's made aware of, affecting Oshawa Power's supply. IV. Oshawa Power will proactively transfer load to other transformer stations to minimize/avoid possible outages, prior to isolation of a 230kV companion circuit. V. Oshawa Power will install additional automated 44kV switches to further improve/minimize future outage durations. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. Oshawa PUC Networks Inc. 2022 19-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 13:25 Yes Oshawa Power received a weather warning from The Weather Network. Oshawa Power requested extra on-call staff to be available in addition to our regular on-call staff. At approximately 13:25 on May 21st, 2022, a derecho entered into Oshawa Power territory with strong wind gusts up to 100 km/hr. This storm affected 9,053 customers (15% of customer base) and caused 25 broken poles along with ancillary wire and equipment damage due to the wind and subsequent downed trees. N/A During Event: 1. Oshawa Power Social Media (Twitter and Facebook) was updated regularly as new information was received. 2. Oshawa Power website was updated and a "pop-up" was created that occurred every time a user accessed the site with the most up-to-date information. 3. After hours answering service was contacted to ensure they were prepared for a surge in calls and had the necessary information to relay to customers. 4. IVR message for the phone system was updated to let customers know that there was a widespread outage and crews were working on restoration. After Event: 1. Twitter event was created summarizing all the tweets sent out. 2. Throughout the evening, Oshawa Power messages were posted to Facebook. 3. Summary of the event was posted on the Oshawa Power website and Twitter. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9053 14.9 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes No Ottawa River Power Corporation Ottawa River Power Corporation 2017 12-Jul-2017 21-Jun-2016 No N/A N/A This was the storm that caused the most damage in the Pembroke service area in over twenty years. Isolated portions of the City were affected customers without power anywhere from one to seventeen hours. In total more than 30% of customers were affected for a total of 19,313 customer hours. Just over 10 hours Yes...a crew from Renfrew Hydro helped restore services the following day. Yes....Ottawa River Power used Facebook and Twitter. A debriefing session was held with operations manager, CEO and control room manager. A list of lessons learned was prepared and reviewed with entire crew during a full post event meeting. Ottawa River Power Corporation Ottawa River Power Corporation 2022 20-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 15:00 PM No Severe weather statements/warnings were issued on very short notice the day of the major event. Rain and possible thunderstorms were forecasted, but no prediction of the event that took place was available. The warnings that were issued did not provide sufficient notice with respect to the severity of the weather event that took place. As per the table in section 2.1.4.2.5, the main contributing cause of the Major Event was #7 Adverse Weather. Secondary to the main contributing cause were #2 Loss of Supply and #3 Tree Contacts. A large portion of the transmission and distribution systems in Ontario were affected by the adverse weather, including Hydro One transmission systems, which resulted in prolonged Loss of Supply issues across all four of ORPC’s territories. ORPC also encounter Tree Contact issues in our Almonte territory resulting in multiple broke poles and trees lying on conductor. N/A Renfrew Hydro Inc. Yes, information was delivered to customers using the following methods: • Facebook • Twitter • Outage map on website • Website posts • 24/7 call centre (customer calls in for updates) An estimated time of restoration (ETR) was difficult to establish for the first 8-9hrs as ORPC territories were dealing with a loss of supply from the provincial grid. Hydro One was engaged with assessments and restoration as a result of major damages across the province, and the Ontario Grid Control Centre was doing its best to provide us with information. Once supply was restored, remaining customers affected by localized damage in ORPC’s distribution system were given constant updates and ETR’s as information became available. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 11590 100 Yes Yes No further action is required at this time No There were no particular issues as a result of this outage that could be mitigated in the future given the unexpected event and severity of the weather. All necessary resources were available, and staff were trained to deal with the event once it occurred. Communication with customers was maintained at frequent intervals during the outage and updates were requested from Hydro One regularly during the outage in an effort to establish ETR’s. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2017 23-May-2017 20-Jun-2016 No. Although we subscribe to a Weather Service Warning system, no weather alerts were issued for the day. The forecast had indicated moderate winds. N/A, no prior warning. General training and drills associated with the IESO Emergency Preparedness Plans. Nothing specific to windstorms. The SAIDI duration of this event exceeded the 5 year Threshold and is considered to be unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable or unavoidable. Approximately 5 hours from the first outages (4:40 PM) No No. A total of 5 ?Media Releases? were issued via email to media outlets for distribution and posted to our Public web page however we did not speculate on ETR. In general terms major events such as this trigger a discussion by Operations staff where we identify aspects that worked well and those that can be improved upon. A recent example is using Technical staff from outside the Line area to mobilize and investigate reports of line down in an effort to identify whether the line is ours or another utility. This preliminary assessment is then used to help prioritize and the Power Line Technicians can devote more of their time in troubleshooting and repairs. Our Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are revised to reflect changes. The SOP was last revised in January 2016, this specific major event did not result in revisions to the SOP. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2017 15-Jun-2017 11-Jun-2017 Yes, a severe thunderstorm watch and a severe thunderstorm warning was issued by The Weather Network via email. No. General training and drills associated with the IESO Emergency Preparedness Plans, nothing specific to lightning. The SAIDI duration of this event exceeded the 5 year Threshold and is considered to be unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable or unavoidable. Approximately 1 hour. No. No. No. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2017 12-Sep-2017 02-Aug-2017 Yes, severe thunderstorm warning was issued by the weather network. No General training and drills associated with the IESO Emergency Preparedness Plan. No training specific to lightning. The SAIDI duration of this event exceeded the 5 year average threshold and is considered to be unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable and unavoidable. Approximately 2 hours. No No Outage review meetings. Determine ways we can restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2018 11-Oct-2018 21-Sep-2018 6:55 AM Yes - Environment Canada issued various statements leading up to the event. Yes - PUC Distribution made arrangements to have additional field and operation resources on standby. PUC Distribution also has a standby schedule for management staff who are required to be available on a round the clock basis. Yes - PUC Distribution has an established training program for Major Events. PUC has a comprehensive Preparedness and Restoration Plan that is continually being updated. In addition to the plan, a meeting is held annually with the emergency response team to review the emergency plan and any updates. The training process entails a review of the plan, ensuring all contact information is up to date, and to address any questions from the team. The weather event on September 21 was consistent with the OEB definition of a "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable or unavoidable. Approximately 1.5 hours. No No Outage review meetings to determine ways we can restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2018 23-Oct-2018 04-Oct-2018 00:38 AM Yes - Environment Canada issued various statements leading up to the event. Yes - PUC Distribution made arrangements to have additional field and operation resources on standby. PUC Distribution has a standby schedule for management staff who are required to be available on a 24/7 basis. PUC Distribution has a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness and Restoration Plan that is continually being updated. In addition to the plan, a meeting is held annually with the emergency response team to review the emergency plan and any updates. The training process entails a review of the plan, ensure all contact information is up-to-date, and to address any questions from the team. The weather event of October 4th was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable or unavoidable. Approximately 5.5 hours. No No Outage review meetings to determine ways we can restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2018 02-Nov-2018 26-Oct-2018 1:54 AM No No PUC Distribution has a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness and Restoration Plan that is continually being updated. In addition to the plan, a meeting is held annually with the emergency response team to review the emergency plan and any updates. The training process entails a review of the plan, ensure all contact information is up-to-date, and to address any questions from the team. Foreign interference event of October 26th was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that is "beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable or unavoidable. Approximately 1 hour and 33 minutes. No No Outage review meetings to determine ways we can restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2019 15-Feb-2019 04-Feb-2019 1:35 PM Yes - Environment Canada issued various statements leading up to the event. Yes - PUC made arrangements to have additional field and operations resources on standby. PUC has a standby schedule for management staff who are required to be available on a 24/7 basis. Yes - PUC has an established training program for Major Events. The weather event of February 4th was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable. Approximately 3.2 hours. No No Outage review meetings were held to determine ways to restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2019 20-Feb-2019 08-Feb-2019 04:11 AM Yes - Environment Canada issued various statements leading up to the event. Yes - PUC made arrangements to have additional field and operation resources on standby. PUC has a standby schedule for management staff who are required to be available on 24/7 basis. Yes - PUC has an established training program for Major Events. the weather event of February 8th was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" ( as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable. Approximately 1.56 Hours No No Outage review meetings were held to determine ways to restore power sooner. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2019 25-Sep-2019 05-Sep-2019 4:18 pm No No General training and drills associated with the IESO Emergency Preparedness Plans are executed throughout the year. The event of September 5th is consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB?s Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable and unpreventable; or avoidable Approximately 3.02 Hours No No Outage review meetings was held PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2019 09-Dec-2019 15-Mar-2019 12:07 AM No No General training and drills associated with the PUC/IESO Emergency Preparedness Plans are executed throughout the year. The event of March 15th is consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB?s Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable and unpreventable; or unavoidable. Approximately 1.7 Hours No No Outage review meetings were held to determine if there are any opportunities for improvement. No opportunities to improve were identified. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2019 20-Dec-2019 27-Nov-2019 06:53 AM Yes, weather forecast indicated high winds and snow. Yes, we had prior warning and we had employees on standby. This major event occurred on November 27th in which we had a full complement of staff working. General training and drills associated with the IESO Emergency Preparedness Plans are executed throughout the year. The event of November 27th is consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that "is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable and unpreventable; or avoidable". Approximately 4 hours, although there were multiple times where the majority of customers were restored. Mutual assistance was not utilized during the outage. No estimated restoration times were given, but as service was restored real time customer restoration numbers are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement. Outage review meetings are being held, and mock outages are part of an ongoing action plan to try and improve outage times and staff proficiency. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2020 21-Feb-2020 30-Dec-2019 17:37 Yes Yes, the weather forecast indicated high winds and snow Yes, PUC had prior warnings and had employees on standby. This major event occurred on December 30th, where we had a full complement of staff working. Winter wind, snow and ice storm 21km winds, freezing rain caused major damage to trees with ice build up Yes, mutual assistance was utilized from staff and equipment from Espanola Hydro during the outage. PUC also contracted tree arborist external parties to assist us, 17 Trees Inc. and Asplundh, to deal with the falling/ damaged trees. During this extensive outage, our top priority was our Vulnerable Persons Registry (VPR), consisting of approximately 60 customers. If an outage is set to exceed the allotted threshold in the system for a registrant, we advise our partners and they follow the agreement set out by VPR accordingly. Estimated restoration times were not given, but as service was restored in real time, customer restoration numbers were released to traditional, social media outlets, radio and the utility website during the duration of the outage until all customers were restored. Adverse Weather-Freezing rain/Ice storm Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 21913 65 No Yes Process improvements No Yes No A process improvement committee was developed to determine if improvements could be learned from this outage. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2020 20-Nov-2020 29-Sep-2020 04:15 PM Yes The weather forecasted heavy rain and wind. This major event occurred on September 29th in which we had a full complement of staff working. September 29th 2020 at 4:15 pm, Sault Ste Marie experienced heavy rain and moderate winds that PUC believes is the contributing factor to the outage that triggered a Major Event which meets the definition of Adverse Weather as outlined in table 15.2 in section 2.1.4.2.5 of the Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements. It took approximately 2.5 hours to restore 90% of the customers who were interrupted. No estimated restoration times were given but as service was restored real time customer restoration numbers are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 15597 46 No No Others No Yes No Outage review meetings are being held, and mock outages are part of an ongoing action plan to try and improve outage times and staff proficiency. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2021 29-Jul-2021 18-Jun-2021 14:39 No The cause of the major event was a motor vehicle accident. Foreign interference event on June 18th was consistent with the OEB definition of "Major Event" (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB's Electrical Reporting and Recording Keeping Requirements). A motor vehicle accident at the intersection of market St and South Market caused extensive damage to multiple poles that caused an outage to PUC's 35Kv system and the 12Kv system. 9.5% of customers effected and approximately 2 hours and 22 minutes to restore 90% of our customers power. No estimated restoration times were given but as service was restored real time customer restoration numbers are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 3215 9.5 No No Others No Outage review meetings are being held and mock outages are part of an ongoing action plan to try and improve outage times and staff proficiency. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2021 07-Sep-2021 11-Aug-2021 17:18 No n/a On August 11, 2021, severe thunderstorms moved across all of Northern Ontario. These major thunderstorms caused major outages to Hydro One which in turn caused a Loss of Supply for ERHDC at approximately 17:18pm. 100% of the customers were without power from 17:18 to 17:34. At that time 84% of customers had their power restored with the remaining customers restored at 18:32. n/a Loss of Supply No, used fixed percentage (i.e., 10% of customers affected) No 3375 100 Yes No No further action is required at this time No n/a PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2021 13-Sep-2021 29-Aug-2021 12:40 No Lighting event on Aug 29th is consistent with the OEB definition of “Major Event” (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB’s Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements). No estimated restoration times were given but as service was restored real time customer restoration numbers are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 10255 28.5 No No No further action is required at this time No Post outage review meetings are held after any major event outages are part of an ongoing action plan to try and improve outage times and staff proficiency. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2022 12-Oct-2022 28-Aug-2022 06:39 No Lighting on Aug 28 is consistent with the OEB definition of “Major Event” (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB’s Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements). No estimated restoration times were given but as service was restored real time customer restoration numbers are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 7140 20.95 No No No further action is required at this time No Post outage review meetings are held after any major event outages are part of an ongoing action plan to try and improve outage times and staff proficiency. PUC Distribution Inc. PUC Distribution Inc. 2023 08-May-2023 05-Apr-2023 02:08 Yes Yes, PUC Distribution received weather warnings for rain and possible lightning. Yes, Additional staff on placed Standby. Line Department and Management staff are standby 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We added additional Line Department Staff on standby. The Electric System Operator and Substation Electricians were also added on standby. A lightning strike initiated a trip on one 12.47kV feeder and simultaneously struck a sky wire owned by a neighbouring Utility that fell on the 34.5kV Sub Transmission line that knocked out power to two additional Distribution Substations. Lightning on April 5th is consistent with the OEB definition of “Major Event” (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of the OEB’s Electrical Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements). Approximately 5 hours and 35 minutes to restore 90% of our affected customers. The outage happened in the middle of the night. No estimated restoration times were given but as service was restored, the number of customers restored are released to media outlets and the utility website. We also notify Vulnerable Persons Registrants if the outage duration will exceed allowable timelines spelled out in the VPR agreement. Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 5984 17.5 No No Additional staff training No Yes No Post outage review meetings are held after any major event outage as part of an ongoing action plan to improve outage times and staff proficiency. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. 2017 06-Apr-2017 20-Dec-2016 No. n/a n/a The event occured as a result of high winds and heavy snow which caused a tree to fall on a primary line connected to our F3 feeder which supplies the urban population of Sioux Lookout. This event was unforeseeable. It took 1:45 to restore 100% of the customers No Yes through phone calls and facebook Line patrols, tree trimming Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. 2017 04-May-2017 20-Jul-2016 No n/a n/a The event occured as a result of loss of supply from Hydro One and was an unexpected outage. 5.34 hours No No, since Hydro One was reporting updates on the local radio. HOwever we were answering customer inquiries at our office until the power was restored. none Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. 2017 18-May-2017 17-May-2017 No n/a n/a The event occured as a result of loss of supply from Hydro One and was an unexpected outage. 100% were restored at the same time - 6 hours No. Not our outage. Yes, through Facebook and it was broadcast on the local radio. None since the outage was caused by Hydro One. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. 2018 12-Feb-2018 18-Oct-2017 01:31 PM No N/A N/A This event was considered a major event due to the SAIDI/day exceeding the TMed calculation. Only 239 customers were affected, however the outage lasted almost nine hours due to the extent of the damage. 8.82 hours No Yes, through Facebook N/A Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. Sioux Lookout Hydro Inc. 2021 22-Jul-2021 23-Jun-2021 07:49 PM No Sioux Lookout experienced a severe storm on June 23, 2021. Comments on 4. Staff is trained to respond to storms. Management is responsible for implementing the Mutual Assistance Agreements when deemed necessary. On June 23, 2021 Sioux Lookout experienced a severe storm that environment Canada classified as a downburst. Winds were gauged at approximately 111 km/hour and the Municipality declared a state of emergency. The storm caused significant damage to all areas of our service territory and resulted in numerous downed trees on power lines, broken poles and downed lines. Synergy North Hydro One Facebook was used to inform customers during the entire restoration process. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2883 100 No Yes Process improvements No Sioux Lookout Hydro will investigate any process improvements that could be implemented as a result of this experience based on debriefing meetings with operations staff. This was the first time the Northwest has utilized its Mutual Assistance Agreement. Synergy North Corporation Thunder Bay Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc. 2018 22-Mar-2018 05-Dec-2017 04:25 AM Thunder Bay Hydro received short term notice of adverse weather expected in the area by Environment Canada; however the outages in consideration were actually caused by the galloping of conductors, and this was not possible to forecast. Thunder Bay Hydro regularly schedules staff to be available on standby regardless of the possibility of a Major Event Day (MED) occurring. This staffing schedule includes one line supervisor, two field staff (on call) and a system control operator on duty. When the first outages began on the day of the event (December 5th 2017 at approx. 4:30am) the on call staff were called in to assist. By 8am the full complement of staff available to Thunder Bay Hydro was deployed to assist with outages. Yes, Thunder Bay Hydro last reviewed its Emergency Preparedness Plan in detail on November 13, 2017. On December 5th, 2017, Thunder Bay and its surrounding areas experienced a period of moderately severe winter weather which was predicted with some advance warning given typical weather trends for the area at that time of year. What was not foreseeable, predictable, preventable or avoidable, was the resonant condition of harmonic motion at the specific wind speed and direction (West at 50-70km/h), which caused extreme galloping of Thunder Bay Hydro?s conductors. This extreme galloping was at a level reported by the experienced field staff, not witnessed in more than 30 years of service. The galloping of conductors caused phases to make contact with each other, and breakers to open (more than 120 breaker operations in a single day). This frenzy of breaker activity and dangerous field condition handicapped Thunder Bay Hydro?s ability to make progress restoring customers until late in the afternoon when wind conditions had changed. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9PvgWIhenZo The number of customer minutes of outage experienced in this one day, nearly doubled Thunder Bay Hydro?s SAIDI compared to the remainder of the year (from 1.86 to 3.44) It took approximately 9.5 Hours to restore 90% of Thunder Bay Hydro customers (based on the duration of the level 2 emergency). No Yes, Thunder Bay Hydro did issue estimated times of restoration through its internet Outage Map (https://www.tbhydro.on.ca/support/power-outage/outage-map/), IVR, and Social Media Accounts (Twitter & Facebook). Local Media inquiries were responded to promptly to ensure news reports were accurate. Thunder Bay Hydro is reviewing its communication methods, crew deployment strategies, and key switch locations as a result of this adverse weather storm Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. 2017 11-May-2017 28-May-2016 No as this was related to an animal contact. Not applicable Subsequent to this Major Event, Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. (THI) developed ?Communication Plan? to assist communications of a large outage. THI, in conjunction with the Town of Tillsonburg has an Emergency Response Plan for outages resulting from emergency situations. Operations and On-Call staff had been trained on the emergency response (not applicable in this case), however as the communication plan was not in place, training was not available prior to this event.. THI uses a fixed percentage approach to identify ?Major Events?. This major event impacted 2,400 customers (33.7%) of our customers for a period of 2 hours. This constitutes a Major Event under the THI thresholds. As this outage was the result of 1 feeder being impacted by an animal contact 100% of the customers were restored at the 2 hour mark. Third party mutual assistance was not warranted as this related to 1 feeder and one area of damage. No ETR was provided to the public. While foreign interference (animal contact) can?t explicitly be prepared for, analysis of this event has driven a review of our response plan and communication plans. THI has also identified system upgrades that will minimize future outages from a loss of a feeder. Feeder ties are currently in the capital budget to provide a more robust distribution network. Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. 2017 28-Jun-2017 16-May-2017 No, Tillsonburg Hydro did not have any prior notices for the major event as it was related to equipment failure. N/A As this event was not a pre-notified event, no specific training for response had been discussed. As this equipment failure was on one of Tillsonburg Hydro feeders, when the fault occurred power to approximately 3,200 (approx. 45% of customers) for 1 hours and 20 minutes. This falls within our more than 1 hours for more than 25% of Tillsonburg Hydro Customers It took 1 hour and 20 minutes to restore power to more than 90% of the customers (all but 1 customer was picked up in this time) No No as the fix was simple and was not anticipated to take long to restore power to the majority of customers. The faulty equipment was a porcelain switch. Through the 2017 capital budgeting process, porcelain switches are being replaced. It will take a few years to work through all porcelain switches and insulators within Tillsonburg Hydro's territory. Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. Tillsonburg Hydro Inc. 2017 29-Nov-2017 28-Oct-2017 03:15 am No, the Major Event was a result of a vehicle hitting a pole as a result no prior warning was available. Not applicable Staff are trained for major outages with pre-notification. Operations staff know who to call to get extra resources and call center staff are trained on how to respond large scale outages Tillsonburg Hydro had greater than 10% of our customers without power for greater than 2 hours. These metrics make this event a "Major Event" in our reporting. It took 5: 45 minutes to get 100% of the customers restored with power. Tillsonburg Hydro did not get above 90% until the 100% was achieved. No, Tillsonburg Hydro did not utilize a 3rd party mutual assistance agreement. No, Tillsonburg Hydro did not issue any ETRs to the public. Re-engineering of the system is being discussed to minimize the number of customers impacted and the duration. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2017 14-Dec-2017 15-Oct-2017 At approxi Yes ? Environment Canada issued various weather statements leading up to the event and Toronto Hydro was actively monitoring the weather. Toronto Hydro made arrangements to have additional field and operations resources on shift at the predicted time of the event. Toronto Hydro has a standby schedule for senior management and supervisory staff who are required to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. Yes ? Toronto Hydro has an established training program for Major Events. Relevant training is executed throughout the year. The weather event of October 15, 2017 was consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable?. Toronto Hydro received a significantly higher volume of calls from the public relative to a typical day. The impact of the weather event on the distribution system was unavoidable and practically unpredictable from a planning perspective. The reliability impact of the weather event met the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366 definition of a Major Event Day (MED) as ?a day in which the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) exceeds a Major Event Day threshold value?. SAIDI for the weather event was 8.52, exceeding Toronto Hydro?s threshold of 6.83. 12 hours. No. Yes ? Toronto Hydro issued ETRs to the public via: 1.General Media Updates (i.e., Toronto Hydro?s dedicated phone line for all media enquiries); 2.Social Media (i.e., Twitter); 3.E-mail updates to the Mayor?s Office; 4.Toronto Hydro?s Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system; and 5.Updates to the outage map on Toronto Hydro?s website. Toronto Hydro via its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. In addition, Toronto Hydro routinely reviews design and construction standards and practices that support distribution system resiliency to mitigate risks associated with Major Events. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2018 01-Jun-2018 04-Apr-2018 09.46 AM Yes also? Environment Canada issued various weather statements leading up to the event. Toronto Hydro received updates from the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) and was actively monitoring the weather. Toronto Hydro made arrangements to have additional field and operations resources on shift at the predicted time of the event and requested an extension of shift as required. Toronto Hydro has a standby schedule for senior management and supervisory staff who are required to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. Yes ? Toronto Hydro has an established training program for Major Events. Relevant training is executed throughout the year. The weather event of April 4, 2018 was consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable?. Toronto Hydro received a significantly higher volume of calls from the public relative to a typical day. The impact of the weather event on the distribution system was unavoidable and practically unpredictable from a planning perspective. The reliability impact of the weather event met the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366 definition of a Major Event Day (MED) as ?a day in which the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) exceeds a Major Event Day threshold value?. SAIDI for the weather event was 8.81 exceeding Toronto Hydro?s threshold of 7.18. 7.5 hours No. Yes ? Toronto Hydro issued ETRs to the public via: 1.General Media Updates (i.e. Toronto Hydro?s dedicated phone line for all media enquiries) and 2.Social Media (i.e. Twitter) Toronto Hydro via its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. In addition, Toronto Hydro routinely reviews design and construction standards and practices that support distribution system resiliency to mitigate risks associated with Major Events. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2018 15-Jun-2018 15-Apr-2018 14:00 hour Yes. From April 11, 2018 to April 15, 2018, Toronto Hydro received various weather statements and notifications of a potentially extreme weather event from the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC), Environment Canada, and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO). Yes. Toronto Hydro had additional field and operations resources on shift at the predicted time of the event. The Toronto Hydro Incident Management Team was activated prior to the event and regular calls were held throughout the weekend of April 14 and April 15. Toronto Hydro has a standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restorations. Due to the expected potential severity of the event, Toronto Hydro also engaged additional crews and contractors to be available on standby. Yes. Toronto Hydro has an established training program for the management of major events with relevant training being executed throughout the year. Toronto Hydro has adopted the Ontario Incident Management System, the provincial recommended practice for incident management, which forms the basis for the Toronto Hydro?s training curriculum for emergency management. Toronto Hydro?s command and general staff are trained on incident management system (IMS 100, IMS 200 and IMS 300) in addition to exercising emergency plans. The weather event of April 15 was consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable?. Toronto Hydro received a significantly higher volume of calls from the public relative to a typical day. The impact of the weather event on the distribution system was unavoidable and practically unpredictable from a planning perspective. The reliability impact of the weather event met the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366 definition of a Major Event Day (MED) as ?a day in which the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) exceeds a Major Event Day threshold value?. SAIDI for the weather event was 12.03, exceeding Toronto Hydro?s threshold of 7.18. It took approximately 12.5 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. No. Yes. Toronto Hydro issued ETRs to the public via: 1.General Media Updates (i.e., Toronto Hydro?s dedicated phone line for all media enquiries). 2.Social Media (i.e., Twitter). 3.Email updates to the Mayor?s Office. 4.Toronto Hydro?s Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. 5.Updates to the outage map on Toronto Hydro?s website. Through its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program, Toronto Hydro develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. Toronto Hydro is also an active and participating member of two mutual assistance groups: the Canadian Mutual Assistance Group (CANMAG) and the North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group (NAMAG). In addition, Toronto Hydro routinely reviews design and construction standards and practices that support distribution system resiliency to help mitigate risks associated with Major Events. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2018 04-Jul-2018 04-May-2018 10.06 hour Yes. Toronto Hydro received various weather statements and notifications from Environment Canada and Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC). Yes. Toronto Hydro had additional field and operations resources on shift at the predicted time of the event and requested and requested an extension of shifts as deemed necessary. Toronto Hydro has a standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restorations. Due to the expected potential severity of the event, Toronto Hydro also engaged additional crews and contractors to be available on standby. Yes. Toronto Hydro has an established training program for the management of major events with relevant training being executed throughout the year. Toronto Hydro has adopted the Ontario Incident Management System, the provincial recommended practice for incident management, which forms the basis for Toronto Hydro?s training curriculum for emergency management. Toronto Hydro?s command and general staff are trained on incident management system (IMS 100, IMS 200 and IMS 300) in addition to exercising emergency plans. The weather event of May 4, 2018 was consistent with the OEB definition of ?Major Event? (as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements) as an event that ?is beyond the control of the distributor and is unforeseeable; unpredictable; unpreventable; or unavoidable?. This event was unavoidable and unpreventable and Toronto Hydro received a significantly higher volume of calls from the public relative to a typical day. In addition, the reliability impact of the weather event met the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1366 definition of a Major Event Day (MED) as ?a day in which the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) exceeds a Major Event Day threshold value?. It took approximately 26 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. No. A global ETR was not issued. When available, Toronto Hydro issued individual/local ETRs to customers and other stakeholders through: 1.Social Media (i.e., Twitter); 2.Updates to the outage map on Toronto Hydro?s website; 3.E-mail updates to the Mayor?s Office and Councillors; 4.Customer Care Representatives and Key Account Representatives; and 5.Toronto Hydro?s Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. Through its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program, Toronto Hydro develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. Toronto Hydro is also an active and participating member of two mutual assistance groups: the Canadian Mutual Assistance Group (CANMAG) and the North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group (NAMAG). In addition, Toronto Hydro routinely reviews design and construction standards and practices that support distribution system resiliency to help mitigate risks associated with Major Events. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2018 14-Aug-2018 13-Jun-2018 16:17 PM Yes. Toronto Hydro received various weather statements and notifications from Environment Canada and Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC). Yes. Toronto Hydro had additional field and operations resources on duty at the predicted time of the event and requested shift extensions as necessary. Toronto Hydro has a standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restorations. Due to the expected severity of the event, Toronto Hydro also engaged additional crews and contractors to be available, if required. Yes. Toronto Hydro has an established training program for the management of major events with relevant training being executed throughout the year. Toronto Hydro has adopted the Ontario Incident Management System, the provincial recommended practice for incident management, which forms the basis for Toronto Hydro?s training curriculum for emergency management. Toronto Hydro?s command and general staff are trained on incident management systems (IMS 100, IMS 200 and IMS 300) in addition to exercising emergency plans. The weather event was consistent with the definition of a ?Major Event? as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements. This includes events that are beyond the control of the distributor, take significantly longer than usual to repair, and affect a substantial number of customers. The event was unavoidable and unpreventable and Toronto Hydro experienced greater than normal call volume. It took approximately 7 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. Mutual assistance was not utilized. Yes, Toronto Hydro issued global ETRs to the public via general media updates (i.e., Toronto Hydro?s dedicated phone line for all media enquiries) and social media (Twitter). In addition, individual/local ETRs were communicated, as available, via: 1 .Updates to the outage map on Toronto Hydro?s website; 2 .Engagement by Customer Care Representatives and Key Account Representatives; and 3. Toronto Hydro?s Interactive Voice Response (IVR) phone system. Through its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program, Toronto Hydro develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. Toronto Hydro is also an active and participating member of two mutual assistance groups: the Canadian Mutual Assistance Group (CANMAG) and the North Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group (NAMAG).In addition, Toronto Hydro routinely reviews design and construction standards and practices that support distribution system resiliency to help mitigate risks associated with major events. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2018 28-Sep-2018 28-Jul-2018 00:39 AM Toronto Hydro did not have prior warning. This event was due to a Loss of Supply at the Finch Transmission Station operated by our transmission partner. As stated above, Toronto Hydro did not have prior warning. However, the organization maintains standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. Yes. Toronto Hydro has an established training program for the management of Major Events with relevant training being executed throughout the year. The Ontario Incident Management System (IMS), the provincial recommended practice for incident management, forms the basis for Toronto Hydro?s training curriculum for emergency management. Toronto Hydro?s command and general staff are trained on IMS (IMS 100, IMS 200 and IMS 300) in addition to exercising emergency plans. The event was consistent with the definition of a ?Major Event? as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB?s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements. This includes events that are beyond the control of the distributor, take significantly longer than usual to repair, and affect a substantial number of customers. The event was unforeseeable, unavoidable and unpreventable and Toronto Hydro experienced greater than normal call volume. It took approximately 14 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. Mutual assistance was not utilized. Toronto Hydro did not issue an ETR because it was not determined by nor available to Toronto Hydro. Through its Disaster Preparedness Management (DPM) program, Toronto Hydro develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. In addition, Toronto Hydro reviews contingency readiness of feeders and where needed, install new feeder ties or upgrade existing manual switches with SCADA capability for quick response to transfer load. The organization?s asset renewal program reviews configuration of the distribution system and makes additional upgrades or improvements where needed to minimize reliability impact of events such as Loss of Supply. Toronto Hydro also maintains a close working relationship with its transmission partner to better understand its systems and operations. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2020 04-Sep-2020 08-Jul-2020 14:43 PM No Toronto Hydro did not have prior warning of the adverse weather event (the “Major Event”). Environment Canada issued an alert for a Tornado Watch at 2:53 pm on July 8, 2020. Toronto Hydro started experiencing outages between 3:00-3:30 pm thereafter. Once the utility became aware of Environment Canada’s alert, it deployed crews, from its Trouble Response, Forestry and Control Centre departments, to assist with the storm response. In addition, a number of employees from the Customer Care department were deployed to handle customer calls. Lastly, on a general basis, Toronto Hydro maintains a standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be readily available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. Environment Canada issued an alert for a Tornado Watch at 2:53 pm on July 8, 2020. Toronto Hydro started experiencing outages between 3:00-3:30 pm thereafter. The restoration took approximately 5 hours and 26 minutes to restore 90% of the customers that were interrupted. Toronto Hydro engaged with its customers on social media, during which restoration updates and safety information were shared. The estimated times of restoration were also shared on Toronto Hydro’s outage map and the IVR. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 54253 7 No No Others No Toronto Hydro monitors the weather through email notifications from the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre, Environment Canada and The Weather Company weather notification application. Toronto Hydro's response to this type of Major Event i.e. an adverse weather event, is managed through the utility’s Disaster Preparedness Management program. This Program prepares the utility to safely, effectively, and efficiently respond to a wide-range of large-scale emergencies and extreme weather. The Program delivers the governance, planning and training that enables Toronto Hydro to mobilize and deploy its resources rapidly and effectively during and following disasters in order to mitigate the public safety, reliability and financial-related risks that can materialize at those critical times. Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2022 20-Jul-2022 21-May-2022 12:45 PM No Toronto Hydro did not have prior warning of the severe wind storm (the “Major Event”). While Toronto Hydro did arrange to have additional forestry crews on standby over the May long weekend because of the weather forecast showing a risk of thunderstorms, it did not arrange for any additional overhead resources since the available weather forecasts provided no prior warning of the Major Event. Toronto Hydro maintains a standby schedule requiring senior management, supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. This standby schedule was in place and operationalized during the Major Event. On May 21, 2022, at approximately 12:45 p.m., a major storm with wind gusts as high as 120 kilometres per hour swept through Toronto Hydro’s service territory. The extreme winds caused substantial damage to vegetation, which in turn damaged overhead distribution wires and equipment. Toronto Hydro declared a Level 2 emergency in response to these system impacts and the exceptionally high volume of trouble calls it received. N/A Toronto Hydro used several forums to engage with customers. Toronto Hydro shared frequent updates on Twitter that detailed restoration updates and safety information. Toronto Hydro also communicated outage boundaries through the Toronto Hydro mobile app and the online outage map (except for a period of time when the outage map was unavailable due to technical issues). Between Saturday, May 21 and Wednesday, May 25, Toronto Hydro issued the following types of updates for customers on Twitter: • Status updates on restoration efforts, including customer counts • Safety tips, especially relating to downed wires • Reminders to help keep crews safe • Damage assessments and challenges in the field (severe damage to electrical equipment, fallen trees and wires, etc.) • Breakdowns of the restoration process • Homeowners’ responsibilities following storms (i.e. how to address damaged customer-owned equipment) Toronto Hydro’s usual communication channels, including live chat, were also available to customers. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 142000 18 No No Process improvements No No No An After-Action Review process was conducted following Toronto Hydro’s response to the Major Event. This process engaged stakeholders who participated in restoration activities to review Toronto Hydro’s response, identify any opportunities for continuous improvement and action these opportunities as applicable. Toronto Hydro also strives for continuous improvement in the area of Major Event preparedness through its Disaster Preparedness Management program. This program aims to prepare the company to better respond to a wide range of large-scale emergencies by optimizing processes to enhance continuity of the organization's functionality in all types of disruptions. Disaster preparedness activities include, but are not limited to, the following: • All-hazard disaster planning — plans outline incident response structures, roles and responsibilities, and communication, logistics and customer engagement strategies • Employee emergency role assignment and training • Emergency response process improvements • System implementation and optimization • Scenario-based emergency exercising/testing Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited 2024 12-Sep-2024 16-Jul-2024 11:41 AM No As the Major Event was initiated by a Loss of Supply, Toronto Hydro did not have any prior warning that the Major Event would occur. This Major Event was initiated by a cause code 2.1 Loss of Supply Transmission. In July, 2024, Toronto experienced unprecedented rainfall totaling over 208mm. Nearly half of this occurred on July 16, 2024, when 100mm of rain fell, marking the fifth largest rainfall in the city’s recorded history. This resulted in severe flooding throughout the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Manby TS, a Hydro One Networks Inc. (HONI) transmission station on the west end of the GTA, experienced significant flooding in all four relay room basements, resulting in the maloperation of several protection systems. This removed multiple 230kV and 115kV transmission lines from service at 11:41 am, resulting in the disconnection of nine different Toronto Hydro transformer stations throughout the city and the interruption of approximately 878 MW of power, impacting over 200,000 Toronto Hydro customers. No additional comments. Toronto Hydro used several forums to engage with customers. Toronto Hydro shared frequent updates on Facebook, Instagram, and X/Twitter that detailed restoration updates. Toronto Hydro also communicated outage boundaries through the Toronto Hydro mobile app and through its online outage map. Between Tuesday, July 16 and Wednesday, July 17, Toronto Hydro issued the following types of updates for customers on social media: • Status updates on restoration efforts, including customer counts • Damage assessments and challenges in the field (e.g., flooding of stations) • Breakdowns of the restoration process Toronto Hydro’s usual communication channels, including online live chat, were also available to customers. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 207000 26 Yes No Others No Toronto Hydro recently collaborated with Hydro One Networks Inc. (HONI) to conduct an operations-based workshop aimed at enhancing protocols for major incident communication between their operations centres. Additionally, HONI will undertake a Post-Event Investigation and will share any relevant recommendations and actions with Toronto Hydro upon completion. Furthermore, Toronto Hydro is conducting its own review of the event to identify further opportunities to bolster resilience. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2017 26-Apr-2017 16-Aug-2016 Weather service warning of high winds and thunderstorms in the area. extra employee were available due to weather forecasts. no arrangement were required, just aware employees. General training in emergency preparedness and situational awareness. Not within Wasaga Distribution's control and it exceeded IEEE Standard 1366 threshold. 5.75 Hours. Yes. We used a private contractor. No. We were well prepared. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2017 26-Apr-2017 26-Dec-2016 Weather service warning No. Emergency response training. Outside of Wasaga Distribution Control. Exceeded IEEE Standard 1366 threshold. 3.75 hrs. No. No Review fuse coordination. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2017 26-Apr-2017 17-Jan-2017 Weather service forecast was calling for Freezing rain. No extras on duty, however employees were aware of weather forecast. Emergency preparedness training. Outside of Wasaga Distribution's control. Exceeded IEEE 1366 Standard. 1.5 hours. No. No. None are being taken. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2017 26-Apr-2017 20-Jun-2016 Yes, weather warning of high winds and wind gusts in the area. No, as this was during normal working hours. General training in emergency preparedness. Was outside of Wasaga Distribution's control and met the IEEE Standard 1366 threshold. .67 hours to restore 90% No. No.. Confirmed existing capital and maintenance programs are where they need to be. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2018 27-Nov-2018 13-Nov-2018 05:49 AM Wasaga Distribution was aware that a wet snow accumulation warning had been issued from the short term weather forecast. The snow began during the night of November 13, 2018. Field staff were aware that additional assistance may be required. Wasaga Distribution?s staff is experienced with effects of a wet snow and the responses required. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: ?Major Event? is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable. This wet snow accumulation was beyond the control of the distributor and is both unavoidable and unpreventable. It took 1.35 hours to restore power to more than 90 percent of its customers. Wasaga Distribution did not receive assistance during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution did not issue any general ETR statements to the public during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution has: - Debriefed staff to discuss lessoned learned - Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2019 27-May-2019 16-May-2019 08:11 AM No, the distributor did not have any prior warnings that the Major Event would occur. N/A Wasaga Distribution's (WDI) staff is experienced with the effects of a loss of supply event. Training included the attentive patrolling of both its system as well as the suppliers for potential dangerous situations. The Ontario Energy Board defined a Major Event as: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable The outage was outside the control of the distributor and was both unavoidable and unpreventable and data produced triggered IEEE Standard 1366. It took 56 minutes to restore power to 90% of its customers. Wasaga Distribution did not receive assistance during this Major Event. WDI did not issue any general ETR statements to the public during the Major Event. Once the issue was determined, any calls that came in were given a 15 to 30-minute ETR. Wasaga Distribution has: * Debriefed staff to discuss lessons learned * Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event * Also the situation was discussed with Hydro One (supplier) Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2019 14-Nov-2019 27-Sep-2019 11:24 AM No the distributor did not have any prior warning that the Major Event would occur. N/A Wasaga Distribution Inc's. (WDI) staff is experienced with effects of a loss of supply event. Training included the attentive patrolling of both its system and as well as the suppliers for potential dangerous situations. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: "Major Event" is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable b) Unpredictable c) Unpreventable, or d) Unavoidable The outage was outside the control of WDI and was both unavoidable and unpreventable. WDI consulted with Board Staff, Helen Guo, regarding this event and her response was as follows: "In general, outage caused by vehicle accident is not considered a Major Event because this type of incident normally occurs at a single location, does not cause exceptional/extensive damage to assets and can be restored in a short period of time. However, this specific event can be qualified as a Major Event because the 44kV feeder outage was a Loss of Supply event, and Loss of Supply event can be reported under Major Event category as long as the daily SAIDI passes the threshold. This Major Event can also include the 8kV circuit outage since it occurred during the same time period." It took ten (10) hours to restore power to more than 90% of its' customers who were interrupted. WDI did not receive assistance during the Major Event. WDI did not issue any general ETR statements to the public during the Major Event. WDI has debriefed staff and discussed lessons learned. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2020 24-Nov-2020 23-Oct-2020 17:44 Yes Wasaga Distribution staffs were aware of tornado warning issued by Environment Canada shortly before the event. The warnings were issued for the immediate area through the “Alert Ready” – National Public Alerting System. Regular after-hours crews were on high alert, along with management staff. On October 23, 2020, Environment Canada issued tornado warnings to several regions in Ontario at around 3:30 pm. The warnings included damaging wind gusts, lightning, and the risk of a tornado. The event happened at 5:44 pm on the same day, caused by a large tree that snapped in half contacting the 44kV lines. At the time of the event, the system was fed by one 44kV feeder. Therefore, this tree contact caused most customers to lose power for approximate two and half hours. After a significant investigation, Wasaga Distribution has concluded that the tree contact was caused by the strong winds. The duration of the interruption could have been reduced, however, Hydro One required additional line patrolling to verify lines were clear prior to restoring power to the Hydro One 44 kV feeder. When individual customers called in regarding outages, Wasaga Distribution informed the customers of their known ETR and progress to date. Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 13603 97 No No Staff Training No No No Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2022 12-Feb-2022 11-Dec-2021 15:20 Yes We were somewhat aware through long-range weather forecasts. Wasaga Distribution made sure all equipment was in ready mode, and available personnel was advised of a potential weather event. This outage was outside the control of the distributor and was both unavoidable and unpreventable. Wasaga Distribution had 7,587 customers experience an interruption during the major event which equals to ~50% of its total customer base. N/A Adverse Weather-Wind The IEEE Standard 1366 was used to identify the scope of this Major Event. No 7587 50 No No No further action is required at this time No Yes Yes Wasaga Distribution has: • Debriefed staff to discuss lessons learned • Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2023 21-Feb-2023 23-Dec-2022 16:38 PM Yes WDI was aware that a winter storm warning had been issued by Environment Canada. Snow began during the afternoon of December 23rd. Field staff and management were aware that additional assistance may be required. The Ontario Energy Board has defined a Major Event as: “Major Event” is defined as an event that is beyond the control of the distributor and is: a) Unforeseeable; b) Unpredictable; c) Unpreventable; or d) Unavoidable. This outage was outside the control of the distributor and was both unavoidable and unpreventable. N/A N/A Adverse Weather-Snow Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 7049 47.3 Yes No Others No Yes No Wasaga Distribution has: • implemented an aggressive capital replacement strategy for the coming years, to replace dated and underclassed equipment. • noted that our tree-trimming strategy needs to be reviewed in the coming year. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2024 27-May-2024 02-Apr-2024 21:25 No N/A This outage was caused by high winds resulting in a tree contact. N/A Wasaga Distribution issued updates via social media to the public at the following dates and times: April 2nd – 10:10pm April 2nd – 11:11pm April 3rd – 8:24am Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 5467 35 Yes No Others No Wasaga Distribution has: • Debriefed staff to discuss lessoned learned • Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2024 27-May-2024 06-Apr-2024 2:30:AM No N/A This outage was caused by a car accident no Loss of supply. N/A Wasaga Distribution issued updates via social media to the public at the following dates and times: April 6th – 2:41am April 6th – 3:20am April 6th – 5:44am April 7th – 1:46pm April 7th – 5:06pm Others Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9490 61 No No Others No Wasaga Distribution has: • Debriefed staff to discuss lessoned learned • Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Wasaga Distribution Inc. Wasaga Distribution Inc. 2024 23-Sep-2024 14-Jul-2024 13:22 DST No N/A. The Cause of Interruption was identified as loss of supply as a result of tree contact to Hydro One's lines. NA Wasaga Distribution released information through social media notifying the public of the outage and notified them when the power was restored. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 9284 46 No No Others No Wasaga Distribution has: • Debriefed staff to discuss lessoned learned • Confirmed the existing maintenance and capital programs that assisted in minimizing the customers interrupted during the Major Event. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2018 23-Oct-2018 29-Aug-2018 02:31 am No, Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. Not applicable. Yes. Through daily work, training and preparedness ensures that Wellington North Power Inc.?s Operations staff and equipment are ready to respond when required. Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP) classifies this event as a ?Major Event? based upon the ?Threshold Major Event Day? (TMED) calculation. The TMED calculation for this event was above the previous 5-year historical years outages recorded for WNP. The 5-year historical TMED for Wellington North Power is 13.63698 calculated by: nlog-average ? = (3.26255) nlog-std. deviation ? = 2.35013 ? + ? = 2.61279 TMED = 13.63698 The 5-year historic period (2013 to 2017 inclusive) is used to determine TMED and this threshold is applied during the current (2018) reporting year. For the ?Loss of Supply? event that occurred on August 29th 2018, the calculated the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDA), in minutes, was 229.1025 which is above the 5-year historical TMED amount of 13.63698 as illustrated above. The ?Loss of Supply? event was unforeseeable, unpredictable, unpreventable, unavoidable, unplanned and beyond the control of the distributor. The interruption was caused by a Loss of Supply and consequently 100% of customers? power was restored when the repair was made. 100% of customers? power was restored in 5 hours and 25 minutes. No. Yes, WNP used both its Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC?s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks? Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). The event was a Loss of Supply. The Ontario Grid Control Centre confirmed that the fault was a broken conductor which was interrupting approximately 8 MW of Hydro One and LDC load. Once repairs to the broken conductor was completed the power was restored at 7:56am on August 29th 2018. Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2018 25-Oct-2018 01-Sep-2018 9:35pm No, Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. Not applicable. Yes. Through daily work, training and preparedness ensures that Wellington North Power Inc.?s Operations staff and equipment are ready to respond when required. Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP) classifies this event as a ?Major Event? based upon the ?Threshold Major Event Day? (TMED) calculation. The TMED calculation for this event was above the previous 5-year historical years outages recorded for WNP. The 5-year historical TMED for Wellington North Power is 13.63698 calculated by: nlog-average ? = (3.26255) nlog-std. deviation ? = 2.35013 ? + ? = 2.61279 TMED = 13.63698 The 5-year historic period (2013 to 2017 inclusive) is used to determine TMED and this threshold is applied during the current (2018) reporting year. For the ?Loss of Supply? event that occurred on September 1st 2018, the calculated the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDA), in minutes, was 113.1545 which is above the 5-year historical TMED amount of 13.63698 as illustrated above. The interruption was caused by a Loss of Supply and consequently 100% of customers? power was restored when the repair was made. 100% of customers? power was restored in 2 hours and 40 minutes. No Yes, WNP used both its Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC?s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks? Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). The event was a Loss of Supply. The Ontario Grid Control Centre confirmed that the Hanover M5 feeder was removed from service to enable repairs to the M4 feeder. Power to Hanover M5 feeder was restored at approx. 12:15am on September 2nd 2018 which resulted in restoration of supply to WNP customers in Holstein and Mount Forest. Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2020 09-Dec-2020 05-Nov-2020 6:10 PM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. Hydro One forced the M5 feeder at its’ Hanover Transmission Station (TS) from service in response to reports from Emergency Management Services of a motor vehicle striking a hydro pole with people trapped in vehicle and wires down across vehicle. As per process, for public safety, the M5 feeder remained isolated until line crews arrived on site and made the area safe. As an embedded distributor, Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP), is fed from the Hanover TS. During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Holstein and parts of Mount Forest were without power. Restoration time was 2 hours and 38 minutes (158 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 904 23 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2020 09-Dec-2020 15-Nov-2020 2:27 PM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. As a result of failure of Hydro One’s equipment, there was a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor, Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. On this day, strong winds of over 100 km/h were gusting through Central and Southern Ontario. Hydro One declared a Level 2 Emergency Storm as high winds continued to hammer Southern Ontario and the mid-north. Restoration time was 6 hours and 49 minutes (649 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1129 29 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2020 11-Dec-2020 11-Jan-2020 5:39 PM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission Station (TS) M1 feeder was locked out causing power outages to customers and distributors supplied by this feeder. As an embedded distributor, Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP), is fed from the Fergus TS. During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. Restoration time was 2 hours and 8 minutes (128 minutes) Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1132 29 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2020 11-Dec-2020 12-Jan-2020 2:09 AM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission Station (TS) 44kV line was affected by a downed tree on the line causing partial power to downstream customers and distributors supplied by this feeder. At the time, there was a severe ice storm with freezing rain in the region. As an embedded distributor, Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP), is fed from the Hanover TS. During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Mount Forest had partial power. Restoration time was 6 hours and 45 minutes (405 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1705 44 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2020 11-Dec-2020 17-Mar-2020 10:05 AM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. Hydro One forced a feeder at its’ Hanover Transmission Station (TS) from service in response to reports of a motor vehicle striking a hydro pole with people trapped in vehicle and wires down across vehicle. As per process, for public safety, the feeder remained isolated until line crews arrived on site and made the area safe. As an embedded distributor, Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP), is fed from the Hanover TS. During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Holstein and parts of Mount Forest (east-side) were without power. Restoration time was 2 hours and 36 minutes (156 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 809 21 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2021 08-Jan-2021 16-Dec-2020 2:44 PM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. As a result of downed tree on the Transmission Line from Hydro One’s Transmission Station at Hanover, there was a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Mount Forest was without power. Actual restoration time was 2 hours 48 mins Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2001 52 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2021 01-Jun-2021 04-May-2021 11:04 am No As a result of broken equipment at Hydro One’s Transmission Station at Hanover, there was a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Mount Forest was without power. Restoration time was 1 hour 23 minutes Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 935 24 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2021 04-Oct-2021 07-Sep-2021 5.27 pm Yes Wellington North Power Inc. did have prior warning that there could possibly be wide-spread power outages due to the extreme weather conditions – wind, hail and rain. The LDC did not arrange for extra employee as all the line-crew members were already on standby to be called-in in the event of outages. On the afternoon, the Operations team prepared equipment including fueling trucks and checking chainsaws. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. Supply feed from both Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission station and Palmerston Transmission station were interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Mount Forest and Holstein was without power. The Loss of Supply was likely due to the adverse weather. Prior to and during the Loss of Supply, there was extreme weather consisting of wind, hail and rain. It was later reported that a tornado had touched down south of Mount Forest Restoration took 6 hours and 47 mins (407 minutes) Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2801 71 Yes No No further action is required at this time No No No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2021 04-Oct-2021 14-Sep-2021 10:33 pm No The cause of interruption was Cause Code 4: Lightning. There was a suspected lightning strike on the LDC’s 44kV line in north of Mount Forest causing an arrester to fail which resulted in power outages to customers served by Wellington North Power (WNP) in the areas of Mount Forest and Holstein. Because this lightning strike occurred on a 44kV power line, the line was de-energized to allow crews to make repairs. The line was de-energized to the source feed from Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission station which caused wide-spread outages to the surrounding areas. Hydro One (HONI) crews performed line-switching to restore power to non-LDC customers. Once WNP had made repairs to the line, ensuring it was safe, the LDC notified HONI and waited for the 44 kV line to be safely re-energized. 5 hours and 4 minutes (304 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as provide updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Lightning Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2805 71 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2021 29-Nov-2021 16-Nov-2021 4:38 pm No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. Supply feed from Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Holstein was without power as well as a portion of Mount Forest. The Loss of Supply was due to a broken Hydro One pole at Varney. Restoration time was 1 hour and 45 minutes Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 944 24 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2022 28-Jan-2022 15-Jan-2022 02:55 am No Supply feed from Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission station (feeder M1) was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. The Loss of Supply was due to the 44 kV conductor failing and falling into the underbuilt line along the Sub-Transmission line south of Arthur. Restoration time was 6 hours 45 minutes Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1153 29 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2022 06-Apr-2022 27-Mar-2022 8:19 pm No Supply feed from Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Holstein was without power as well as a portion of Mount Forest. The Loss of Supply was due to downed Hydro One sub transmission wire at Orchardville. For 90% of customers, power was restored to Mount Forest at 12:30 am on March 28, 2022. Outage was 4.18 hours (251 minutes). Power was restored to Holstein at 1:30 am on March 28, 2022. Total outage was 5.28 hours (317 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 941 24 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2022 31-Aug-2022 01-Aug-2022 7:24 pm No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. Supply feed from Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission station M1 feeder was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. The Loss of Supply was due to a Hydro One broken pole that carries the 44 kV sub transmission line at Fergus. Hydro One restored hydro to Arthur at 10:39 pm on August 1, 2022. Outage was 3.25 hours (195 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1190 30 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2022 31-Aug-2022 03-Aug-2022 5:54 pm No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. Supply feed from Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission station M1 feeder was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. The Loss of Supply was due to a Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission station M1 feeder being locked out – this feeder supplies the 44 kV sub transmission line. At the start of the outage, there was a severe storm in the area with strong winds. Hydro One restored hydro to Arthur at 11:28 pm on August 3, 2022. Outage was 5.57 hours (334 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Ontario Grid Control Centre (OGCC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1192 30 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Ontario Grid Control Centre. Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2022 06-Dec-2022 30-Nov-2022 12:16 pm No Supply feed from Hydro One’s Fergus Transmission station M1 feeder was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, WNP’s service territory of Arthur was without power. The Loss of Supply was due to a Hydro One’s Transmission pole being on fire – this transmission line carries the 44 kV sub transmission line. Hydro One restored hydro to Arthur at 2:51 pm on November 30, 2022. Outage was 2.58 hours (155 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One's Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1199 30 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2023 02-Mar-2023 17-Feb-2023 5:53 AM No 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Palmerston Transmission station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, a large section of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. For 90% of customers, power was restored to Mount Forest at 8:29 am on February 17, 2023. Outage was 2.60 hours (156 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1724 42 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2023 01-Sep-2023 03-Aug-2023 9:31 PM No 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Hanover Transmission station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, all of Holstein and a large section of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. The cause was damaged Hydro One equipment – a broken cross-arm and a broken insulator near Neustadt affecting the 44kV supply. For 90% of customers, power was restored to all of Holstein and Mount Forest at 1:35 am on August 4, 2023. Outage was 4.03 hours (242 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from Hydro One Networks’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1635 40 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2023 05-Dec-2023 13-Nov-2023 7:47 pm No The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Palmerston Transmission station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). During the Loss of Supply, a large section (east-side) of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. For 90% of customers, power was restored to Mount Forest at approx. 10:11 pm on November 13, 2023. Outage was 2.40 hours (144 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from HONI’s’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1749 41 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2024 01-Mar-2024 27-Feb-2024 11:16 AM No 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Palmerston Transmission Station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). At the time of the Loss of Supply, there was a severe thunderstorm in the area with lightning. Hydro One reported the cause of the outage was “Palmerston Z bus tripped from bus protection. Cause of the trip was due to a feeder breaker fail operation.” During the Loss of Supply, a large section (east-side and north-west) of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. Power was restored to Mount Forest at 12:52 pm on February 27, 2024. Outage was 1.60 hours (96 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from HONI’s’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1954 45 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2024 05-Jun-2024 22-May-2024 2:43 PM No Wellington North Power Inc. did not have prior warning that the Major Event would occur. The cause of the interruption was Cause Code 6: Adverse weather; Sub-Cause: 6.1 Tree contact weather. During a thunderstorm on May 22, 2024, a large tree branch fell on Wellington North Power Inc.’s (WNP) 44 kV overhead powerline running along Normanby Street North / Wellington Street West in the town of Mount Forest, the distributor’s service area. Consequently, this locked out 3 of the LDC’s substations resulting in a power outage to the town of Mount Forest. As this was the 44 kV powerline, the reclosure tripped at Rothsay therefore de-energizing Hydro One’s transmission line between Rothsay to Mount Forest. WNP hydro crews cleared the fallen tree branch and other branches from its 44 kV powerlines. Once cleared, WNP requested HONI to re-energize the 44 kV powerline section from Rothsay to Mount Forest. HONI re-energized the 44 kV supply and power was restored. At the time of the power outage, there was a severe thunderstorm in the area with strong winds and lightning. For 90% of customers, power was restored to Mount Forest at 3:52 pm on May 22, 2024. Outage was 1.15 hours (69 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from HONI’s’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Adverse Weather-Wind Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1954 45 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2024 08-Aug-2024 29-Jul-2024 11:49 pm No The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Palmerston Transmission Station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). Hydro One reported the cause of the outage was a downed wire at Teviotdale. During the Loss of Supply, a large section (east-side and north-west) of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. For 90%+ of customers, power was restored to Mount Forest at 4:59 am on July 30, 2024. Outage was 5.17 hours (310 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from HONI’s’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 1954 45 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Wellington North Power Inc. Wellington North Power Inc. 2024 29-Oct-2024 08-Oct-2024 5:39 PM No The cause of interruption was Cause Code 2: Loss of Supply. 44kV supply feed from Hydro One’s Palmerston Transmission Station was interrupted resulting in a Loss of Supply to embedded distributor Wellington North Power Inc. (WNP). Hydro One reported the cause of the outage was failed equipment (a broken insulator). During the Loss of Supply, all of Mount Forest (WNP’s service territory) was without power. Outage was 5.00 hours (300 minutes). Yes, WNP used both its’ Twitter and Facebook accounts to post estimation restoration times (ETR) to customers as well as providing updates on the LDC’s website. ETRs were provided to WNP from HONI’s’ Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 Yes 2885 66 Yes No No further action is required at this time No Wellington North Power Inc. will continue to forge good working relations with Hydro One Networks and the Hydro One Integrated System Operating Centre (ISOC). Westario Power Inc. Westario Power Inc. 2021 12-Feb-2021 15-Nov-2020 01:45 pm No Westario Power did not have prior warning. This event was due to a Loss of Supply by Hydro One, our transmission partner. The Loss of Supply was the first indicator of an issue with power in the affected regions. As stated above, Westario Power did not have prior warning. With no advanced warning, no extra employees were engaged. However, the organization maintains standby schedule requiring supervisory and operational staff to be available on a 24/7 basis to support with event restoration. The event was consistent with the definition of a “Major Event” as set out in Section 2.1.4.2 of OEB’s Electricity Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements. This includes events that are beyond the control of the distributor, take significantly longer than usual to repair, and affect a substantial number of customers. The event was unforeseeable, unavoidable and unpreventable and Westario experienced greater than normal call volume. It took approximately 18 hours to restore 60% of the affected customers, and approximately 20 hours to restore 90% of the affected customers. Please note that customers were restored over multiple steps. Westario Power did not issue an ETR because it was not determined by nor available during the event. Updates on the outage were communicated to customers and media when new information was available to Westario Power. Loss of Supply Yes, used IEEE Standard 1366 No 9613 40 Yes No No further action is required at this time No No No Through its Emergency Preparedness program, Westario Power develops, implements and sustains a state of emergency readiness and response proficiency. In addition, Westario’s asset renewal program reviews configuration of the distribution system and makes additional upgrades or improvements where needed to minimize reliability impact of events such as Loss of Supply. Westario Power also maintains a close working relationship with its transmission partner, Hydro One, to better understand its systems and operations.